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ABSTRACT 
SUPPORT OF POLICE CONSOLIDATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
PERCEIVED COMPLEXITY 
John C. Reed, Jr. 
May 11,2013 
This dissertation is an examination of how police officers' perceptions of the 
complexity in merging Organizational Change Components (OCCs) related to the 
consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police (LOP) and Jefferson County Police 
Department (JCPD) in 2003 impact support for police consolidation. This study focused 
on five primary OCCs: 1) culture(s), 2) policies and procedures, 3) communications, 4) 
collective bargaining contracts, and 5) re-defining patrol division boundaries. 
The population consisted of officers who were currently employed by the 
Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) and were affiliated with either the fonner 
LOP or the JCPD in 2003 when these departments were merged to form LMPD. The 
entire population of 669 police officers was invited to participate in this study and 
complete a survey. The survey resulted in 390 respondents, a 58.2% response rate. 
Police officers hired post-consolidation were not included in the population for this study. 
The dissertation was divided into six chapters comprising monocentrism and 
polycentrism, history of the LMPD consolidation, diffusion of innovation theory, and 
complexity theory. Chapter I provides an overview of the study. Chapter II explores 
monocentric and polycentric fonns of government and police departments. It also 
v 
focuses on diffusion of innovation theory in consolidation efforts and how complexity 
plays a significant part of innovation. Chapter III gives an overview of the merger of the 
LDP and JCPD. This chapter further explores the nature of the OCCs used in merging 
the two police agencies. Chapter IV, V, and VI cover the methods utilized, findings, and 
discussion of the findings respectively. 
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted utilizing current support for 
consolidation as the dependent variable. Six models were tested. The findings indicate 
that officers' perception of the complexity of merging OCCs was a significant predictor 
of current support for consolidation. Additionally. officers' prior supp011 for 
consolidation and offIcers' satisfaction with the results of the merged OCCs were also 
signifIcant predictors of current support for merger. In comparison, prior support was the 
strongest predictor of current support followed by satisfaction. 
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Background of Study 
Throughout the country, govenllnent consolidation has been the topic of many 
discussions among scholars, researchers, policy-makers, government leaders, and 
advocates of both monocentlic and polycentric views of government. Typically, 
proponents of government consolidation advertised effectiveness and efficiency as the 
cornerstone to their argument. While many governmental entities conduct research on 
effectiveness and efficiency, little comparative research exists after a consolidation takes 
place (Durning, J 992). Durning (1992) notes that researchers "have not provided enough 
in the way of empirical insights into what happens after city and county governments 
merge" (p. ]). Since city-county mergers occur injrequently, there is much work to be 
done in the study of governmental consolidation, in addition to the sub-units of 
government that also join together as a result of the overall merger. 
Change exists in all organizations, especially during a consolidation. Many 
changes can lead to complex issues. As a result, government consolidations are 
complicated. Most organizational change efforts are overwhelming because of the many 
ways an organization can change (Glenn and Malott, 2004). During consolidations, 
governments can change structurally, operationally, administratively, and procedurally. 
For example, during a consolidation, governments can change structurally by eliminating 
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certain levels of management or supervision or by having certain departments repOliing 
to difTerent agency bureaus than they had prior to the merger. This also holds true for 
different subunits within government. These subunits include the different agencies in 
government that are part of the larger governmental unit and provide services to citizens 
such as police, fire, public works, sanitation, etc. 
There are a myriad of terms used in the research to describe consolidation (i.e., 
merger, unification, consolidation, etc.). For the purpose of this research, the terms 
merger and consolidation will be used interchangeably. 
The primary focus ofthis study is the consolidation of a subunit of Louisville 
Metro government, the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD). The Louisville 
Metro Police Department came into being with th(! consolidation of the Louisville 
Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department in 2003. When the 
Louisville Division of Police, with an authorized strength of 723 sworn officers and 324 
civilians, merged with the 450 SW0111 officers and 247 civilians from Jefferson County 
Police Department, (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998). it resulted in 
the newly fornled Louisville Metro Police Department which, overnight, became the 41 'it 
largest police department in the nation (Department of Justice, 2007). According to the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007), the Louisville Metro Police Department was in the top 
0.4% oflaw enforcement agencies in the nation with LOOO or more sworn personnel. 
Consolidation of police forces is not a new phenomenon. In Kentucky, the City 
of Lexington merged with Fayette County as a metropolitan government in the early 
1970's. As a result. the individual police agencies unified as one. Las Vegas, Nevada 
completed a comparable consolidation about the same time when the county, city, and 
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three neighboring smaller jurisdictions combined their police agencies into the now Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. In Pennsylvania, the York Regional Police 
Department was established when several jurisdictions joined to create their own police 
force. In 1993, Charlotte City Police and the Mecklenburg County Police Department 
merged. There was also a 1994 merger of the New York Housing Authority Police and 
the Transit Authority Police into the Ne,v York City Police Department. These are just a 
few examples of agencies that have considered and undertaken department consolidation. 
But, prior to this, in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice sunnised that "law enforcement in the country was 
fi'agmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping" (p. 119). Based on this premise, 
the President' s Commission suggested that jurisdictions should take action focused on 
uniting police services in order to provide effective and efficient service. 
In many communities, almost all stakeholders enter into discussions of 
consolidation with preconceptions about the value, if any, of joining together agencies. 
These discussions have either a positive or negative set of expectations. At the forefront 
of these expectations are the positive attributes of effective, efficient, and less costly 
government. In opposition, the negatives often cited are that larger governments are far 
less efficient and effective than smaller units of government. Additionally, smaller units 
of government are seen as providing a more personalized service to the consumer or 
citizen. The Louisville merger was no different. 
The stakeholders of Louisville and Jefferson County discussed some of the same 
issues related to government consolidation. While doing so, police department 
consolidation was of primary interest. During early discussions, proponents of the 
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departmental consolidation in Louisville asserted Ithat increased efficiency through 
combined records and communications would result from a merger. Reductions in 
supervisory personnel were also cited as an advantage and this, in tum, would increase 
the number of patrol officers. Additionally, many cited standardized recruitment 
practices and training procedures as a positive benefit of consolidation. 
Those opposed to police department consolidation proposed increased costs, 
particularly because of the start-up costs of reorganization, planning, and standardizing 
equipment, and possible need for a new building to house the combined agencies. Some 
cited a loss of identity, inter-agency jealousies, and issues related to pmity in that officers 
of different departments had different compensation and benefit packages. Others 
opposed to the consolidation noted that a departmental merger would result in impersonal 
service and would have a negative effect on service levels. 
At the conclusion of all of these discussions, consolidation was seen as a viable 
choice for Louisville. A referendum to consolidate governments successfully passed in 
November 2000 (Jefferson County Kentucky Clerk's OffIce/Election Center, 2000). 
No matter what the reason for consolidation, satisfactory law enforcement service 
and protection is in large part contingent upon the attitudes of employees. Attitudes and 
perceptions of employees change during consolidations or transitional events, such as 
mergers, where rules are changed, agencies are restructured, or there are different 
interpretations of culture (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton, 1992). The attitudes and 
perceptions of employees dUling these events can have both positive and negative effects 
on the organization (Greenberg and Colquitt, 2005). In private organizations, these 
events have increasingly been understood as a significant reason for merger failures 
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(CaIiwright and Cooper, 1993). Cameron and Quinn (1999) note that the failure rate of 
most planned organizational change initiatives is dramatic. In fact, successful 
organizational change has proved a very elusive creature, with many studies reporting a 
very high failure rate, sometimes 80% or above (Beer and Nohria, 2000: Brodbeck, 2002; 
Bryant, 1998; Burnes, 2004; Clarke, 1999; Harung et a1. 1999). 
However, the attitudes and perceptions of personnel, specifically police officers, 
can change over time. Attitudes and perceptions are not stable and are formed as a result 
of many factors including, but not limited to, experience, education, social interaction or 
influence, communication, environment, and persuasion. A police officer's perception of 
the complexity of merging organizational change components (OCCs) relating to police 
department consolidation is anticipated to affect attitudes and perceptions regarding 
support for consolidation. For this reason, the Louisville Metro Police Department 
consolidation and police oHicers' perceived complexity of merging organizational 
change components should be studied in order to offer detailed insight for future 
government mergers and consolidation of govemmental sub-units such as police 
departments. 
Statement of Problem 
Prior to the merger of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson 
County Police Department (JCPD) in 2003, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission (UCCC) (1998) conducted a survey on the perceptions and attitudes 
regarding police consolidation. This survey was distributed to members of the LDP, 
JCPD. the Jefferson County Sheriffs Office, other police departments that were in 
incorporated areas in Jefferson County, and citizens. The survey, directed at the police 
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employees, focused on yvhether or not the consolidation was supp0l1ed by sworn officers. 
According to the findings, 82.1 % of LDP swom personnel were in favor of the 
consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to consolidation. 
The survey also measured the attitudes and perceptions of employees related to 1) 
the effects of merger on the individual officer, the organization, and the citizens, 2) 
outcomes expected from consolidation, and 3) priorities of issues to be addressed by 
consolidation. Demographic infornlation for the respondents was also captured. Since 
the consolidation of the LMPD in 2003, only one follow-up study has been conducted 
related to perceptions and attitudes, whether changing or not, of the police department 
members regarding the agency's consolidation. 
Many components/factors/issues were considered in forming the LMPD. 
Organizational change components considered in forming the LMPD involved 
depm1mental culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining 
contracts, and re-deiining patrol division boundaries. While all of these OCCs existed in 
the respective organizations prior to the consolidation, they all were merged, redefined, 
and/or structured to meet the needs of the newly fon1led LMPD. Implementing each of 
these OCCs, either alone or in their entirety, is a vt:ry difficult unde11aking. Often, 
employees are not aware ofthe complexities involved in consolidating sub-units of 
government or of implementing these components/factors. 
The ease with which organizational entities unite depends on the number of 
entities and their diversity. Dooley (2002) notes that in most cases, it is usually easier to 
make connections between like elements in compatison to unlike elements. 
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Dooley (2002) defines organizational complexity as the amount of differentiation 
that exists within different elements constituting the organization. In this connotation, 
complexity is generally comparable to variety. Complexity impacts how easy it is for 
organizational members to make sense of their CUlTent perceptions, and the type of effort 
that is needed to detelmine and implement effective action (Dooley, 2002). 
No studies exist in which a retrospective survey has been conducted in referenct: 
to complexity, specifically the perceived complexity of merging the OCCs and how that 
perceived complexity affects support for government consolidation. This study will 
focus primarily on the consolidation of a subunit of the Louisville Metro government. the 
Louisville Metro Police Department. The police department is usually the largest 
function of all governments and is the most costly (Conser, et al., 2003). Police 
practitioners are always looking for ways to increase effectiveness and efficiency of their 
operations. As previously mentioned, the attitudes and perceptions of employees can 
influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the departmental operations. This study was 
undeltaken to determine if police officers at LMPD: 1) support the police department 
consolidation, 2) if they do SUppOlt consolidation. to what degree, and 3) whether or not 
their perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs integral to the success of 
consolidation affects their support of the consolidation. 
Outline of Chapters 
This section outlines the remaining chapters of the study and details their content. 
Chapter Il contains a review of relevant literature, information and related studies that are 
associated with government consolidations and, more specifically, police department 
consolidations. Literature regarding complexity theories and organizational change will 
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also be reviewed. Chapter III will provide a succinct synopsis of the Louisville-Jefferson 
County Police Department consolidation, the consolidation process, and an explanation 
of Organizational Change Components used to nH~asure the perceived complexity of 
police officers before and during the LMPD consolidation. Chapter IV outlines the 
methodology used in this study. Chapter V will discuss the findings, and Chapter VI will 
a discussion of the research, as well as the study's limitations. Also included are 
recommendations for future inquiry, policy implications, and the closing remarks or 




The theoretical framework for this study draws from the literature in four distinct 
areas including 1) government consolidations, 2) police mt:rgers, 3) innovations, and 4) 
complexity. The research draws extensively on the works of Rogers (2003) regarding the 
diffusion of innovation and more specifically, the attribute of complexity during an 
innovation such as a police consolidation. 
Government Consolidation: The Pros and Cons 
The debate concerning the pros and cons of consolidation arc well documented 
(Lowery and Lyons, 1989). Advocates of the consolidation of governments claim that 
fragmented local governments create inefficiencies that can be ameliorated through 
consolidation of government services and functions (Lyons, 1977). Opponents to 
consolidation center their argument in the public choice school based on the work of 
Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961). In their research, they propose 
that smaller bureaucracies may be more efficient than larger bureaucracies that replace 
them. 
No mattt:r if one is for or against consolidation of government, the fact remains 
that problems in government exist and identi fying problem cause and effect, in addition 
to finding solutions to these issues, is an arduous task, one in which then: is little 
agreement by the experts (Wyly, Glickman, and Lahr, 1998). Many attribute the issues 
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encountered in metropolitan areas to the failure of local governments to attend to 
significant regional problems. The problems viewed by researchers include, but are not 
limited to, sprawl, poverty, differences in socioeconomic status, etc. (Rusk, 2003, 1999; 
Wyly, Glickman, and Lahr, 1998). Thus, annexation, municipal consolidation, city-
county consolidation, etc. are seen as the answer by some and viewed as necessary to 
successfully and effectively attend to the problems of the metropolis (Jones, 1942; Rusk, 
2003, 1999). 
In an effort to address these issues, many believe that government consolidation is 
the best choice. While conceptually, this perceived solution might make sense, it is one 
of the least-implemented structural reforms in local government body (Johnson and 
Leland,2000). 
In fact, nationally, while more than 100 referenda have been put to the voters, 
only 32 have resulted in some type of consolidation, i.e., regional or city-county 
consolidation. Some of the most notable are New York (1898), Nashville (1963), 
Jacksonville (1968), Lexington-Fayette County Kentucky (1974), Wyandotte County-
Kansas City (1997), Louisville (2003), and Indianapol is (2007). While these are some of 
the examples, it is by no means an all inclusive list. 
Advocates of government refonn argue that consolidation promotes effectiveness 
and efficiency, equity, accountability, and a reduction in the growing disparities between 
central cities and suburbs (Rusk, 2003, 1999). However, consolidation is viewed 
skeptically by some as empirical support for these effects is contradictory. Government 
consolidation, while not viewed as mainstream, is seen as a workable option by those 
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advocating government reforn1s. While this alternative is supported by some, it is not 
preferred by all. 
Monocentrism vs. Polycentrism 
There are two established views that dictate thought on what type of government 
should be established for cities. On one hand, proponents of monocentric government or 
consolidation contend that metropolitan areas with many fragmented governments result 
in service duplication, diseconomies of scale, and other inefficien<;:ies making it virtually 
impossible to effectively solve municipal problems common to all (Studenski, 1930). 
Other proponents cite the inability of core cities to expand their borders. Accordingly, 
this accounts for continued economic decline and an inability to work regionally, in 
conjunction with other areas/jurisdictions, to boost economic development (Rusk, 1999, 
2003). Other shortcomings of fragmented government include a decreasing 
competitiveness in an ever increasing global economy (Peirce, 1993). 
Supporters of a monocentric government contend that each urban area should be 
governed by a centralized single-government (see Taylor, 1911; Goodnow, 1900; Wilson, 
1885, 1887). Consolidation also enhances a regional perspective and increases the 
prospects for regional cooperation in economic development (Staley, 2005). According 
to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000), a centralized or general-purpose government based 
upon the efficiency and effectiveness principles of scientific management should provide 
all local public services. 
On the other hand, advocates of pol ycentIic government believe in the theory of 
Public Choice. They believe that local control is important to citizens and lower costs are 
not likely to result from consolidation. The theory is based more on economically 
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grounded motives rather than the traditional public administration concems that 
structured consolidation (Schneider, 1986). These theorists suggest that consolidation 
limits competition between smaller divisions of govemment. This perspective challenged 
the basic principle of advocates of consolidation in that "bigger and fewer" administrative 
units would provide more cost-efficient, specialized and improved services (Bish and 
Ostrom, 1974; Ostrom, 1971). 
Supporters of public choice argue that the competition among jurisdictions is 
thought to provide more choices for residents and results in more efficiency in the levels 
of service that are provided. It also results in uniformity within communities in that 
residents will value public services similarly. Tiebout (1956) states that this uniformity 
provides for community stability in that no individual can be made better off by moving 
because the market is efficient and does not require political solutions to provide the 
optimal level of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Tht:refore, competition between varieties 
of local producers of public services is eliminated, and when faced with poor quality or 
higher taxes, recipients can "vote with their feet" choosing the services that best suit 
their needs (Tiebout, 1956). This results in more responsive and efficient levels of 
service provision (Ostrom, Tiebout. and Wanen, 1961). 
Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) assert that public choice advocates fear that in the 
search for efficiency and economy at the metropolitan or regional level, the desires and 
values of the citizen will be minimized or disregarded entirely. While issues related to 
effectiveness and efficiency stand out in the readings on consolidation, there appears to 
be a lack of empirical evidence supporting or denying the et1ectiveness and efficiency of 
one t01111 of local government over another. Howe:ver, an emerging acknowledgement 
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exists on the part of theorists that local governments cannot handle all regional problems. 
Therefore, it is believed that some type of regional government or governance is needed 
to address regional issues (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Wanen, 1961). 
Today, scholars of urban affairs that advocate consolidation reform endorse a type 
of hybrid system that is two-faceted - providing regional or system-maintenance 
services/infrastructure (i.e., water, sewers, and mass transportation) which retain existing 
cities and tow-ns, providing lifestyle services tailored to the communities they currently 
serve (i.e., elementary and secondary public education) (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). 
Even so, differences should be identified to determine what problems are inherent in a 
metropolitan area and what problems can be attributed to the government structure in and 
of itself (Banfield and Grodzins, 195R). 
Both monocentric and polycentric views an: debated by theorists. Advocates of 
consolidation cite examples of cities such as Jacksonville,. Portland, Baton Rouge, Miami, 
Nashville, and Indianapolis, to name a few, as examples of the advantages and ultimate 
successes of consolidation. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) assert that there are many 
positives to monocentric government. They are as follows: 
1. Promotes a sense of regional identity and introduces a regional factor into the 
local policy process. 
2. Promotes economic development and attracts large companies to their region., 
resulting in substantial private investment and additional jobs. 
3. Implements a substantial degree of governmental modernization, 
administrative centralization, and ftmctional integration, resulting in service 
etliciencies and savings in governmental operations. 
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4. Provides a more uniform and better quality of system-maintenance services 
throughout their regions and promotes more orderly regional development and 
growth. 
5. Credited with being innovative in their operations (i.e., Indianapolis being in 
the forefront in incorporating the concepts of competition and privatization 
into the delivery of public services; Jacksonville developing structures to 
facilitate citizen participation in government; and all five metropolitan 
governments having made novel use of taxing and service districts). 
There are also negatives associated with consolidation. Persons in opposition to 
consolidation oftentimes point to same cities cited by advocates of consolidation and 
have used them as examples of why not to consolidate government. Stephens and 
Wikstrom (2000) point to examples such as: 
1. Implementing only partial consolidations such as allowing for the continuing 
existence of a variety of local governmental units. 
2. Failing to encompass the entire socioeconomic metropolitan region. 
3. Increasing government expenses and taxes paid by citizens over the years 
despite promoting metropolitan government as a way of enhancing local 
governmental efficiency. 
4. Cities inconsequential ability to redistribute wealth in response to the 
economic and social problems of the disadvantaged. 
Conversely, polycentric government has played an important part in shaping the 
current dispute regarding metropolitan governance. The focus of its role has been an 
evolution of the more important insights that have led to a more informed understanding 
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of metropolitan governance. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) cite the contributions of 
polycentric government to include: 
1. Moving the attention away from the structure of the metropolitan government 
towards the focus on individual needs and preferences. 
2. Eroding the legitimacy of totally consolidated metropolitan government, 
endorsing instead a hybrid type of federative or two-tier governmental 
structure. 
3. Widening the discussions by stressing the positive features and consequences 
flowing from the polycentric character of government in the metropolis. 
4. Noting the maximization of economies of scales in terms of service delivery 
requires governmental units of varying geographical size for the provision of 
. . 
vanous servIces. 
5. Providing a more sophisticated understanding of the functional operation and 
service-rendeling role of government. 
6. Pointing out thaI the most important need in the metropolis is not the 
establishment of a regional government, but rather, the institution of 
neighborhood governments while also being able to show an impact and 
express policy preferences on a neighborhood level. 
At the same time, public choice has been criticized for (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000): 
1. Too much emphasis on the belief that citizens are rational and make decisions 
based upon self-interest. 
2. Not providing a way in which citizens can directly communicate their public 
policy preferences to elected officials. 
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3. Placing too much emphasis on individuals' ability to "vote with their feeC-
not taking into consideration constraints placed on individuals. 
4. Not considering the deed for redistributive politics in the metropolis, whereby 
the more affluent sectors of the metropolitan area provide a financial subsidy 
to fund services for citizens dwelling in disadvantaged areas. 
5. Not substantiating the debate of efficiency and effectiveness of services. 
6. Being excessively parochial, by downplaying the regional responsibilities. 
7. Placing too much emphasis/trust in the local government to deliver services 
and, in its defense of poly centrism, fails to acknowledge the perplexing maze 
of service arrangements and the undernlining of accountability. 
Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) cite three generalizations that can be made 
regarding consolidations. First, service problems such as sewer, water, fire and police 
protection, and/or primary and secondary public education were the catalyst for 
consolidation. Secondly, consolidations tend to be partial in nature. In other words, they 
usually do not include all governmental entities. For example, the consolidation of 
Louisville and Jefferson County in 2003 excluded more than 80 small municipalities 
(Savitch and Vogel, 2004a) and the volunteer fire departments throughout Jefferson 
County did not merge with the Louisville Division of Fire, a "career" fire organization. 
At the time of this writing, this consolidation of fire protective service has yet to occur. 
Third and finally, consolidations generally have vigorous govemt11ent support from the 
political leaders. This supp0l1 is grounded in more efficient and effective government 
and attracting new businesses to the area and is integral to gamering government and 
community support for the policy. 
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Factors specific to particular jurisdictions, i.e., issues, circumstances, 
expectations, openness to consolidation, etc., have also been shown to have an effect on 
the level of consolidation that takes place within a jurisdiction (lACP, 2003). 
Consequently, each consolidation has the potential, and maybe the probability, to impact 
each departmental entity and its employees differently. Even though these factors likely 
affect the success rate(s) of monocentlic govemment, the focus of scholars has been 
directed more on issues of effectiveness and efficiency. This is particularly the case in 
private organizations where the interest of the aforementioned factors outweighs the 
integration process of departments and employees relating to consolidation (Cartwright 
and Cooper, 1993). This is primarily due to the fact that private organizations are profit 
driven. One department of particular interest, due in pmi to its role as representatives of 
the civil power of govemment (Dempsey and Forst, 2010), is the police department. 
Police Consolidation 
Consolidation of police services around the country has taken many forms. Since 
the 1950s, consolidations have occurred in communities ranging trom small towns to 
large cities (lACP, 20(3). They have also taken place due to a myriad of different 
reasons andlor situations. According to Hamby (1992), variables intluencing the 
consolidation of police agencies include general govemment consolidation, a public 
safety/govemment crisis, financial concems or the need tor enhanced cost efficiency, the 
pressure ot' govemmentalleadcrship, the influence or local of community leadership, and 
periods of high growth which have an impact on the delivery of govemment services. 
Consolidation of pol ice forces is not a new phenomenon. In fact, there are many 
examples of consolidation around the country, some of which occurred in larger cities 
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(lACP,2003). In California, in 1 <)54, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department 
began to contract services with the neighboring city of Lakewood. Las Vegas, Nevada 
completed a comparable consolidation about the same time when the county, city, and 
three neighboring smaller jurisdictions combined their police agencies into the now Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Depmiment in 1973. In Kentucky, the City of Lexington 
merged with Fayette County as a metropolitan government in the early 1970's. As a 
result, the individual police agencies unified as one. In Florida, the City of Jacksonville 
and Duval County in 1968 went so far as to totally combine their governments to form a 
single agency under the name, the City of Jacksonville in 196R. In Pennsylvania, the 
York Regional Police Department was established when several jurisdictions joined to 
create their own police force. In 1993, Charlotte City Police and the Mecklenburg 
County Police Department merged. There was also a 1994 merger of the New York 
Housing Authority Police and the Transit Authority Police into the New York City Police 
Department. Most recently, in 2003, as a result of a government consolidation, the city 
of Louisville, Kentucky, combined with Jefferson County and, as a result, created the 
Louisville Metro Police Department. These are just a few examples of agencies that have 
considered and undertaken department consolidation. 
When police agencies were first formed in the United States, leaders were being 
responsive to the social issues of the time and police officers served at the discretion of 
the dominant political institution of the time (O'Brien and Marcus, 1979). Due to the 
political nature of government and the reasons for which police agencies were 
established, police departments have become complex, autonomous and somewhat 
inflexible and unresponsive to the needs of other governmental entities. Rather than 
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working hand in hand to combat problems, this has resulted in, at a minimum, 
duplications of effOlis and questions of the effectiveness and efficiency of the current 
system. 
Even after law enforcement had been in existence tor some time, in 1967, the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice surmised 
that "law enforcement in the country was fragmented, complicated, and frequently 
overlapping" (p.119). Based on this argument, the President's Commission made the 
following proposal: 
Each metropolitan area and each county should take action 
directed toward the pooling, or consolidation, of' police services 
through the particular technique that 'will provide the most 
sati.~(actory law enforcement service and protection at the lowest 
possible cost (p. J J 9). 
An estimated 17,976 state and local police agencies were in existence in the 
United States in 2004 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics also noted that almost 50 % of these departments employed fewer than 10 full-
time officers and nearly a third (31 %) employed fewer than 5 officers. Only 6% of law 
enforcement organizations employed more than 100 officers with 12% employing just 
one full-time officer or only part-time officers. Nearly all local police departments (98%) 
were operated by a single municipality. The remainder were operated by a county or 
tJibai govemment, or served multiple jurisdictions under a regional or joint arrangement 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 20(7). 
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Jurisdictions contemplating consolidation efforts anticipate the production of a 
higher volume of police services, lower response time, reduced overtime, reduced 
duplication of effort, and lower overall operating costs (lACP, 2003). There is also 
anticipation of increased agency status, resources, and capacity. The quality of policing is 
expected to rise under consolidation as a result of more efficient and coordinated use of 
personnel, more flexibility to meet hours of peak demand, enhanced training 
opportunities, and improved management and supervision (IACP, 2003). 
Those opposing police depmiment consolidation cite loss of autonomy in the 
community, and reduced oversight and supervision of a consolidated agency covering 
several jurisdictions. Opponents also assume that the personal nature of policing in their 
community will be lost, that response times may not be lowered, but rather increase. 
There may also be increases in costs to the smaller community. Additionally, some 
minority groups may feel like they will lose equal representation and therefore, reduced 
servlces. 
Even though there are many factors to consider regarding consolidation, 
controversy is almost always at the forefront of these effl1rts. While some agencies such 
as Jacksonville, Las Vegas, and Louisville have consolidated and endured the process, 
others such as Brisbane, Califomia and Winston-Salem, North Carolina have not. In fact, 
some of the cities failing at consolidation have selected to "deconsolidate" their agency 
and retum to their previous status due to high cost of operation, the high cost of liability 
insurance, and police credibility (lACP, 2003). Outcomes of consolidation almost always 
vary from the expectation of what consolidation can bring to the table. These variances 
are dependent on many factors. For this reason, communities and, more specifically, 
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police agencies, undertaking consolidation efforts must painstakingly investigate the 
matter prior to making any decision. 
For the most part, arguments for consolidating continue to primarily revolve 
around efforts to produce and provide services more efficiently and effectively. Taking 
into consideration the issues confronting contemporary police agencies (i.e., budgetary 
constraints, inadequate resources, and crime prevention and control), consolidation is still 
viewed as a practical solution. 
Perspectives on Police Consolidation 
Since the turn of the twentieth century. proponents of "good government" have 
advocated consolidation (Rusk 1995). As early as 1920, advocates of consolidation 
recognized the potential problems associated with fragmented local law enforcement 
agencies (Fosdick, 1920). Advocates argued that fi:agmented governments and their sub-
units were unable to adequately serve their constituents. Delehunt (1977) suggests that as 
a result of the large number of jurisdictions, there exists a "maze" of governments and 
officials that have divergent objectives. Fosdick (1920) argued that police consolidation 
in metropolitan areas would undoubtedly produce beneficial results in the United States. 
Proponents of consolidation continued the discussions by citing various arguments in 
support of the concept of consolidation (Smith, 1940). Promoters argued that we cannot 
continue the fiscal strain of supporting law enforcement agencies that are not efficient 
and cost effective. 
While all of these arguments are valid. one important consideration, not to be 
f()rgotten, is crime. Police departments are charged with preventing and controlling 
crime. Many advocates of consolidation believe that we are losing the war on crime. 
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While this is not sufficient evidence in and of itselfto argue for consolidation, it is one of 
the core issues regarding consolidation 
Arguments also focused on the complexity of fragmented police agencies. 
Because of these complexities. police agency fragmentation is said to cause confusion to 
consumers. For example, many jurisdictions would cause a need for many physical 
facilities. Consumers would not know where to go to access services. Ultimately, this 
would be expensive due to the fact that at least one police facility would be needed for 
each different agency. Additionally, there would be competition between agencies which 
could inhibit effective work production. 
These issues are compounded for smaller agencies and their governing entities in 
providing and delivering services to citizens (IACP, 2003). Rusk (1995, p. 1) notes that 
"parochial political boundaries continue to fix the operations of each law' enforcement 
department to its own particular area. ,. 
According to Herley ( 1989) and Wickum (1986), the foundation of this argument 
is based on the assumptions that: 
1. Many small municipalities cannot afford to support their own police forces at an 
adequate level of funding. Those attempting to do so risk their capacity to 
provide adequate public services in other areas of responsibility. 
2. Small police departments cannot recruit, train, and retain highly qualified 
personnel. There is a tendency to lose thesle officers to larger, better paying 
organizations where opportunities for advancements and skill development 
abound. 
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3. Small police departments are sometimes noit sufficiently professional and 
modernized to serve the needs of the community. 
4. Supervision and administration are sometimes inadequate in small police 
agencies, thereby adding to the liability costs of the jurisdiction. 
5. The existence of many small forces, for example in a metropolitan area, can lead 
to confusion among citizens about jurisdiction and to professional jealousy. 
6. Formal and informal coordination among multiple police departmcnts is generally 
lacking or insufficient. 
Consolidation is espe(:ialiy attractive to city and county decision-makers in 
regions with numerous smaller police agencies, where fragmentation or redundancy in 
policing may be present and where tiscal challenges exist (IACP, 2003; Wickum, 1986). 
Agencies can work together pooling resources, both equipment and personnel, to 
accomplish tasks that are common to or affect each jUlisdiction. Proponents argue that 
the consolidations of police services will (TACP, 2(03): 
1. Increase efliciency through a reduction of duplicate services. 
2. [ncrease effectiveness by eliminating political tampering. 
3. Lessen the ability of criminal activity to move from one jurisdiction to another. 
4. Increase professionalism and lower turnover rates by providing more 
opportunities in the merged agency. 
Valiolls government-initiated national commissions have supported consolidation. 
These include the National C0111mission on Law Observance and Enforcement 
(Wickersham Commission, 1931) which was charged with investigating corruption 
activities in govemment (police). The Wickersham Commission drew a strong 
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correlation between fragmented systems of policing and the corruption within the ranks 
of police agencies. 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
in 1967, in its work, Task Force Report -- The Police, examined how we police our 
society. It made several observations regarding the impact of the fragmentation oflaw 
enforcement agencies and how this interteres \\'ith the provision of effective police 
services (President's Commission, 1967, p. 96). The Commission viewed fragmentation 
as a fundamental problem that resulted in a general lack of crime prevention and control. 
Individualism among police departments was seen to negatively affect police cooperation 
and coordination, particularly for intelligence sharing. 
The National Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (197]) 
detennined that smaller police agencies (1 O-person or fe\ver) have difficulties in 
providing primary services such as full time patrols and investigative services, in addition 
to staff functions of a police department such as communications, records management, 
and laboratory services. 
The National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals published a 
comprehensive report, Report on Police, in 1973. This report investigated and identitied 
minimum staffing levels for police departments, i.e., what is the optimal size of a police 
agency? The Commission concluded that smaller agencies (10 or tevv'Cr) should 
consolidate for effectiveness and efficiency. 
There were also other studies that were funded by the federal government, 
specifically the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (United 
States Department of Justice). In one such study, Koepsell and Girard (1979), 
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investigated the limited use of consolidation of police agencies and, in particular, focused 
on the transition of smaller agencies that were part of a fragmented system working into a 
consolidated anangement. Koepsell and Girard (1979) cited issues such as relationships 
between governmental units, fiscal and managerial planning, legal mandates, and 
feasibility of merged services to name a few. Koepsell and Girard (1979) concluded that 
smaller agencies were costly and ineffective and cannot provide adequate professional, 
specialized law entoreement services. They further concluded that consolidation 
removes jurisdictional boundaries and conflicts, pnwents duplication of cHarts/services, 
and maximizes tax dollars. 
Other studies advocating consolidation include Krimmell, 1997; Lyons and 
Lowery, 1989; and Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997. There is also a California-based study 
supporting the consolidation movement (see Wickum, 1986; Herley, 1989). In general, 
these studies primarily focused on the increased efficiency and effectiveness that comes 
from consolidation. Other reasons specifically noted are enhanced communications, 
reduced duplication in investigations, greater purchasing power. and improved training, 
crime analysis, and records management. 
Wickum (1986) conducted a study that was state-based and focused on 
contracting for police services as a means of regionalizing (consolidating) law 
enforcement services under a single agency umbreilla. The thesis of this research 
addressed disbanding existing smaller city police dt:pmiments in favor of a single, larger 
force (Wickul1l, 1986). During his research, he identified different types of resistance 
that the Chief of Pol ice, City Manager, residents, and elected officials might encounter 
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when given the option of eliminating their police force and joining a larger entity. 
Wickum identified several forms of resistance that might include: 
1. Loss of local control; 
2. The inability to control costs; 
3. Local concerns ignored by the new agency; 
4. The head of the larger agency not residing in the jurisdiction; 
5. A loss of local identity from not having their own police department; 
6. The inability of the city to control the quality of the police officers in the new 
agency; 
7. Fear that levels of sen!ice would decline; 
8. An inherent distrust by cities when dealing with other units of government. 
Peter Coolly (1975) summarizes the many of the points made toward a pro-
consolidation perspective. They include: 
1. Many small municipalities cannot afford to support their own police at an 
adequate level of funding. 
2. Small police departments cannot recnlit, train, or retain highly qualified 
personnel. 
3> Small police departments are not sufficiently professional; and modernized to 
serve the needs of their communities. 
4. Supervision and administration are inadequate in small police agencies. 
5. The existence of many small police torces in a metropolitan area leads to 
confusion and rivalry. 
6. Fonnal and infonnal coordination among police depm1ments in metropolitan 
areas is lacking or insufficient. 
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Even though there is research and support towards consolidation, there is still 
opposition from many. 
Public Choice Perspective 
Many supporters ofthe public choice perspective believe that advocates of 
consolidation primarily base their arguments on efficiency and economy which imply 
that bigger and fewer administrative units will provide more cost-efficient, specialized, 
and improved services (Christenson and Sachs, 1980). However, they also argue the 
importance of local control to citizens and that lower costs are not likely to result from 
consolidation. They supp0l1 this argument citing differences in pay and issues related to 
longevity are difficult to address during consolidation. 
Others fear the loss of community autonomy. They are also concerned about 
reduced oversight and supervision of a consolidated police department spanning several 
towns or cities. They assume that the personal character and the individuality of policing 
in their community will vanish and that response times may not be lowered, the desires 
and values of the citizens will be minimized or disregarded entirely, and that (.:osts to the 
smaller community may increase (Ostrom, 1971). As previously mentioned, the 
expectations versus the actual reality of consolidation outcomes may vary greatly 
depending upon many factors. StilL the advocates of public choice view the tens of 
thousands of units of government and jurisdictions in the United States as many different 
public firms or publil.: enterprises (Bish and Ostrom, 1974). This, in tum, produces an 
economy which exists to not only provide citizens v"ith public goods and services, but 
also public safety. 
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Then: are some basic assumptions that must be understood in how public choice 
advocates view law enforcement and, in particular, the services they provide. Some basic 
assumptions of this type of thinking were developed by Ostrom in 1971. They are as 
follows: 
1. citizens are consumers; 
2. government activity is the production and provision of public goods and services; 
3. institutional arrangements for making decisions that affect the production, 
provision, and consumption of public goods and services have a critical influence 
on the perforn1ance of public entities (Ostrom, 1971). 
Bish and Ostrom, (1974) assert that public choice proponents discriminate 
between public and private goods. With plivate goods, consumers choose what products 
to purchase and how many to buy. These goods can be withheld to some degree by 
increasing the cost of goods. Hence, they are not available to everyone. 
Public goods such as police services, fire services, sanitation, etc., are seen 
differently. These goods are provided to everyolH: and are available to all comers to 
enjoy (Bish and Ostrom, 1974). No individual can be excluded from the provision of 
these services. Therefore, these services are supplied to all in a jurisdiction; they are not 
seen by public choice proponents as a duplication of services. 
In their 1976 publication, Ostrom and Smith tackle the issue of consolidation 
theorizing that police services are best provided in small governmental jurisdictions. 
They conducted both interviews and surveys with citizens and police officers in the St. 
Louis metropolitan area and found that: 
I. size did not matter on most indicators of effectiveness and efficiency; 
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2. smaller departments rate higher than their larger counterparts in community 
relations; 
3. the education level of officers in the smaller departments. a possible indicator of 
professionalism in an agency, was no less than that of others in the larger 
departments. 
However, even with their findings favoring public choice and promoting the 
practicality of smaller police agencies, they did not totally eliminate the possibility that 
some smaller agencies should be eliminated and combined with medium sized 
departments such as St. Louis (Ostrom and Smith, 1976). 
Another study conducted by McDavid (2002), examined the 1996 consolidation 
of three departments in Halifax, Canada. He found that after consolidation, the number 
of sworn officers decreased resulting in higher workloads for personnel. The study 
compared data from surveys, interviews, and budget and manpower reports before and 
after the consolidation. Service levels, as measured by the number of officers serving the 
population, also decreased. Expenditures on police services increased primarily due to 
union negotiations which included substantial salary increases. Consolidation was found 
to have no effect on crime rates. The study also looked at perceptions of citizens relating 
to the quality of policing services before and after consolidation. The majority of 
respondents (78.1 %) in each year surveyed believed that the quality of police services 
stayed the same (McDavid, 2002). 
Even though many advocates of consolidation argue the point of smaller agencies 
not being able to provide adequate polices services, and, as previously mentioned, 
Ostrom and Smith (1976) did not eliminate the possibility that some smaller agencies 
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should be abolished and combined into medium-sized agencies, smaller governmental 
entities providing police services feel differently. Bollens and Schmandt (1982) found 
different results in a study conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area, with nearly 350 
locally sustained agencies (police agencies). This study showed that regardless of the 
size of tInancial resources, they regarded themselves as capable of providing adequate 
law enforcement within their boundaries. 
The Dilemma of Law Enforcement Consolidation 
Citizens in any community enter into discussions of consolidation with 
preconceptions about the value of consolidating agencies and police services. These 
thoughts and ideas can be either present positive or negative expectations. Policy makers 
and police administrators are confronted with two schools of thought. 
Advocates of the consolidation of governments claim that fragmented local 
governments create inefficiencies that can be minimized or alleviated through 
consolidation of government services and functions (Lyons, 1977). National and state 
advisory boards, along with police administration experts, advocate that more effective, 
efficient, and less costly law enforcement is feasible, only ifnumerous small, local 
departments are eliminated. 
Proponents of public choice believe that smaller bureaucracies may be more 
efficient than larger bureaucracies that replace them. Police chief" and administrators of 
small departments argue that small departments provide the persona! type of police 
services necessary and requested in the communities they serve. 
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Additionally, negative preconceptions and a possible source of resistance could 
potentially follow a proposed consolidation. These include (see IACP, 2003; Herley, 
1989; Wickum, 1986; Hogan, 1980; Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973): 
1. Senior, supervisory, and line officers alike may be threatened by consolidation 
and aggressively resist change. 
2. Consolidation is likely to increase costs, particularly because of the start-up 
costs of reorganization, planning, and standardizing equipment, and possible 
need for a new huilding to house the combined agencies. 
3. Officers in line for promotion or advanced assignment in one agency may find 
they are outranked for these opportunities by their peers in the other agency. 
4. Loss of identity. 
5. Distrust between departments and inter-agency jealousies. 
6. Issues of parity between officers of different departments that were merged 
and who had different compensation and benetit packages. 
7. Impersonal service. 
8. A negative effect on service levels. 
9. Viable methods of cost sharing would be difficult. 
Also, governance of the newly created agency, once consolidation has occurred, 
may face other challenges such as (see IACP, 2003; Herley, 1989): 
I. Loss of control by smaller communities. 
2. Confusion on the pm1 of citizens ahout how and where complaints are sent. 
3. Loss of personal interaction by the community with locallmv enforcement. 
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4. Fragmented oversight of the newly <:ombined law enforcement agency by 
local community councils and mayors. 
5. Recruitment and retention issues. 
6. Promotional opportunities. 
7. Insurance costs. 
8. Training costs. 
9. Costs of technology (i.e., combining communication systems). 
10. Investigative services provided 
II. Purchasing orders (i.e., new cars, uniforms, etc.). 
Consolidation also affects the attitudes of both police officers and civilian 
employees, in addition to community members. Police chiefs and administrators may 
more than likely have to contend with the perceptiions and attitudes of officers opposing 
the consolidation. Pay, promotional opportunities, benefits, and training opportunities are 
just a few of the issues that affect the perceptions of police officers and their attitudes. 
For example, in a study, <:onducted in 1998 before: the consolidation by the Louisville-
JetIerson County Crime Commission, 82.1 % ofLDP's sworn personnel were in favor of 
~ the consolidation while 89.9% ofJCPD"s sworn persomlel were opposed to the 
consolidation. This was, in part, due to the fact that the LDP officers thought they would 
benefit financially from the consolidation while JCPD's otIicers anticipated that they 
would more than likely see declines in their financial well-being. This was partially true 
in both instances in that LDP officers increased their salaries while some parts of the 
JCPD officer's benefit package were reduced. Conversely, in another example, 
McAninch and Sanders (1988) conducted a survey of 102 police officers (the entire 
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population of offIcers) in Bloomington and Normal, Illinois and found that the majority 
of the officers believed that a consolidated department would operate more economically, 
more effectively address local crime, and eliminate duplicate services and equipment. 
However, the issue in question still exists about whether or not fragmentation 
actually produces an insurmountable number of hannful side effects. Community 
stakeholders that are facing an upsurge in fiscal constraints and diminishing levels of 
service delivery are investigating the pros and cons of consolidating govemments and 
sub-units of govemment or centralizing the provision of services as a possible solution to 
these woes (Dolan, 1990). Halter (1993) provides three factors as the basis of most 
consolidations that occur. These include: 
1. OCl:Uning between very small cities or one considerably larger than the other; 
2. Occurring when cities face a severe population decline; 
3. Occuning when delivery and/or financial problems were present. 
Wickul11 (1986) supports these presumptions and cites high costs, liability concems, and 
a lack of police credibility as elements leading to discussions of consolidation. 
Most studies on the topic of pol ice consolidation are indecisive as to whether or 
not one school of thought dominates. This might be because of the different factors, 
circumstances, and issues that affect each consolidation, in addition to the different types 
of consolidation. When so many different "variables" affect this type of research, it is 
often difficult to generalize the findings in studies. Two studies conducted by the same 
researcher demonstrate this point. 
In 1988, a study of police services in Michigan conducted by Gyapong and 
Gyimah-Brempong focused on estimating the demand for inputs in municipal police 
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departments. The operating assumption for their paper was that police decision-makers 
choose inputs to maximize output subject to budget and technology constraints (Gyapong 
and Gyimah-Brempong, 1988). As in all police agencies, the measurement of police 
output is difficult. Unlike private businesses, police departments do not produce output 
for sale. As a result, only a few output measurements exist. These include clearance 
rates, rates of conviction, and number of arrests. 
For their study, Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong measured the number of arrests 
for each of the eight Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) index crimes. The eight FBI 
index crimes are homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft, and arson. 
Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong (19R8) used cross sectional data from 130 
municipal police departments serving cities with populations of 5000 or more in the state 
of Michigan. This data collected was from 1984 and 1985 and there were 260 
observations available for estimating the model. 
They found that their estimate of economies of scale positi vely indicated 
increasing returns to scale, but was not statistically significant. In an earlier study in 
1987, Gyimah-Brempong found statistically signiticant diseconomies of scale (average 
costs increasing as the number of arrests increase) in the average police department in 
Florida using 1982 and 1983 data from 256 departments in municipalities with 
populations of 5,000 or more. To test for economies of scale in small, medium, and large 
cities, he divided the sample and determined that police depatiments in large cities (41 of 
the 256 cities in the dataset) experienced statisticalily significant diseconomies of scale for 
police services, while police services in small and medium cities did not exhibit 
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significant economies or diseconomies of scale. Although this is only one study, the 
results suggest that there may be a maximum limit for the size of a police department. 
As previously mentioned, different factors, circumstances, and issues affect each 
consolidation, in addition to the different types of consolidation for each jurisdiction. 
Many of these factors include, but are not limited to, political, financial, technological, 
legaL services, etc. Therefore, administrators must be prudent in not focusing on one 
variable to the exclusion of others (i.e., cost savings masking deterioration of service 
quality) (Staley, 2005). 
Even though economics playa major role in the arguments for and against 
consolidation, economics should not be the sole determining factor in the consideration 
of consolidation. How well local governments match; the flexibility of decision-makers 
to implement necessary changes; who is elected to the new government; and the 
implementation decisions of the policy makers-are all contributing factors in a 
consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000). 
As the perceptions and attitudes of employees are important, it would follow that 
the needs, satisfactions and wants of employees are also important. Staley (2005) asserts 
that employees represent olle the most powerful or, at least, influential constituencies in 
an electoral process and whose influence should be taken into account when 
implementing public policy. This is of particular reason why consideration should be 
given to the issues and concerns of employees. Studying the issues and concerns of 
employees. in addition to their attitudes and perceptions, is necessary to fully understand 
the potential impacts of consolidation. 
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The Structure of Consolidation 
Three crucial factors make up the structun.~ or composition of consolidation. 
These indude the degree of structural change, the type of consolidation, and the actual 
stage of the consolidation, 
Each of these factors can difTer from one consolidation to another depending on 
several variables, These variables are particular to different jurisdictional consolidations 
and are dependent upon circumstances and issues related to each consolidation, 
Structural Change: Complexity and Control 
As one might imagine, consolidation involves structural change. This involves 
integrating some or all functions and activities (lACP, 2003). These changes usually 
involve structural changes in the aspects of control and complexity of an organization. 
Robbins (1987) defines structural complexity as the extent of differentiation 
within the organization. This differentiation includes the extent of specialization or 
division oflabor, i.e., number and types of specialized units and/or functions, Krimmel 
(1997) cites specialized services such as a canine unit, investigative unit, and juvenile 
services that were added after a consolidation, 
Differentiation, according to Robbins (1987), also includes the number oflevcls 
in the organization's hierarchy. In other words, does the organizational structure have 
many levels or has the structure heen flattened? An example would be that a flattened 
structure promotes better communication. 
Finally, Robbins (1987) cites the extent to which the organization'S units are 
dispersed geographically. Are the organization's units more centrally located or are they 
decentralized? 
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Based on Robbins' analysis and on works conducted by Langworthy (1986) and 
Bayley (1992), it follows that complexity has thn:e basic components: 
1. Vertical differentiation, which f()cuscS on the nature of the hierarchy within an 
organization; 
2. Functional differentiation, which measures the degree to which tasks are broken 
down into functionally distinct units; 
3. Spatial differentiation, or the extent to wh ieh an organization is distributed 
geographically. 
MaGuire (2003) defines structural coordination and control as the means by 
which an organization achieves a level of control within the organization. This includes 
administration intensity, formalization, and centralization. 
Administration intensity addresses the relative size of an organization's 
administrative component (Langworth y, 1986;l'vlonkkonen, 1981). It can include 
administrative and/or statTfunctions such as budgeting, fleet management, human 
resources, etc. 
Formalization is defined as the extent to which an organization is governed by 
formal yvritten rules, policies, standards, and procedures (Hall, Hass, and Johnson, 1967). 
In other \vords, are formalized structures governing the operations of the agency or are 
they of an informal nature? 
Centralization is the degree to which the decision-making capacity within an 
organization is concentrated in a single individual or small select group (MaGuire, 2003 l. 
In years past, decision making was conducted only at higher levels. MaGuire (2003) 
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asserts that new ways of thinking have encouraged administrators to push decision-
making to the lowest levels. 
No matter what type of consolidation an organization undertakes, it will encounter 
these factors. Consequently, the type of consolidation will ultimately influence the 
degree to which these factors will affect it. 
Types of Consolidation 
The extent to which organizational change can vary is substantially different 
across consolidations. This is due to the fact that motives and types of consolidations 
differ widely. IACP (2003) asserts that consolidation is a matter of degree and 
documents the different variations of consolidation that include: 
I. Functional-two or more agencies combine selected functional units, sllch as 
emergency communications, dispatch, or records. 
2. Cross Deputization/Mutual Enforcement Zones / Overlapping .Turisdictions-
agencies authorize each other's officers to pool resources and improve 
regional coverage, for example, permitting a city police officer to make arrests 
in the county and a sheriff s deputy to make an'ests in the city. 
3. Public Safety--city or county governments may unite all police, fire, and 
emergency medical services agencies under one umbrella. 
4. Local Merger-two separate police agencies fonn a single new entity. The 
agencies may be in small communities or metropolitan areas. 
5. Regional---a number of agencies combine to police a geographic area rather 
than a jurisdictional one. 
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6. Metropolitan--two or more agencies serving overlapping jurisdictions join 
forces to become one agency serving an entire metropolitan area. 
7. Government-a city and sUlTounding county consolidate their entire 
governments, creating a "metro" form of government for all citizens. 
IACP (2003) notes that no one fornl of consolidation is superior to others. They 
assert that the type selected for implementation depends on the needs, expectations, and 
degree of cooperation among the stakeholders in each particular jurisdiction (IACP, 
2003). As one might expect, the type of consolidation selected for each jurisdiction can 
have a different impact on different jurisdictions and more specifically, the different 
stakeholders in the particular jurisdiction (i.e .. administrators, citizens, and employees). 
This is also dependent on the needs for the consolidation and the degree of disruption 
inculTed by jurisdiction by the consolidation. 
Each of the aforementioned types of consolidation are complex and an innovation 
that goes through various stages or a series of transitional events. These stages or 
transitional events impact the implementation of consolidation and the "final product." 
Transitional Events Affecting the Implementation of Consolidation 
Kranz (1985) defines organizational transition or "transition events" in private 
organizations involved with organizational changt::. The following components of change 
do not focus or target the individuaL but rather groups, work units, divisions, or those 
with celiain organizational standing. However, even so, the individual is still somewhat 
affected hy the innovation, especially in the case of consolidation. 
Components of change include situations vvhere continuity is threatened or 
changed and, more specifically, where internal or external conditions call for a rethinking 
of the organizational structure, functions, and/or role constellations and change (Kranz, 
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1985). When changes are openly announced or when a beginning date or even a timeline 
for the change is either formally publicized or broadly expected, these transitions become 
events. 
These transitional events occur in stages in both private organizations (mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) and in public organizations (consolidations, mergers, 
unifications). In the private sector, Seo and Hill (2005) analyzed mergers and 
acquisitions and identified four stages of implementation. They include 
1. The pre-merger stage: 
2. The initial planning and [omwl combination stage; 
3. The operational combination stage; 
4. The stabilization stage. 
The pre-merger or pre-consolidation stage begins with the inquiry of 
consolidation and starts with the examination of a possible merger. It usually ends with 
the official announcement of the merger. Included in this stage of implementation is 
planning and discussions among top managers and executives regarding a possible 
merger (Garpin and Herndon, 2000). Also discussed during this stage are rumors that 
may develop regarding the merger among employees (lvancevich. Schweiger, and Power, 
1987). During this stage, it is probable that organizations will remain relatively stable 
(Buono and Bowditch, 1989). 
After the merger is formally announced, the initial planning and formal 
combination stage begins. This stage usually ends once the former organizations have 
been legally disbanded and a new organization has been created, many times with a new 
moniker. The conception of a new vision, nt:w goals, and joint committees and teams to 
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make decisions regarding management changes, staffing plans, and new organizational 
structure comprise this stage. 
Integrating organizational functions and operations occurs in the operational 
combination stage. Garpin and Herndon (2000) note that exchanges between the 
associates of the combined organizations are extended from top administrators and 
multipaIiy committees to general work units and day-to-day operations. Budgets, 
physical work space, work assignments, and repOliing responsibilities are restructured 
during this stage. Employees are encouraged to learn new, innovative ways of 
conducting business while meeting newly revised pertonnance standards. They are also 
influenced to adopt new value and belief systems (Marks and Mirvis, 19(2). This stage 
is lengthy in tenns of time due to the impact on all aspects of the merged organization, 
i.e., procedural, cultural, role related, etc. It usually lakes much longer than managers 
typically expect, sometimes years (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). During this stage, 
structural complexity and structural control are altered. 
The stahilization stage is the last stage of the consolidation process and in this 
stage, operational integration is completed. Evolution is common in almost all 
consolidations. Even though changes, modifications, and con'ections may continue at 
this stage, the organization stabilizes and customs, roles, and organizational routines are 
stabilized. 
As noted, transitional events affect the implementation of consolidation. A 
transition is defined as the process or instance of changing from one state, fornI, or 
activity to another. As such, consolidations are innovations that are complex and can be 
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perceived differently by individuals depending upon the particular attributes of the 
innovation. 
Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
The initiation of etlorts toward consolidation of police agencies is a difficult 
undertaking. These efforts may take many years !before their "full" adoption. 
Oftentimes, this is because of how those affected by the change perceive the change and 
attributes of the change. In other words, how otlicers perceive and view the change will 
affect their willingness to adopt the new idea(s) or innovation(s) such as with 
consolidation. 
Diffusion of innovation theory provides a useful framework for studying the 
process of support for innovations or consolidation. Diffusion research has detennined 
that the manner in which adopters perceive the attributes of an innovation such as 
consolidation is critical. In fact, these perceptions account for 49 - 87% of the variance 
in whether or not they adopt the innovation (Rogers, 1995). 
Rogers (2003) asserts that diffusion is needed for success in making major 
changes. He defines diffusion as "the process in which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (p. 5). In 
other words, diffusion is a special kind of communication that is associated with the 
distribution of messages that are viewed as new ideas. Additionally, he defines 
communications as "a process in \vhich participants create and share information with 
one another in order to reach mutual understanding" (p. 5). 
Diffusion is similar to a type of social change. It is a foml of change that takes 
place in the structure and function ofa social system. When a change of magnitude 
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occurs, such as a police depmiment consolidation, the entire social system of the entity is 
changed. 
Based on the definition of Rogers (2003), four main dements exist in diffusion. 
These include 1) communication channels, 2) time, 3) the social system, and the 
innovation. For purposes of this paper, the main focus will be directed toward the 
element of innovation and more specifically the attribute of complexity related to an 
innovation. However, a brief descri ption of the remaining elements and attributes of 
innovation will be given. 
One of the elements existing in diffusion is a communication channel. A 
communications channel is used to transcend messages from one individual to another. It 
is how messages get from one individual to anothl~r. The view of the innovation is reliant 
upon this communication and depends on the nature of the communication. According to 
Rogers (2003), the process involves 1) an innovation, 2) an individual or other unit of 
adoption that has know'ledge of, or has expelienced using, the innovation, 3) another 
individual or another unit that does not yet have knowledge of, or experience with, the 
innovation, and 4) a communication channel connecting the two units. 
Time is another important element in diffusion. Rogers (2003) notes that time is 
involved in diffusion in 1) the innovation-decision process, 2) innovativeness, and 3) an 
i1UlOvation's rate of adoption. 
The innovation-decision process is the progression through which an individual 
passes from first being infonned of an innovation, to the development of an attitude 
toward the innovation, to a decision to accept or disallow, to implementation and use of 
the new idea, and finally to affirmation of this decision (Rogers, 2003). 
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lnnovativeness, according to Rogers (2003), is the rate at which an individual or 
other unit of adoption is "earlier" than others in adopting the innovation. Rogers (2003) 
refers to some individuals as the "late majority:' Research has shown these individuals 
to be of lower soeio-economic status, rarely uses mass media channels, and learns most 
of what they know from their peers (Rogers, 2003). Many individuals who had reached 
higher levels of the organization at LOP, JCPO and ultimately LMPD had more 
awareness, experience and were more educated than others of lower rank. These 
individuals, some of which might have been part of the implementation committees, were 
the first to accept the innovation of consolidation earlier in the process and worked to 
make the merger a success. Others who did not have the educational background, 
awareness or experience, in many cases, were slower to accept or adopt the innovation. 
Rate of adoption is the third variable in which time is involved. It is the relative 
speed at which an innovation is adopted by individuals of the social system. As one might 
expect, the rate of adoption is slow at first, but as time passes, more and more individuals 
accept the innovation. The rate of adoption is usually measured by the length of time 
required for a certain number of the individuals within a system to adopt the innovation. 
It should be noted that while individuals adopted the consolidation ofthe LMPO on a 
certain date, January 6,2003, not all individuals accepted the merger at that time. 
Interrelated units that are engaged in shared problem solving to achieve a 
common goal is known as a social system, another element of diffusion (Rogers, 2003). 
The LMPO was such a social system in that its common goal was the innovation of a 
consolidated agency. Members of a social system include individuals, groups, 
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organizations and/or sub-systems. Members of a social system usually fom1 and work 
collectively to combat or solve a common problem. 
In all social systems. diffusion takes place. Diffusion is affected in these systems 
as they structure a boundary and the diffusion works within it. How the structure affects 
diffusion, the roles of opinion leader and agents of change, types of innovation decisions, 
and consequences all affect diffusion (Rogers, 2003). It should he noted that structures 
can he both formal and informal. 
One aspect of the theoretical framework for this research is based in the element 
of innovation and more specifically, complexity r,elated to innovation. Innovation refers 
to a concept or procedure that is viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. It does 
not actually need to be new as dictated by time. Rather, it just needs to be perceived as 
new by the individual accepting it. For instance, the police department consolidation was 
an innovation that had occurred many times in the: past in other jurisdictions. However, it 
was new to all personnel at LDP and JCPD. The perceptions of members of the societal 
group, in relation to the charader of the innovation, affect how quickly it is adopted. 
Rogers (2003) suggests that five attributes of innovation exist. Perceived 
attributes include 1) relative advantage, 2) compatibility, 3) trialability, 4) observability, 
and 5) complexity. 
Relative advantage relates to the extent to which an innovation is viewed as better 
than the one currently in existence. The view of the member is primary to this 
assessment. The higher the perceived relative advantage, the more likely the innovation 
will be adopted (Pankratz, et aI., 2002). 
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Compatibility is how the innovation is observed in tenns of consistency relating 
to existing values, past experiences, and the needs, wants, and satisfactions of the 
individuals who will be adopting the innovation. If an innovation is contrary to existing 
values and nonns, new or revised ones will need to be implemented prior to initiating the 
innovation. This is done for two reasons. First, values guide behavior. If values are 
consistent with the innovation, it will be easier to achieve or implement. Secondly, 
individuals will look for consistency between the innovation, values, and norms and if 
new values aren't established and consistent with the innovation, they will notice 
inconsistencies and that will hinder implementation of the innovation. 
Trialability relates to whether or not the innovation can be tested on a controlled 
basis. Utilizing an incremental approach will prevent uncertainty. 
Observability relates to whether or not results of the innovation are visible to all. 
If results can be seen, the innovation is more likely to be accepted. 
The final attribute of an innovation such as a police department consolidation and 
the focus of this research is complexity. Complexity addresses the perceived view of 
whether or not the innovation is complicated to understand or difficult to utilize. 
Complex innovations are difficult to implement and are adopted more slowly than ones 
that are viewed as simple (Rogers, 2003). Pankratz, et al. (2002) also notes that 
innovations perceived as complex are less likely to be adopted. Additionally, in a meta-
analysis of the relationship between the characteristics or attributes of an innovation, 
Tornatzkyand Klein (1982) note complexity as one of the attributes having the most 
consistent significant relationship across a broad range of innovation types. 
46 
Most of the innovations regarding the consolidation of LOP and JCPO such as 
cuIture(s), communications, redefining patrol boundaries, policies and procedures and 
collective bargaining contracts were complex to merge or redefine due to many facets 
and intricacies of these components. To add to this complexity, each of the former 
agencies had their own unique way of conducting business. Further compounding the 
issue is that personnel of all ranks might not have perceived these complexities. 
Some innovations are quickly understood by most members of an organization; 
other are more complicated, complex and are adopted more slowly. Typically, according 
to Rogers (2003), new ideas that are simpler to understand are adopted more rapidly than 
innovations that require the adopter to develop new skills and understandings. This is 
particularly the case with a police department consolidation. 
According to Rogers (2003), complexity can be a very important obstacle to 
adoption or support for an innovation. For those having experience with consolidation, 
merger might have been viewed less complex. However, few, if any, with LMPO had 
any experience with a police department consolidation and might not have perceived the 
complexities of the innovation and the consolidation of cel1ain organizational change 
components. 
One of the fastest growing areas of interest in recent years, related to 
organizational change, has been in the continuous transformation model which seeks to 
apply complexity theories to organizational change (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Fitzgerald, 2002a; Hock, 1999: MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001). New advancements in 
the area of complexity science focus on innovative ways in which we conceptualize and 
operationalize complexity (Anderson, 1999; McKelvey, 1997). Complexity science is 
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grounded in the belief that all organizations are "complex" and that this attribute is a 
culmination of behavior on the part many members acting in simple ways on local 
information (Dooley, 2002). The information provided adds to the concept of complexity 
and the degree of complexity in relation to an organization. While all organizations are 
complex, every organization has a different level of complexity depending upon 
organizational components, factors, structure, individuals, and the like. 
Most fundamental is that organizations are complex because the people 
comprising the organizations are complex. Schein (1980) asserts that individuals are 
complex because they vary greatly in age, gender, their histOlies and expeliences, and 
their beliefs and desires. In addition to interpersonal diversity, it is possible that people 
in the organization also fill various roJes. For example, a commanding officer on the 
police department may hold the rank of Major and be a manager, mentor, instructor, a 
team member, or a friend. The transition between these roles may not be noticeable. 
However, all of these variances of individuals and their roles add to the complexities of 
the organization. 
Complexity is an important concept that has been studied by scholars of many 
different disciplines such as systems theory, cybernetics, synergetics, and the like. 
However, even today, we are a long way fi'om consensus about what such as concept 
actually involves (Horgan, 1995; Edmonds, 1999). The failure of determining one 
definition is that the concept of complexity is complex (Kitto, 2008). As such, there is no 
single objective definition of complexity. 
In an attempt to define complexity, researchers have attempted to understand the 
mon:: straightforward concept of simplicity. Researchers have studied simple systems 
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which have, at least by their definition. been removed from the environment. The 
technique of reduction has been used and consists of dividing or splitting complex 
problems into smaller, more manageable compon<;mts. The solutions to these smaller 
issues are then transferred back to a larger solution which represents the original system 
(Kitto, 2008). 
Reduction has been attempted at police agencies. At LMPD during consolidation, 
personnel often divided problems into smaller components in order to make them more 
manageable. For example, when consolidation first occurred, both the LDP and JCPD 
training academies were working on smaller components of merging the entire training 
units such as recruit training and in-service training. However, when both groups 
reconvened, there were often scheduling conflicts between the two components. 
Many times, when reduction was used during the merger innovation and the 
smaller components of the problem were again matched with the elements ofthe larger 
problem, solutions failed to work. This was due to the fact that there was little 
interoperability between components during the problem-solving phases. As Kitto 
(2008) notes, reduction lends itself more to the natural sciences than to the social 
SCIences. 
Therefore, as the application of complexity has transcended from the natural 
sciences to the social sciences, many researchers have developed definitions for it based 
on their particular discipline and its (complexity) application to that discipline. Some of 
these definitions are noted below. 
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Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory or theories is an all encompassing tenn for a number of 
different the0l1es, thoughts, and research programs that originated in scientific disciplines 
such as meteorology, biology, physics, chemistry, and mathematics (Rcschcr, 1996: 
Stacey, 2003). As there are a vast number of different theories and not just one, many are 
influenced by their own particular discipline. Hence, it must be recognized that any 
particular definition of complexity is influenced by the perspective of the original 
discipline (Burnes, 2005). Therefore, for purposes of this paper, Black's (2000) use of 
the term "complexity theories'· rather than complexity theory will be followed to 
highlight the many different viewpoints among researchers. 
Complexity theories are increasingly being seen by academics and practitioners as 
a way of understanding organizations and promoting organizational change (Bechtold, 
1997; Black, 2000; MacBeth, 20(2) such as during a police department consolidation. 
Complexity theories are utilized in the natural sciences to argue that chaos is a necessary 
condition for the growth 0 f dynamic systems, but that these systems are prevented from 
destruction by the presence of"simpJe order-generating" rules (Gell-Mann, 1994: Gould, 
1989). When these theories are applied to organizations, proponents argue that 
organizations, like complex systems in nature, are dynamic, non-linear systems, and they 
too are governed by a set of simple "order-generating" rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997; Lewis, 1994; Macintosh and MacLean, 2001). 
A consolidating police agency meets this criterion in that the organization is 
characterized by continuous change, adivity or pro!,'Tess. Additionally, because of the 
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non-linear nature of the system, niles are devised in order to provide some form of focus, 
restraint, and/or order. 
In abrreement, Stacey et al (2002) assert that the key to survival is for all 
organizations to develop a set of niles which keep the organization operating "on the 
edge of chaos." Too much stability results in absence of change while too much chaos 
creates an overwhelming atmosphere where change cannot occur. 
At the time of merger in 2003, the entire organization was chaotic. Many changes 
such as restnlcturing, personnel movement or reassignment, information gatheling and 
the like were occurring very quickly and this was chaotic in and of itself. However, 
order-generating niles such as who would make certain decisions were established in 
order to implement change. The decision-making process was similar to each of the 
former departments in that a hierarchical system was utilized, but unlike some of the 
decision-making in the former departments, every bit of information needing a decision 
did not need to be sent to the Chief of Police tor approval. The new system was more 
streamlined in that individuals of lower ranks such as committee chairs were empowered 
to make decisions. This assisted in the consolidation efforts. 
Many different definitions of complexity exist among researchers. Corning 
(2002, p. 56) asserts that "in short, contradictory opinions abound." Even though there 
are many competing ideas and theories, three key ones are most cited: chaos theory; 
dissipative stmctures theory; and the theory of complex adaptive systems (Stacey et ai, 
2002). 
Chaos theory is resultant from research conducted on weather systems by Lorenz 
(1993). Lorenz (1993) defined chaotic systems as processes that appear to advance 
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according to chance, even though their behavior is in fact determined by precise laws. 
Chaos theory involves dynamic systems that are continually changing themselves in an 
irreversible and thus evolutionary manner (Bechtold, 1997; Haigh, 2002). 
According to the theory, small changes in the environment, especially during the 
innovation of police consolidation, can be aU!,'111emed by chaos which in turn causes 
instability. This instability is integral to the convel1ing of an existing pattern of behavior 
into a new more suitable one. In an organization and more specifically, a police 
department involved in consolidating organizational change components, the changes 
causing instability can be planned, spontaneous, or anywhere in between. They can also 
be induced by individuals or factors in the environment, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
DUling organizational consolidations as in the case of LDP and JCPD, changes 
such as reorganizing patrol boundaries cause chaos and in turn, instability as this change 
caused other changes to occur such as reporting practices, changes in police rep0l1ing 
areas (PRAs), and statistical reporting for Clime analysis. These changes in many 
instances were non-linear in that they did not seem to be based in logic and many times, 
did not make sense. Additionally, these changes happened very quickly. This added to 
the complexity of the process. For example, when redefining patrol boundaries, the 
process for statistical reporting related to crime analysis changed. Crime analysts 
requested infonnation in a more timely fashion; earlier in the week than before the 
adjustment to the boundaries. \Vhile no one could understand why this had to occur, it 
worked for the organization and seemed to work bt:tter. 
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Systems may also encounter instability and reach notable places where they self 
organize to produce a varied configuration of behavior pattern (Burnes, 2005). Stacey 
(2003) refers to these configurations as dissipative structures. 
The dissipative structures theory recognizes that unless energy is fed in from the 
outside. structures will ""dissipate." Dissipative structures are similar to chaotic systems., 
According to Prigogine (1997), a dissipative structure is a somewhat constant 
configuration that operates in hanmmy with non-linear logic. Styhere (2002) goes on the 
note that in celiain positions, the structure can attract considerable external pressure, 
while in others it can be completely changed by even the smallest disturbances. These 
structures can also experience periods of instability and at certain points, reorganize to 
fonn a structure or behavior that cannot be foretold from knowledge of the prior 
condition, but rather from an internal dynamic. (Stacey, 2003). 
For LMPD, one of the outside forces providing energy for the departmental 
consolidation was the larger government consolidation. During the merger of LDP and 
JCPD, political and community considerations influenced the organizational structure of 
the agency. While the LMPD structure was like in nature with LDP and JCPD and was 
somewhat harmonious, many of the changes were considered by personnel to be 
decisions of non-linear reasoning. This was because many personnel were not aware of 
the process of consolidation and did not perceive the complexities involved in the 
process. 
The chaos theory and the dissipative structures theory focLls on entire sets and 
populations. In contrast, the complex adaptive systems approach attempts to make 
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meaning of the behavior of the individual elements of systems and populations (Stacey et 
al,2002). 
A complex adaptive system (CAS) consists of many different components, or 
"agents", working together with one another under a set ofmles so as to improve their 
behavior and, in turn, the behavior of the group which they compromise. Thcse systems 
req uire each agent to modity its behavior to that of other agents (Stacey, 2003). Put 
another way, behavior in a complex adaptive system is not influenced by a single entity, 
but rather simultaneous and cOITesponding actions of agents within the system itself. 
Learning takes place duling this interaction. In this system, all of the CASs, fonn a 
larger system which "learns its way into the future" (Stacey. 1996, p. 183). As 
individuals or sets of individuals learn, so do their groups. As these groups or sub-
systems learn, they evolve (Stacey, 1996). 
The CAS does not operate exclusively in the environment, but rather with other 
CAS's as part ofa system. Goldstein in Zimmerman et a1. (1998, p. 270) refers to self-
orga11lZlI1g as: 
"(1 process ... whereby new emergent structures, patterns, and 
properties arise without heing e.l.'ternally imposed on the 5)JStem. 
Not controlled by a central, hierarchical command-and-control 
center, self-organization is usua/~v distributed throughout the 
system. " 
Organizations are also complex adaptive systems. In these systems, groups and 
individuals fonn to affect influences over ecollomil;, political, and societal systems. All 
of these systems work collectively to evolve. 
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In government consolidations, several complex adaptive systems exist. These 
systems may be formal or informal. In these systems, sub-units are comprised of other 
sub-units and so on until a group level of individuals in a particular organization is 
reached. Complexities are part of the sub-units and the entire system and their 
behavior(s) are influenced by the simultaneous and corresponding actions of agents 
within the system itself Each of the individuals in these groups interacts and learns from 
one another. 
For example, during the LMPD consolidation, several individuals from units with 
LDP and JCPD (i.e., criminal investigation, evidence technicians, training, etc.) merged 
their activities to include, policies, structures, goals, procedures and the like. While all of 
the different units worked indcpendently from one another, they all interacted at some 
point in time. Many inforn1al individual groups formed to affect influence over systems. 
Learning took place during this interaction and the' sub-units evolved causing in turn, the 
organization to evolve. 
All of these systems work in unison to evolve and, as individuals are involved, 
complexity is viewed by many researchers as applying to human systems (Stacey, 1996). 
Adding even more credence to this thought is the fact that no research has shown to 
nullify the importance of human characteristics. 
All of these theories have differences. The primary difference is that the chaos 
dissipative structures work to build mathematical models at the macro level. To the 
contrary, while complex adaptive systems theory works toward the same goal, it utilizes 
an individual-based approach. In this theory, rules are not constructed for the whole 
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population, but for interaction for the individual entities or units making up a system. 
From this, theorists explain the behavior of the population as a whole (Burnes, 2005). 
Police agencies involved in consolidation have elements in common associated 
with all of these theories (i.e., chaos theory, dissipative structures theory, and complex 
adaptive systems). In using LMPD as an example related to the aforementioned theories, 
the department is comprised of elements from each of them. 
LMPD was a dynamic system that was always fluid during and after the 
consolidation phase. As new initiatives related to consolidation were implemented, the 
organization was constantly changing and evolving. Some of the changes involved 
complex initiatives such as consolidating or redefining cultures, policies and procedures, 
communications, collective bargaining contracts and patrol houndaries to name a few. 
All of these changes were complex. In addition, bt::cause of the consolidation, the 
department displayed complex patterns of behavior. This not only happened at the 
organizational and group level, but also at the individual level. While these behaviors 
\""ere chaotic, restraining rules that governed behavior were established that would allow 
for innovation, but at the same time discourage excessive behaviors. 
During the consolidation process, small changes caused instability. These 
changes included initiati ves as small as redefining a single policy. Changes such as this, 
while seemingly small, were complex. 
During the LDP and JCPD consolidation, energy or changes also culminated from 
the outside environment as with dissipative structures. There were also components of 
complex adaptive systems encountered during the LMPD consolidation. Individuals 
worked and leamed from other members ofthe LMPD system, especially in specialty 
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units such as narcotics, communications, investigations, etc. These systems worked with 
other systems as part of the entire larger system, LMPD. 
From the theOlies of complexity and, more specifically, the concept of chaos and 
order, chaos is seen as arbitrary or the absence of order. but is actually a form of order 
(Arndt and Bigelow (2002). Fitzgerald (2002a) asserts that chaos and order are not 
opposites to choose from, but rather like attributes of such systems and within these 
systems of chaos, there may exist some order that is hidden and less obvious than the 
randomness that is observed. Fitzgerald (2002a) also notes that non-linear systems 
contain both their own sense of instability and ordt:r. Tetenbaum (1998) summarizes the 
concept stating that chaos and order describe a complex, unpredictable, and orderly 
disorder in which patters of behavior disclose in inegular, but similar fonns. 
Such fonns of chaos and order exist in organizational consolidation. For 
example, during the merger of LDP and JCPD, the Chief of Police had a mantra of 
"Sooner is better." At each ofthe former departments, issues were handled. but not with 
the same expediency or urgency as with LMPD. While the process was chaotic for 
personnel at the inception of merger, order evolved and it became a nonnal part of 
conducting business. 
Three types of order-disorder in complex systems have been identified by Stacey 
(2003): stable equilibrium; explosive instability; and bounded instability. Stahle 
equilibrium and explosive instahility are complex systems not viewed to be able to 
convert themselves in order to survive. For organizations to survive, they must be 
flexible, not too stable and at the same time not be overly unstable. Organizations in 
these categories are not able to convert themselves to adapt to changes in the internal and 
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extemal environment. Only the hounded instahility complex system is considered as 
being capable of this transfomlation. If systems stagnate, they eventually die. 
Under bounded instahility complex systems, the conditions exist somewhere 
between the verge of order and chaos. The teml used to descrihe this condition is the 
"edge of chaos": 
Complex systems have large numhers of independent yet 
interacting actors. Rather than ever reaching a stable equilibrium, 
the most adaptive of these complex systems keeps changing 
continuously by remaining at the poetical~}' termed "edge (!f 
chaos" that exists hetween order and disorder. By staying in this 
intermediate zone, these systems never quite settle into stable 
equilibrium hut never quite fall apart. Rather, these systems, 
which .'Ita)' constantly poised between order and disorder, exhihit 
the most pro/Uic. complex and continuolls change 
and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 29). 
(Brown 
When a complex system is on the edge of chaos, the system's creativity, growth, 
and useful self-organization are optimal. But somt~ organizations go too far. Keeping an 
organization from going to the extreme is accomplished by order-generating rules. 
The most complex systems display order through a process of self organization 
(Bumes, 2005). This is accomplished by a simple set of order-generating rules, which 
allow limited chaos while providing comparative order (Frederick, 1998; Lewis, 1994; 
Madntoch and MacLean, 200 1; Stacey et ai, 2002). 
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As previously mentioned, organizations have many sub-units and consequently 
many individuals working alone and in unison with others. During the innovation of 
govemment consolidations, these complex systems of individuals are continually 
changing and are usually in a state of flux somewhere between stability and confilsion. 
This in tum caused complexity. 
At LMPD, during the consolidation process, individuals were empowered to think 
"outside of the box" and develop solutions to factors such as policies, redefining patrol 
boundaries, and consistency among collective bargaining contracts. In attempting to 
solve these complex issues, many times individuals made decisions that could harm the 
agency. In order to prevent decisions that \vould cause irreparable ham1, rules were 
developed that generated order in the processes. 
Kauffman's (1995) "rugged landscapes" is another complexity theory that states 
that complex adaptive theories evolve so that "goodness" or condition in the dynamic 
environment can be maximized to its fullest extent. The concept behind this theory 
maintains that the achievement of a system can be represented by a "landscape" where 
coordinates represent the organizational design, and the height of the topography 
represents organizational well-being. The highest point in this landscape and its 
associated well-being rate could be considered the best possible state for the system. 
When the well-being landscape is simple, it is relatively simple to optimize 
organizational perfonnancc. Administrators are responsible f()f assessing and identifying 
important factors and how they should be arranged so that the overall configuration of the 
organization complements the contingencies of the environment. 
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At LMPD, factors were identitied by the Chief of Police, command staff, officers, 
and citizens so that the configuration of the department complemented the contingencies 
of the environment. A computerized statistics program to prevent and reduce crime, 
COMPSTA T, was identified as a major factor in the environment that influenced the 
configuration of the department. Preventing crime was a major concern of the 
community. Contlgurations of units in the department were established based on 
decentralization so that commanders in patrol divisions could address crime issues in 
their area of responsibility. This "landscape" was not simple due to the many different 
departmental components involved in this process. Accordingly, organizational well-
being was difficult to realize until the culture of centralization was altered. 
Conversely, if the "landscape" is complex. as in the case of police consolidations, 
organizational well-being may bl; more difficult. Complexities such as this exist where 
optimality of the organizational system is determined by tightly coupled components 
(Kauffman, 1995). When individual components can be optimized without any 
connectivity or consideration for another, the "landscape" is considered to be simple. If 
individual components of the organization playa pmi in the overall well-being of the 
organization in a vmiety of means, the optimal organization configuration becomes 
difficult to find (Dooley, 2002). Therefore, it follows that the extent to which constituent 
elements are interdependent on each other is a deternlining factor relating to an 
organization's complexity. 
While not all elements in a police organization are interdependent, there are a 
multitude of elements that are. For example, while centralized investigative units work 
independently from patrol division in their function of follow-up investigations, they are 
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still interdependent for preliminary investigative n::ports, court testimony, initial evidence 
protection. initial scene security, etc. 
In the case of organizational consolidation related to policies and procedures, 
many complexities arise in policies because of the interdependency in them. As an 
example, when developing policy for evidence collection, such policies involve sub-units 
such as investigators, patrol officers, labs, evidence technicians and the like. All of these 
interdependent elements make for complex environments. 
Glenn and Malott (2004) liken organizations to ecosystems in that they possess 
complex interdependencies among organizational systems and their interconnected 
contingencies. They cite three types of organizational complexity: environmental, 
component, and hierarchical complexities. 
The environment outside of the organization is constantly changing and causing 
many internal changes sequentially causing complexities within the organization. These 
changes include product or service development. mergers, consolidations, government 
regulations, warfare. and bankruptcies (Glenn and Malott, 2004). Such was the ease for 
the innovation of the consolidation of LDP and JCPD. 
Changes in the external environment have an impact on the internal workings of 
the organization. Internal changes in the organization can also impact the external 
environment. Organizations that do not adapt to changes in the external environment arc 
subject to falter. 
In the case of the innovation of police consolidation of LDP and JCPD, the 
external environment dictated the merger. The government of the newly merged 
Louisville Metro was established by a referendum vote in 2001. However, other external 
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environmental considerations affected the merger of LDP and JCPD. Thest: included, but 
are not limited to political considerations, service demands, and external funding sources 
such as feckral and state b'Tants. 
Component complexity is caused by the number of elements that comprise an 
organization. These elements may exist as equals or in a hierarchical manner. 
Component complexity depends on both the numbers of people participating in 
processes, in addition to the number of processes. Therefore, the organization's 
complexity is greater when the organization has more subsystems and/or larger numbers 
of interlocking behavioral contingencies (Glenn and Maloti, 2004). Efforts must be 
systemized or risk increases of component complexity, redundancy, and inefficiency 
(Malott, 1999). 
There are many sub-systems in a police agency. During the consolidation process 
of LMPD, many sub-systems existed and included investigations, operations, and 
administration in addition to a multitude of sub-units within each of these. This in itself 
made the organization and the merger process very complex. The complexity was 
compounded during the innovation of consolidation in that all of these sub-units were 
involved in merging organizational change components. 
Hierarchical complexity is determined by the number of system levels in the 
organization. In other words, almost all entities are made up of systems and sub-systems 
(Glenn and Malott 2004). Some of these sub-systems may also have sub-systems and 
this process can continue with systems bifurcating. 
The more levels in an organization, or, the "taller" the organization, the more 
hierarchical complexity it has. Hierarchical complexity is usually aflected by component 
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complexity (Glenn and Malott 2004). For example, in a police department, the number 
of Patrol Divisions (e.g. geographic patrol areas) may be expanded from eight to ten. As 
a consequence, more Division commanders would be needed. Because of the added 
functions of each Division, additional management/supervisory levels would be needed 
to effectively manage this change/modification. 
Most hierarchical structures are assembled to mirror their organizational 
structures. As noted by Glenn and Malott (2004), these structures may be defined by 
geography, content, fonn, life expectancy, or seasonality. In police agencies, these 
structures are defined by geography, function, or a combination of both geography and 
function (Conser, et ai., 2003). 
Related to hierarchical complexity is the fw;;t that as the organization gets taller, or 
as management levels increase, the behavior ofthosc in higher levels of management 
becomes increasingly unrelated to critical components of the interconnected 
contingencies of lower levels. This adds to organizational complexity and the complexity 
of merging organizational change COmp(lllents in that the perfonnance at the lower levels 
depends on the behavior of higher levels and if such disconnect eXlsts, complexity 
abounds and organizational f.1i1ure thrives. 
This often happens in police agencies in that police officers note this disconnect 
between managers and the rank and file. Because there are so many levels of 
management, infonnation intended for either offict::rs or top management is often tIltered. 
Communication occurs, but it is often not effective communication. This adds 
complexity to the consolidation process and organization especially if the ofllcers don't 
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understand what the manager wants or needs. Conversely, if management does not 
understand the wants and needs of officers, the same chance for complexity exists. 
Complexity theory is a relatively new s<.:ience (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). 
Because these theories are primarily based in the natural sciences, proponents can cite the 
work of prominent researchers to champion their cause. However, much of the work is 
controversial. Many writers have expressed doubts about the validity of complexity 
theories (Hiett, 200 I). Most evidence explaining complexity comes from computer 
simulation models and not from empirical studies (Kauffman, 1993). However, Lissack 
and Richardson (200 I) assert that it is difficult to build meaningful computer models of 
human behavior. As a result, while these complexity theories can be utilized in the study 
of organizational theory, researchers must be cautious in their application. 
Organizational Complexity and the Environment 
Organizational environments are complex, especially dUling the innovation of a 
police consolidation. Thus, organizational complexity is seen as a response to 
complexity within the internal and external environment (Dooley, 2002). The il1te111al 
environment consists of the processes and technologies that make up the most basic 
operations of the department. For example, during an innovation such as a police 
consolidation, organization change components such as culture(s), policies and 
procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol 
division boundaries are internal to the organization and are all complex issues that arc 
usually merged, revised, redefined and then re-implemented. The external environment 
includes customers, markets and basically associations that influence the responses of the 
organization. During the innovation of police consolidation, external influences adding 
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to complexity include political considerations, labor unions, community members, 
businesses and special groups to name a few. According to Dooley (2002), the 
complexity of both the internal and external environments can be described along three 
dimensions: its differentiation or variety, its dynamic properties, and the complexity of its 
underlying causal mechanisms. 
A police agency would be considered to be a complex organization that's internal 
and external environments are complex. First, in tern1S of differentiation, a police 
department's clients are very diverse in many terms (i.e., gender, ethnicity, age, type of 
client, etc.). In assessing the department's clienteh:. the perpetrators are diverse as are the 
victims. Even those in the community who are not directly affected by crime are diverse. 
Thus, diverse responses are needed for the different individuals. 
Secondly, the internal and external environments of the police department are 
varied (i.e., community, departmental, legal, etc.) adding to the complexity. Each of 
these environments requires different assessments and responses to issues. 
Third, police agencies and the environments in which they operate are dynamic in 
nature. Both the internal and external environments are constantly changing. For 
example, in policing, technological advances have been continually evolving, are 
complex and have required constant changes in policies and procedures and the ways 
police respond to clientele. 
Finally, causal mechanisms for the police organization are 110t simple. Adoption 
and diffusion processes arc complex and somdimt.!s unprt.!dictablt.!. 
Such is tht.! cast.! of a consolidated police agency. A policing agency in the 
process of merging organizational change compont:nts sllch as culture(s), policies and 
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procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and patrol division 
houndaries is even more complex. 
Organizations usually arrange themselves so that they can react to environmental 
emergencies. Thus, a complex environment requires a complex organization (Thompson, 
1967). For example, the structure in a police agency is very complex and is established 
hased 011 geographic area, function, or a combination of both (Conser, et ul., 2003). 
Depm1ments are structured in this fashion so that it can respond to needs of both the 
internal and external environment. In the case of LMPD, the department is structured by 
both area and function which is a factor causing a degree of even more complexity. 
Thompson (1967) asserts that this follows the general principle within systems 
theory called "requisite variety", which states that the complexity of a control system 
must be at least as great as the complexity of the system that is being controlled. 
However, the organization in and of itself is usually less complicated that the 
organil:ation's environment. Even so, complex organizational change components such 
as eulture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, 
and re-defining patrol division boundaries are related in the environments of police 
depm1ments that are consolidating. 
Still, the organizations make an effort to complement their complexity with the 
environment through differentiation. The differentiation into smaller units, the 
differentiation of center/periphery, the differentiation of confonning versus deviant 
behavior. hierarchical ditlerentiation, and functional differentiation are ways an 
organization attempts to mah:h its complexity with the extemal environment (Luhmann, 
1995). While this differentiation may be viewed as complementary, it causes even more 
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complexity. This is especially true in consolidated police agencies where there is a 
variety of differentiation. Other factors such as turbulence, hostility, diversity, technical 
complexity and restrictiveness may all lead to environmental complexity (Khandwalla, 
1977). 
Internal environments and the complexity of those environments result in 
differences in organizational complexity. Organizational change components, in addition 
to other methods, procedures, and processes that require action on the part of 
organizations are more and more complex as organizations get more complex. Over 
time, this complexity has necessitated more specialists to understand the causal 
system(s). 
However, in many cases, individuals involved in the organization do not perceive 
the complexity of these issues. This has the potential of affecting the attitudes of 
personnel. In police organizations, many of the specialists are persons of higher rank or 
individuals with a vast amount of experience. Personnel such as patrol officers and 
officers in the lower supervisory ranks often do not perceive the complexities of issues 
such as organizational change components that are being merged during the innovation of 
consolidation. As such, greater effort is required toward integration and coordination, 
again adding to the variety of tasks that the organization must do to function effectively 
(Dooley. 2002). This addition of tasks also adds to complexity and to the perception of 
complexity relating to organizational change components. 
Complexities in public organizations exist as a response to their institutional 
environment. Powell (19R8) states that puhlic organizations "located in environments in 
which conflicting demands are made upon them will be especially likely to generate 
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complex organizational structures with disproportionatdy large administrative 
components and boundary spanning units" (p. 126). This is done in an etf01i to better 
manage the complexities of the organization and its environment. 
Police agencies model this comment in that organizational structures are very 
complex hierarchical structures. Due to the fact that most police agencies are structured 
by area and function, some of the functions such as homicide, robbery, burglary, etc. span 
different jUlisdictional boundaries. As such, administrative components within the 
organization arc increased due to the many specialized functions and the areas they cover. 
The more components an organization has, the more complex the organization is and the 
more complex the organizational change components are that are used to manage the 
organization (i.e., policies and procedures. communications, collective bargaining 
contracts, etc.). This complexity is emphasized even more when merging oces during 
the innovation of police consolidation. 
Implications of Complexity Theory for the Innovation of Police Consolidation 
The theory that organizations are complex, non-linear systems whose members 
can shape their present and future behavior through unprompted self-organizing is 
debated by organizational theorists and practitioners alike (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000; 
Bechtold. 1997; Fitzgerald, 2002a; Lewis, 1994; I'v1acintosh and MacLean, 2001; Stacey, 
2003). Similar to complex systems of nature, organizations must also modify themselves 
so that they can survive and prosper. 
Such is the case with consolidated police organizations. In order to survive and 
prosper, consolidated police organizations must adapt to the intemal and extemal 
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environment during their evolution. They must bl~come more efficient and effective 
while merging services and continually adapting to increasing service needs. 
Much of the complexity literature is based on a chaotic platform. In successful 
organizations, conditions exist somewhere between the verge of order and chaos. The 
term used to describe this condition is the "edge of chaos." The most complex systems 
display order through a process of self organization (Burnes, 2005). This is 
accomplished by a simple set of order-generating rules, which allow limited chaos while 
providing comparative order (Frederick, 1998; Lewis, 1994; MacIntoch and MacLean, 
2001; Stacey et al, 2002). 
Police agencies experiencing the innovation of consolidation are like in nature. 
Many complex sub-units or self organizing systems exist in all police agencies. These 
complex systems consist of many individuals who work alone and also with others. The 
coexistence of the self organizing systems also <:n:ates complexities. In tum, these 
complexities are further increased by the task at hand. It is the relationship between these 
components or sub-units within the system and lhe tasks they are completing, in addition 
to the number of them and their degree of difficulty that determines their complexity. 
However, oftentimes, individuals in the organization do not perceive the intIicacies of 
these complexities. 
Organizational change components encountered dUling the consolidation of a 
police department such as culture, policies and procedures, communications, contractual 
concerns, and redefining patrol boundaries are all complex issues. Complexity increases 
in addressing these factors due to their many facets and the number of sub-units in the 
organization. As part of a system, the sub-units often never acquire stable equilibrium. 
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To the contrary, they keep changing continuously in a state of chaos that exists in an 
intenllediate zone somewhere between order and disorder. By doing so, these systems 
tend to survive and engage in continual and complex change. Due to the many 
complexities involved in the innovation of a police consolidation, police officers might 
not perceive the difficulty in merging the OCCs thereby ultimately affecting their attitude 
toward support of the merger. 
Thomas (2003) asselts that the many controversies associated with the study of 
organizations have yet to be detennined. However, complexity theories can offer some 
insight into organizational change and the complexities of the innovation of a police 
department consolidation. 
The diffusion of innovation is critical to any new idea. The attlibute of 
complexity regarding an innovation is of primary lmportance in understanding a police 
consolidation such as the LMPD merger. It is even more critical when addressing major 
undertakings such as organizational change components (i.e., culture(s), policies and 
procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and redefining patr01 
boundaries). This is especially true related to an individual's perception of the 
complexity of merging the OCCs. However, in the case ofLMPD, most involved in the 
consolidation might not have perceived the difficulty in merging the accs due to the tact 
that they have never encountered such an innovation. While consolidation is not a new 
concept, it is entirely a new idea/thought for members of the newly fomled Louisville 
Metro Police Department. 
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Summary 
The nature of metropolitan areas and the issues related to them are both 
complicated and multifaceted. Many of the issues and problems associated with cities 
and metropolitan areas point to the failure of fragmented local governments to tackle 
issues such as sprawl, socioeconomic disparities, and concentration of poverty that affect 
the entire region. Jones (1942) asserts that in order to correct these issues/problems, 
governments must rely on some fonn of regional government which involves some f011n 
of consolidation or cooperation between local governments. While this course is seen as 
necessary to effectively address and respond to the problems of the metropolis (Jones, 
1942), this issue is not without controversy. 
In the study of government, two prominent thoughts influence the literature 
related to government consolidation: l110nocentlic government and polycentric 
government. Debates over these fonns of government and which one is supelior date 
back to the 1930's. Proponents of consolidation argue of the inefficiencies and 
ineffective nature resulting fl'om the duplication in governmental services caused by the 
fragmented nature oflocal government (Rusk, 2003, 1999; Peirce, 1993; StudenskL 
1930). Public choice proponents assert that single unit governments are unresponsive, 
cumbersome, ineffective, and inefticient in delivering services, thereby decreasing 
competition for services (Bish and Ostrom, 1974; Tiebout, 1956). Stephens and 
Wikstrom, (2000) SUppOI1 this proposition stating that when consolidations do occur, 
service problems exist and consolidations are usually incomplete, but are shown strong 
support by a mayor and council. 
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Research is plentiful relating to which fonn oflocal government is more 
economical. In reviewing the research, there appears to be some agreement among the 
monocentric and polycentlic scholars that local govemments are unable to handle all of 
the problems in a metropolitan area (see Stephens and Wikstrom). Nonetheless, 
researchers have conducted few studies focusing on the impact government consolidation 
and its etIects on sub-units of the government and its employees after the intebTfation of 
the entities. One of the entities or sub-units in question is the police depmiment. 
As noted by IACP (2003), consolidation proponents assert that a police agency 
merger would produce J) a higher volume ofpoliee services, 2) lower response times 
related to calls for service, 3) reduce overtime, 4) reduce duplication of effort, and 5) 
lower overall operating costs. They con1inue that consolidation of police agencies would 
ultimately save money, produce greater efficiency and flexibility in response to crime, 
and provide for greater opportunities for advancement for both S\1I,'0m and civilian 
personnel (IACP, 2003). Those who oppose consolidation are anxious that merging 
police agencies would result in loss of community independence and reduced oversight 
and supervi sion (lAC P, 2003). 
Police consolidations arc similar to government consolidations in that many 
studies have focused on the economic t~lctors of consolidating police agencies. Similarly, 
both government consolidation and police consolidation res~arch has resulted in 
inconclusive findings as to which type oflaw enforcement departmental structure 
(consolidated or fragmented) is most effective and efficient in addressing the needs of 
govemment, citizens, and the community. Ostrom and Smith (1976) state that there 
appears to be a consensus that smaller agencies should consolidate. 
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The majority of police consolidations occur with smaller agencies. These usually 
occur when I) cities experience a population decline and 2) delivery and/or financial 
problems are present (Halter, 1993). Wickum (1986), in support notes other factors such 
as high costs, liability concems, and a lack of police credibility as elements leading to 
discussions of consolidation. 
Consolidations involve organizational change that requires the integration of 
some or all parts of the original organizations' functions and activities. This integration 
of functions and activities varies in degrees from one type of consolidation to the next 
(IACP, 2003). 
Understanding the contextual bases or dynamics in which a consolidation occurs 
(i.e., stmctural complexity and stmctural control, type of consolidation, and stages of a 
consolidation) can provide insight into the complexities of the process. It can also add to 
knowledge relatt:d to how the organization, employees and their rarities and perceptions 
are affected. 
The initiation of eff(nis toward consolidation of police agencies is a difficult 
undertaking. How changes are made is integral to the process. Diffusion of innovation 
theory, along with complexity theory provides some insight into the consolidation 
process. 
Diffusion is a special kind of communication that is associated with the 
distribution of messages that are viewed as new ideas. Diffusion is integral to the 
innovation of police consolidation in that it not only communicates new ideas, but also 
the complexities associated with them. 
73 
Diffusion is similar to a type of social change. It is a form of change that takes 
place in the structure and function of a social system such as the Louisville Metro Police 
Department. When a change of magnitude occurs such as a police consolidation and the 
merging of organizational change components, the entire social system ofthe entity is 
changed. Not only is the merging ofOCCs complex, but the change in and of itself is 
complex. 
Based on the detinition of Rogers (2003), four mail elements exist in diffusion. 
These include 1) communication channels, 2) time, 3) the social system, and 4) the 
innovation. A communications channel is used to transcend messages from one 
individual to another. Time, according to Rogers (2003), is involved in diffusion in 1) 
the innovation-decision process. 2) innovativeness, and :3) an innovation' s rate of 
adoption. Interrelated units that are engaged in shared problem solving to achieve a 
common goal is known as a social system (Rogers, 2003). Innovation is viewed as a 
concept or procedure that is viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. One of the 
most significant attlibutes related to an innovation such police consolidation is 
complexity. 
In reviewing the literature, it is dear that there are many perspectives as to the 
basis of complexity and the research ranges fi'om cursory to well-considered. Most of the 
literature is conducted by researchers who are not experts in the fields whose tindings 
they report. Therefore, in transcending complexity theory from the natural sciem:es to 
the social sciences. one must begin with an "act of faith" (Wheatley, 1992). 
Complexity is an important concept, but one in which there is no consensus about 
what such as concept actually involves (Horgan, 1995; Edmonds, 1999). As mentioned, 
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the application of complexity began with the natural sciences and is now being used by 
the social sciences. As such, definitions have been based on the discipline of study. 
Even so, complexity theories are utilized more and more to understand organizations 
(Bechtold, 1997; Black, 2000; MacBeth, 2002). 
Complexity theorists argue that chaos is a necessary condition for the growth of 
dynamic systems, but that these systems are prevented from destruction by the presence 
of "simple order-generating" rules (Gell-tvlann, 1994; Gould, 1989). Organizations, such 
as police agencies dUling a merger, are seen as such due to the fact that they, like 
complex systems in nature, are dynamic, non-linear systems and they too are governed by 
a set of simple "order-generating" rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997: Lewis, 1994; 
MacIntosh and MacLean, 200 I). The key to survival then, is for all organizations to 
develop a set of rules which keep the organization operating "on the edge of chaos" 
(Stacey et aI., 2002). 
Such is the case of the LMPD consolidation. During the consolidation process, 
the LMPD was constantly changing and dynamic in nature. Many of the organizational 
change components that were merged or changed such as cultures, policies and 
procedures and collective bargaining contracts to name a few, were complex in and of 
themselves. During this dynamic time, rules were developed to preserve order in the 
organization. 
Many difterent theories and their ddinitions exist among complexity researchers. 
Three key ones are most cited; chaos theory; dissipative structures theory; and the theory 
of complex adaptive systems (Stacey ct al, 2(02). 
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Chaos theory involves small changes in the environment that are followed by 
chaos causing instahility. Instahility causes a change of behavior into a new more 
suitable one. In the innovation of the LMPO consolidation, the merging of organizational 
change components involved changes causing instability. 
The dissipative structures theory recognizes that unless energy is fed in from the 
outside, structures will "dissipate." Structures experience periods of instability and 
reorganize to form a structure fi'om an internal dynamic. (Stacey. 2003). External 
"energy" was fed in from the outside during the innovation of consolidating the LOP and 
JCPD. Much of this energy in the external environment was a result of government 
merger. community concerns and political considerations. 
In contrast, to the aflxementioned theories, the complex adaptive systems 
approach attempts to make meaning of the behavior of the individual elements of systems 
and populations (Stacey et ai, 2002). Complex adaptive systems (CAS) consist of many 
different components that work together under one set of rules so as to improve their 
behavior and the behavior of the group which they compromise. Such is the case of 
merging the different organizational change components throughout many different suh·· 
units during the innovation of merging the police department 
Component complexity is caused by the number of elements and is dependent 
upon both the numbers of people pmiicipating in processes, in addition to the number of 
processes. Therefore. the organization· s complexity is greater when there are more 
subsystems and/or interlocking behavioral contingencies (Glenn and Malott, 2004). 
Hierarl.:hical complexity is determined by the number of system levels in the 
organization. The more levels in an organization, or. the '·taller" the organization, the 
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more hierarchical complexity it has. Additionally, hierarchical complexity is usually 
affected by component complexity (Glenn and Malott, 2004). 
LMPD had elements in common with all of these theories. Chaos existed within 
the organization causing instability. Also, many different sub-systems existed within the 
organization that worked together to accomplish issues. Additionally, energy was many 
times fed into the organization during consolidation from the external environment. 
Finally, the organization was hierarchal in nature. 
Complexity theory is a relatively new science (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). 
Because these theolies are primarily based in the natural sciences, much of the work is 
controversial. Even though researchers must be cautious in using these models, 
complexity theories can offer some insight into organizational change. 
While the diffusion of innovation is applicable to police department 
consolidations, it is unreasonable to assume that aU individuals would accept the 
innovation. During the consolidation of LDP and JCPD, many systems were complex. 
In 1110st cases, individuals had no experience or perception ofthe complexity involved in 
merging organizational change components that were a substantial part uftbe innovation 
of the consolidation. For innovations, especially police department consolidations such 
as LMPD, issues such as the complexities of organizational change components within 
the system of consolidation and officers' perceptions of the complexity ofOCCs being 
merged or changed during merger arc bclieved to have an affect on attitudes toward 
acceptance of the consolidation. 
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CHAPTER III 
LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT-
THE HISTORY OF CONSOLIDATION 
Government leaders are always looking for ways to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of government. Likewise, police practitioners look for ways to improve their 
operations in tenns of effectiveness and efficiency. In any community contemplating 
consolidation, almost all stakeholders enter into discussions with preconceptions about 
the value, if any, of joining together agencies. These discussions have either a positive or 
negative set of expectations. The Louisville merger was no different. 
In the years preceding 2000, there was much discussion regarding the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government in both the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, 
Kentucky. Many of these discussions date back to the late 1970's and the early 198()"s 
when the first talks of government consolidation took place. These discussions 
eventually led to a "merger" referendum in 1982 and 1983. However, the merger of 
Louisville and Jefferson County governments \,\Ias defeated on both occasions. 
Many of the talks involving merger revolved around police services and the 
merger of the two largest police agencies in Jefferson County. the Louisville Division of 
Police and the Jefferson County Police DepaJiment. In fact, discussions of a police 
merger in Jefferson County date back to the early 1950's. In a series published in 1967 
by the Courier-Journal, a Louisville newspaper, it is noted that a police department 
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merger was recommended by a Jefferson County Grand Jury for the purpose of "greater 
efficiency and better policing" (Courier-Journal, 1967). 
In 1961, renewed enorts rekindled to consolidate the two departments under the 
leadership of County Judge Marlow W. Cook and Mayor William O. Cowger, both of 
whom vowed dming their individual campaigns to consolidate the two agencies. When 
elected, they worked together to establish a committee to study the two departments 
merging. They also contracted with the Intemational Association of Chiefs of Police 
(LA.C.P.) to perform an initial study of how the departments would merge. As a result of 
this study, IACP determined that the merger was practical, hut there would need to be 
several unique modifications in state legislation. 
Police consolidation was again discussed in 1965 between County Judge Marlow 
Cook and then Louisville Mayor Kenneth Schmied. These conversations carried over to 
1966 when a Jeflcrson County Citizens Advisory Committee made a proposal "urging 
that the City and County Police Forces be replaced by a county-\vide police department." 
(Louisville-Jefterson County Crime Commission, 1998, p. 1-5). Advocates of this 
consolidation anticipated, and hoped, that the IACP study of both police agencies would 
produce the basis for a comprehensive consolidation study for both departments. 
During early discussions, proponents of the departmental consolidation in 
Louisville brought attention to the many reasons they were pro-consolidation, including 
increased etliciency through combined records and communications. Reductions in 
supervisory personnel were also cited as an advantage and this, in tum, would increase 
the number of patrol officers. This would be accomplished by converting supervisory 
positions in the budget to police officer positions thereby decreasing the number of 
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supervisors and adding to the number of police officers who would be assigned to street 
duty. Another reason for the consolidation was standardized recruitment practices and 
training procedures. Ultimately, all ofthe aforementioned reasons were said to be the 
impetus for improving morale among sworn officers (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission, 1998). However, there would need to be changes in legislation, especially 
as it related to the different and distinct pension systems each department had at the time. 
As time passed, more etfectiveness was sought in government, and the center of 
the debate in consolidating police departments evolved into merging the Louisville and 
Jefferson County governments. [n 1992 and 1983, the community voted on consolidating 
governments and the bill was defeated, largely, in part, due to the difference in 
community opinion and apprehension that community representation and services to 
certain portions of the community would be reduced. This perception pernleated western 
Louisville and the southern and southwest areas of Jetferson County (Louisville-Jefferson 
County Crime Commission, 1998). These areas '.'vere comprised of mostly lower income 
or lower-middle income residents and, particularly in the West End, African-Americans. 
As discussions evolved regarding the merger, talks focused on redefining political 
boundaries or areas. Under the City of Louisville and the Jefferson County governments, 
each of the aforementioned areas had substantial representation in their respective 
political systems. However, these residents believed that their representation in the metro 
government would be diminished ifmerger took place since their areas might be 
incorporated with other areas in larger, newly created political jurisdictions. 
As a result of this vote defeating the consolidation of governments, Louisville and 
Jefferson County established a cooperative agreement to advance economi(; and 
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community growth within the overall corporate boundaries. In 1986, Mayor Jerry 
Abramson and County Judge/Executive Harvey Sloane negotiated the Cooperative 
Compact Agreement. This twelve-year agreement provided for the sharing of revenues 
and taxes, in addition to dividing the economic responsibility for agencies that had been 
mutually funded by both governments. The agreement also limited annexation of 
unincorporated areas of Jefferson County. 
Even though the Cooperative Compact Agreement was signed, discussions still 
lingered regarding police agency consolidation and especially, certain units in the police 
depm1ments, two of which were the Narcotics Units and the Youth Bureaus. In 1987, the 
Crimes against Children Unit was created to consolidate the Youth Bureaus of both 
agencies and the Missing and Exploited Children's Unit of the Jefferson County Police 
Department. This was done in order to take a community-wide approach to crimes 
against children and also to improve communications and intelligence sharing between 
the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department. In 1990, 
the Metro Narcotics Unit was established. This unit, a consolidation of both 
depaI1ments' narcotics units, was also established to enhance community-wide dJUg 
enforcement etTorts and increase the flow of intormation between both agencies. 
In 1994, the Jefferson County Governance Project was established by the 
Jefferson County J udge/Executive David Armstrong, the Mayor of the City of Louisville 
Jerry Abramson, the County Commissioners, and the Louisville Board of Aldermen. The 
··committee" was petitioned to study govemmental institutions and make 
recommendations to ensure the efficient delivery of govemmental services to enhance 
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and support future growth and development (Jem~rson County Governance Project, Final 
Recommendations, January 1996). 
Part of the study also involved a review of inform ation, in addition to making a 
proposal regarding specific governmental tasks and services. A group was established to 
specifically study the public safety function in 1995. Their mission was: 
"To determine how the structure of the following agencies 
positively or negatively influences the efficiency, effectiveness. 
equity, and responsiveness of their respective services and 
policies. The purpose of the group is to conduct an in-depth 
investigation and analysis of the current public safety structures 
and their effolis on the delivery of services and on policy 
making" (Issues Summary. Public Safety Study Group. 
September, 1995). 
This 30-mcmber Public Safety Study Group concentrated on the services provided 
by the Jefferson County Police Department, the Louisville Division of Police, suburban 
city police departments, the Sheriffs Office as it related only to their policing 
responsibilities, the Louisville Division ofFirc, and Jefferson County Fire Districts, 
Louisvil1e and Jefferson County Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Units, Jefferson 
County Corrections, and Louisville/Jefferson County Disaster and Emergency Services. 
The services of the agencies were evaluated, in addition to issues related to training, 91 I 
and radio communications, jurisdictional matters, pay, wages, policies, collective 
bargaining, and duplication of services (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 
1998). 
In 1995, the First Cut Preliminary Recommendations of the Jefferson County 
Governance Project (October, 1995) legitimizt~d police department consolidation. 
However, the consolidation included a recommcndation to include small city police 
agencles. This recommendation was altered appreciably following extensive discussions 
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and opposition prepared by those who feared that a merged department would reduce 
service delivery to smaller cities and all but eliminate enforcement of 5th and 6th class city 
ordinances. 
After further discussions, the Final Recommendations of the Jefferson County 
Govemance Task force was published in January 1996. The following recommendations 
were included under the police category: 
1. Support a long term vision of a single equitable, police 
protection system for all of Jefferson County. It is expected 
that this may take years: therefore it is recommended that 
supportive discussions begin and that govemment endorse 
ongoing eftolis to implement friendly mutual consolidation of 
suburban city police depmiments. 
2. Law enforcement agencies should be able to communicate 
through the use of a common communications system. 
3. Establish a shared Records Information System disseminating 
information regarding complaints, stal istics, and data analysis 
for use by all departments including the Department of 
Corrections. 
4. Consistent hiring and training standards should be required for 
all law enforcement officers within the Jefferson County lines. 
A regional training facility should be: established, located in 
Jefferson County, which coordinates content (including 
cultural diversity) for use by all law enforcement agencies 
(p.8). 
It is important to note that these recommendations were included in the 
"Altemative Opinions" section of the Final Report due to the fact that it was an item that 
failed to receive support by at least 70o;~) of the Task Force members who were present. 
Support was primarily focused on merging the Jefferson County Police Department and 
the Louisville Division of Police. A modified recommendation provided "smaller city 
police departments with the "option to negotiate with the ne\v government to be pmi of 
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the new metropolitan police department (Jefferson County Governance Project, 1996, p. 
17.)" 
Following the aforementioned recommendations, an attitude survey was 
conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission. One part of 
the survey targeted citizens residing in both the City of Louisville and Jefferson County. 
The construction and distribution of the survey emphasized not only a representative 
demographic sample, but also provided for equal input from residents of both 
jurisdictions. 
The survey \vas performed by telephone calls to the respondents. Times the calls 
were made varied for approximately five-weeks during the late spring of 1998. 
Telephone calls were made until a proportionate sample was realized. The sample 
attained included approximately half of the respondents from the City of Louisville and 
half from Jefferson County. A total of I ,873 surveys were completed. City of Louisville 
residents represented 50.7% (951) of the sample. Jefferson County residents residing 
outside of the city limits, yet within the jurisdiction of Jefferson County represented 
49.2% (922) of the sample. 
According to the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission Report (1998), 
most respondents to the survey (69.7%) reported that they were aware of the anticipated 
consolidation. Approximately half of all residents (52%) supported consolidation while 
8% opposed consolidation. A relatively large proportion of the respondents (39.9%) 
were undecided. City resident respondents (55.7(1(,) were more likely than Jefterson 
County residents (4~L3%) to support consolidation. Consolidation was opposed more by 
Jefferson County residents (I 1.3(~o) than by City residents (4.9%). 
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In general, most of the respondents, whether a resident of the City of Louisville or 
Jefferson County, supported consolidation. SUpp0l1 tor consolidation was much more 
prominent than opposition against consolidation. 
After failing to pass a referendum on consolidation on three different occasions 
(1956, 1982 and 1983) the citizenry of Louisville and Jefferson County, by a vote of 54% 
to 46%, successfully passed a referendum to consolidate their govemments in Novemb(;:r 
2000 (Jefferson County Kentucky Clerk's Office/Election Center, 2000). In 2003, the 
newly formed govemment was the tlrst consolidation of a major metro area in three 
decades, increasing the population size of Louisville from the 65th largest city to the 26th 
largest city in the nation (lnfoplease, 2008). 
Many ofthose against consolidation were apprehensive over the perceived 
adverse impact to both suburban and urban residents. Consolidation drew considerable 
concern ti'om primarily minority communities in the "old" City of Louisville due to the 
power realignment resulting from structural changes (Savikh and Vogel, 2004a, b). 
Many proponents cited that consolidation would enhance economic development in the 
area due to a now unitied fi'ont to address economic devdopment efforts. 
The passing oCthe consolidation referendum was attributed to several factors. 
Most noteworthy was the supp0l1 of current and former political leaders whose backing 
was acquired due to the "towering of expectations" (Allegheny Institute, 2005). Also, 
consolidation was defeated in the past due to 80 small municipalities in Jefferson County 
being required to dissolve. The consolidation vote in 2000 would exempt these cities 
from any dissolution. This was considered to he a necessary concession tor the 
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aforementioned municipalities in order for the consolidation to take place. Thus, only the 
City of Louisville would he ahsorhed into the larger consolidation. 
The consolidation of services, departments, or authorities, in an effort to save 
money, was never an important topic of discussion prior to the Louisville-Jefferson 
County consolidation (Allegheny Institute, 2005). House Bill 647 (see Commonwealth 
of Kentucky, 2000) authorized the consolidation of government and left all former 
county-level offices untouched. The offices of the County judge-executive, justices of 
the peace, and County commissioners had their powers limited, but were intact. The 
consolidated govemment also left untouched fire protection distIicts, sanitation districts, 
water districts, and all other special taxing or service districts. The aforementioned 
services would operate as they did prior to consolidation with the same pen-ver and duties 
and would maintain funding by the new government as they had prior to the 
consolidation. 
Even though there were discussions prior to the consolidation occurring, no 
fonnal commitments \vcrc made to consolidate sub-units/depm1ments or functions in 
order to save money. However, sub-units of government continually felt tht: pressure 
from political leaders to do so. 
Constructing the New LMPD 
Perhaps the most prominent, and celiainly the largest departmental consolidation 
in the newly fonned Louisville Metro government was between the Louisville Division 
of Police (LOP) and Jefferson County Police OepaIiments (JCPD). Both agencies havc a 
distinguished history of dedicated service to the citizens of Louisville and Jefferson 
County. The Louisville Division of Police came into being in 1806 and just prior to 
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consolidating with the JCPD had an authorized strength of 723 swom offIcers and 324 
civilian personne1. JCPD began its operations in 1868. Prior to consolidation, JCPD had 
an authorized strength of 450 sworn officers and 225 civilian personne1. Both of these 
agencies, prior to the consolidation in 2003, were autonomous with the exception of the 
previously mentioned Crimes Against Children Unit \-vhich consolidated in 1987 and the 
Metro Narcotics Unit established in 1990 (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission, 1998). 
The actual consolidation process or the steps to consolidating the LOP and the 
JCPD are primarily undocumented or limited at best. The information, for the purposes 
of this paper, was secured from a 1998 rep0l1 conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson 
County Crime Commission, and staff presentations from the former Chiet~ Robert White, 
and his staff. These documents outline the consolidation of LDP and J CPD and provide 
a brief summation of the issues, decisions, and events that occurred. 
Previewing Support for the Consolidation of LMPD 
In 1998 and prior to govemment consolidation, the Louisville-Jefferson County 
Crime Commission conducted several surveys in order to detennine the support for 
consolidation, in addition to the fiscal, administrative, and operational presumptions of 
consolidating LDP and JCPD. Part of this study, as previously mentioned, focused on 
citizens residing in the City of Louisville and Jctlerson County. This research also 
included a survey attempting to ascertain the perceptions and attitudes of each 
departmenf s personnel. The population surveyed consisted of the 1,722 sworn and 
civilian personnel comprising both LDP and JCPD. Of the 1,722 sworn and civilian 
personnel, 1,210 responded to the survey - a 70%, response rate. Of the respondents, 685 
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(57.4%) were from LDP and 508 (42.6%) were trom JCPO. It should be noted that the 
diffcrence in the total numbers is rdlective of the number of persons responding to a 
particular or specitic question, 
This survey did not addrcss all of thc qucstions of attitude and perceptions of 
police officers toward or against consolidation, such as perceptions of complexity in 
merging organizational change components. Howe\'cr, it did offer some insight into 
issues of concern that police officers and civilian personnel had regarding the possibility 
of consolidation. 
One question that was presented in the survey to police oftIcers assessed their 
suppOli for the consolidation of LOP and JCPO. Table 1 displays the results for support 
tl1r thc merger and a comparison between LOP and JePD s\vorn personnel. 
Table 1 - LDP and JCPD Support for Mergl'r* 
LOP Sworn JCPO Sworn 
Very strongly in favor of a merger 39.0~,'O (199) 2.1%(8) 
Mostly in favor of a merger 30.4% (155) 2,7% (10) 
Mildly in favor of a merger 12.7% (65) 5,3% (20) 
Mildly opposed to a merger 4,3()/o (22) 4.0% (15) 
Mostly opposed to a mergcr 5.1%(26) 11.2% (42) 
Strongly opposed to a merger 8.4% (43) 74.7% (280) 
*ffCll11 1 !J9S Study hy Louisville·Jefkr,on Count)' Crime Cl'lllmissiul~ 
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Based on the findings of the survey, 82.1~;,) of the LDP sworn personnel were in 
favor of consolidation (39'()% very strongly in favor of a consolidation, 30.4% mostly in 
favor of a consolidation. and 12.7f% mildly in favor of a consolidation). However, 89.9%> 
of the JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to consolidation (74.7% strongly opposed to 
a consolidation, 11.2% mostly opposed to a consolidation, and 4.0% mildly opposed to a 
consolidation). 
The survey also assessed perceptions and attitudes on how the consolidation 
would affect the offIcer in the following areas: 1) pay, 2) unifonTI and equipment 
expenses, 3) promotion opportunity, 4) health insurance, 5) access to take-home vehicle, 
6) supervision, T) training, 8) pension, 9) safety. 10) access to specialized assignments, 
and II) pride in the job. Table 2 represents the findings related to LDP sworn personnel. 
Table 2 depicts the beliefs of LDP personnel who thought that most items would 
remain about the same under a consolidated department. LDP personnel listed only two 
of the aforementioned items as possibly being better: pay (77.2%» and health insurance 
(57.3%). They did not believe that any of the othtT items listed above would deteriorate 
under a consolidated department. 
Table 3 lists the finding related to the sworn personnel of .JCPD. Contrary to LDP 
personnel, JCPD personnel believed that most items would get worse under a 
consolidated depmiment, including their pay (59.7%), uniforms and equipment expenses 
(61.8%), promotional opportunity (62.71~/O). health insurance (76.0%), access to take-
home vehicles (63.8%), supervision (52.7%1), al:cess to specialized assignments (59.0%), 
and pride in job (60.3%). No items were rated by JCPD personnel as having the potential 
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to be better under a consolidated depaIiment. In fact, they listed only three items 
(training, pension, and safety) as likely to remain about the same. 
Table 2 - LOP Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation* 
Area Much Somew-hat About Somewhat Much Better Better the same Worse Worse 
Your Pay 35.3% 41.9%, 20.7~/O 1.4% .8% (232) (275) (136) (9) (5) 
Your unifom1s & 18.7% 30.5% 43.4% 4.8%, 2.6% 
equipment expenses (109) (178) (253) (28) ( 15) 
Your promotion 7.1% II . 7·~~ 48.2% 20.2% 12.8% 
opportunity (44) (73) (300) ( 126) (80) 
Your health insurance 27.5~~) 29.8% 40.6% 1.6% .6% (176) (l9l) (260) (10) (4 ) 
Your access to take-home 19.4% 13.9% 63.2~/;, 2.1% 1.5% 
vehicle (103 ) (74) (336) (11 ) (8) 
Your supervision 5.8% 
5.6(% 77,5<'/0 7.7% 3.4% 
(37) (36) (496) (49) (22) 
Your training 5.8% 11.4% 73.9% 7.2% 1.9% (37) (73) (475) (460) ( 12) 
Your pension 10.6% 18.1% 69.m'o L[% .6% (67) (115) (442) (7) (4) 
Your safety 9.0% 
[4.2%, 69.4% 5.8% 1.7% 
(58) (91 ) (446) (37) (11 ) 
Your access to specialized 6.5% 15.40,'0 55.8%, 15.7% 6.7% 
assignments (39) (92) (334) (94) (40) 
Pride in job 8.2% 15.3°/;-' 68.6% 4.9% 3.1% (53 ) (99) (445) (32) (20) 
"From 1998 Study by Lnuiwi1l<:'·Je!f<:'r,oI1 ('punty Clime C ommissi(lll 
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Table 3 - JCPD Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation* 
Area Much Somewhat About Somewhat Much Better Better the same Worse Worse 
Your Pay 3.7% 6.5% 30.1% 29.4% 30.3% (18) (32) (147) (144) (148) 
Your uniforms & 2.5% 2.3~~) 33.3~iO 29.2'% 32.6% 
equipment expenses (11 ) (10) ( 144) ( 126) (141 ) 
Your promotion 3.4% 7.70/0 26.2% 21.3% 41.4% 
opportunity ( 16) (36) (123) (l00) (194) 
Your health insurance 1.5%, 1.3% 21.3% 17.9% 58.1% (7) (6) (102) (86) (279) 
Your access to take-home 1. 7~/O .5% 34.0% 23.8% 40.0% 
vehicle (7) (2) (137) (96) (161) 
Your supervision 1.7% l.5% 44.2% 24.2% 28.5% (8) (7) (212) (116) (137) 
Your training 2.]% 4.40.,,(, 53.4% 17.7% 22.5% (10) (21) (257) (85 ) (108) 
Your pension 1.1% 1.1% 59.4~~, 16.8% 21.7% (5) (5) (282) (80) (103) 
Your safety 1.5% 2.5%, 53.2% 19.3% 23.5% (7) (12) (256) (93) (113) 
Your access to specialized 3.] %, 6.0%, 31.g~'o 23.8% 35.2% 
assignments (14) (27) (143) (l07) (158) 
Pride in job 2.3% 2.0(% 35.5% 24.8% 35.5% (11) (10) (173) (121 ) (173) 
"From 1998 Study hy Louisville··Jettersoll County Crime COl1lmission 
Finally, officers were asked how' the operations (i.e., cost of running the police 
department, efficiency of running the police department, coverage of all high crime areas, 
leadership, cooperation among units, training resources, and torensic resources) would be 
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affected by a consolidated department. Table 4 represents the results of the survey 
related to LDP. 
Table 4 - LDP Officer Perceptions of how Operations would be affected by 
Consolidation * 
Area Much Somewhat About Somewhat Much Better Better the same Worse Worse 
Cost of running the police 16.4% 39.5% 29.3% 10.5%, 4.3% 
department (l08) (260) (193) (69) (28) 
Efilciency of running the 21.5%, 33.6% 28.7% 10.7% 5.4{% 
police depm1ment ( 142) (222) (190) (71 ) (36) 
Coverage of all high crime 15.9% 3l.1 % 40.5%) 8.0% 4.5% 
areas (106) (207) (269) (53) (30) 
Leadership 8.4
f1'o 16.2% 59.5% 10.9~'~ 5.0% 
(55) (l06) (389) (71) (33) 
Cooperation among units 17.3% 28.1% 35.4% 12.7(10 6.5% (l15) (186) (235) (84) (43) 
Training resources 14.8% 
34.7% 44.4% 4.3% ].8% 
(97) (228) (292) (28) (12) 
Forensic resources 12.5% 26.5% 57.6% 2.3% l.1% (78) (165) 058) (14) (7) 
*Froll1 19<)8 Study hy Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission 
The majority of LDP personnel rated the cost of running the police department 
(55.9%) and efficiency of running the police department (55.1 %) as likely to improve 
under a consolidated department. No operations were seen by LDP personnel as 
declining under a consolidated depmiment. They listed leadership (59.5%) and forensic 
resources (57.6%) as the two areas they believed as likely to remain about the same. 
Table 5 represents beliefs of JCPD swom otlicers related to the operations of a 
merged police agency. 
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Table 5 - JCPD Officer Perceptions of how Operations would be affected by 
Consolidation * 
_.-_ .. _ .._-----_.- .. _ .._--_._-_ ... _------
Area Much Somewhat About Somewhat Much Better Betkr the same Worse Worse 
Cost of mnning the police 3.3%. 8.4% 20.8~·o 25.9% 4].6% 
department (] 6) (4] ) ( 102) (127) (204) 
Efficiency of mnning the 3.7% 7.3°1.. 15.]%) 28.3% 45.6% 
police department (] 8) (36) (74) (139) (224) 
Coverage of all high crime 4.6% 9.9~/(. 34.0% 18.8%) 32.7~~ 
areas (22) (48) (164) (9] ) (158) 
Leadership 2.0% 2.7% 34.6% 27.3% 33.4% (10) (13) (169) (133) (163) 
Cooperation among units 3.5% 7.80/0 30.0% 25.1% 33.7% (17) (38) (146) ( 133) ( 164) 
Training resourccs 3.7% 10.5% 48.6% ]8.6% 18.6~/o (18) (51 ) (235) (90) (90) 
Forensic resources 3.4% 9.2%, 60.3% ] 1.8% 15.4% (16) (43) (282) (55) (72) 
*Fwm ! 998 Study by Louisvilk-kffcrsull County Crimt' Commission 
Personnel with JCPD rated all operations as likely to decline or get worse under a 
consolidated department with two exceptions, training resources and forensic resources. 
Respondents were also asked to access the importance of certain outcomes related 
to a police consolidation. The outcomes related to the consolidation included unified law 
enforcement delivery, elimination of duplication of services, improved acccss to 
information, more opportunity to serve in specialty units, creation of a nationally 
recognized agency, and elimination of jurisdictional disputes. Table 6 represents the 
findings of LDP personnel. 
As depicted in Table 6, LDP personnel rated improved a<.:cess to information as 
the most important possible outcome (92.7%), followed by elimination of duplication of 
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Table 6 - LOP Officer Perceptions of Outcomes affected by Consolidation* 
Outcome Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all Important Important Important Important 
Unified law enforcement 52.0% 36.6% 9.7% 1.7% 
service delivery (342) (241 ) (64) (11 ) 
Elimination of duplication of 56.9% 34.9% 6.9% 1.2% 
serVIce (377) (231 ) (64) (8) 
Improved access to 64.3% 28.4% 6.4% .9% 
ini01111ation (425) ( 188) (42) (6) 
More opportunity to serve in 23.0% 41.6% 31.7% 3.7~;o 
specialized units (145) (262) (200) (23) 
Creation of nationally 29.4'% 34.4% 27.7% 8.6% 
recognized agency (192) (225) (181 ) (56) 
Elimination of jurisdictional 57.2~/o 28.9% 10.]% 3.8% 
disputes (378) (191 ) (67) (25) 
*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission 
service (91.8°;'0), unified law enforcement service delivery (88.6%), and elimination of 
jurisdictional disputes (86.1 %). The creation of a nationally recognized agency was last 
in importance to LOP personnel with 63.8% of the respondents believing it was either 
very important (29.4%) or important (34.4%). 
Table 7 depicts the responses of JCPO personnel who also assessed the 
importance of outcomes related to a police consolidation, such as unified law 
enforcement delivery, elimination of dupl ication of services, improved access to 
information, more opportunity to serve in specialty units, creation of a nationally 
recognized agency and elimination of jurisdictional disputes. 
As displayed in Table 7, JCPO personnel, like LOP personnel, rated improved 
access to inii:mnation as the most important possible outcome (79.3%), followed by 
d imination of duplication of service (64.7%), unifIed law enforcement serVIce delivery 
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Table 7 - JCPD Officer Perceptions of Outcomes affected by Consolidation* 
-----.. _._._---
Outcome Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all Important Important Important Important 
Unified law enforcement 35.2% 27.3% 21.8% 15.7% 
service delivery (161 ) ( 125) (100) (72) 
Elimination of duplication of 29.3% 35.4% 22.2% 12.2% 
servIce (129) (156) (98) (58) 
Improved access to 42.7% 36.6% 12.8% 7.9% 
infonnation (194) (166) {58) (36) 
More opportunity to serve in 17.9% 31.9% 33.3% 16.8% 
specialized units (77) (137) (143) (72) 
Creation of nationally 16.3% 26.2% 27.5% 30.0% 
recognized agency (73) ( 117) ( 123) (134) 
Elimination of jurisdictional 28.2% 28.0% 25.1% 18.7% 
disputes (127) (126) (113) (84) 
*Frol11 1995 Study by Louis\'ille·Jcftcrson County CrimI? COl11l1lis,ion 
(62.5%), and elimination of jurisdictional disputes (56.2%). They, just as LOP personneL 
believed that the creation of a nationally recognized agency was last in importance, 
42.5~/~1 of the respondents believing it was either very important 06.3%) or imp0l1ant 
(26.2%), 
Personnel from both agencies were additionally asked to rate the importance of 
issues needing resolution in order for consolidation to work. Both LOP and JCPO 
personnel rated a need for reconciling: 1) pay disparity (92.2%), 2) radio 
communications, and 3) other technological differences (91.2%). Seen as most important 
was reconciling union/Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) contract differences (89.2%). 
In reviewing the findings of the sun'ey of police officers conducted by the 
Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission in 1998, ditferences were revealed in 
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how each particular depaJimenfs personnel perceived the proposed police consolidation. 
As stated earlier, although it does not address or identify all issues, it does provide a basis 
or foundation in understanding some of the perceptions and attitudes about consolidation. 
Initial Planning and Formal Combination Stage 
After the consolidation referendum was passed in 2000, announcements were 
made by political leaders that the govemments of Louisville and Jefferson County would 
consolidate, in addition to the LDP and the JCPD police departments. In November 
2002, Mayor Jeny Abramson was elected as the first mayor of the consolidated 
govemment. Mayor Abramson had previous political experience as an Alderman and 
also as a 3 consecutive tenn mayor of the City of Louisville. In January 2003, the 
Louisville Metro govemment was established andl began operations. Subsequently, a 
nationwide search was conducted by the Southem Police fnstitute at the University of 
Louisville, and Chief Robert White was seleckd and swom into oftlce on January 5, 
2003 as the first chief executive of the Louisville Metro Police Department. 
One of the first steps in planning for this innovation, the consolidation of LPD 
and lCPD, was to assemble several of the commanders from each of the fonner agencies 
to start the planning process for the merger of both agencies. DUling this time, issues 
such as equipment, policies and procedures, communications, Division realignments, 
departmental mission and values, and cultun: were discussed, in addition to the 
complexity of consolidating them. 
During this phase, Chief White was also considering statf appointments (Major, 
Lieutenant Colonel, and Deputy Chief). Chief White requested all commanding officers 
to submit position papers for these positions. As part of this process, commanding 
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officers interested in staff positions were to identify the two biggest challenges facing 
consolidation and to identify, in their opinion, the future direction of the department 
(LMPD). After the papers were submitted to the Chief, he scheduled interviews so that 
he could meet with potential candidates for the staff positions. Following the interviews 
with each commanding officer, a project manager ("merger manager") was selected to 
oversee the consolidation along with the selection of a command staff-consisting of 
three Assistant Chiefs holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Soon after these 
selections, the organization was re-structured and an organizational chaI1 was created to 
identity the proposed structure of LMPD. This structure consisted offive major 
functional or operational branches: 1) Chiefs Of1ice, 2) Administrative Bureau. 3) Patrol 
Bureau, and 4) Support Bureau, and 5) Special Investigations. 
Figure 1 and 2 depicts the organizational structure ofthe tormer LDP and JCPD 
respectively. Figure 3 portrays the organizational chart of the newly fomled LMPD. 
Challenges inherited by the new command staff were ever present. Many of these 
inhelited challenges presented issues to consolidation efforts. A 11 of these challenges 
werc complex in nature. Much of the complexity came from working under 
cin.:umstances where people had never worked. For example, neither personnel from the 
former LDP or JCPD had ever been involved in consolidating two large police agencies. 
Due to personnel having no experience with a previous police department consolidation, 
they might not have perceived the complexities in addressing merger efforts and in 
p311icular, merging the organizational change components. 
First, neither administration with the fonner Louisville Division of Police or the 
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during the two years prior to the actual consolidation. Some of the unit commanders with 
each of the former agencies did attempt to talk with each other regarding the 
consolidation and how some of the particular units would merge, but there was no formal 
process for planning and no details of the complexities in merging units were ever 
discussed. In fact, because of having no first-hand experience with merger and the 
innovation of consolidating police agencies, personnel might not have perceived these 
complexities. To add to the problem of communicating with each other was the fact that 
in some cases, there was little support from the staff(s) of the fonner agencies to even 
talk about the future consolidation. 
Secondly, two budgets were inherited, each of which would expire within six 
months. Prior to the second half of the 2002/2003 fiscal year budget, many of the funds 
were expended for planned purchases because of the uncertainty of the budget(s) after 
January 1, 2003. Combining these budgets was a complex undertaking in that several 
line items from each budget were different. JCPD had some line items that LDP did not 
have and visa versa. Command staft'mcmbers with each of the former agencies might 
not have perceived the complexities of merging these budgets because they had no first-
hand knowledge of the other former depmtment's budget. 
At the time of merger, the Louisville Division of Police had an operating budget 
of $56,42 I ,887 and a capital budget of $1 ,200,670 totaling $57,622,557. The Jefferson 
County Police Department had an operating budget of$39,757,300 and a capital budget 
of$435,000 totaling $40,192,300. LDP had interagency charges and bond payments 
while JCPD did not. JCPD had an equipment budget of $1,322,300. LDP had no such 
budget category. JCPD's contractual and supplies budget(s) were $532,127 and 
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$1,036,985 more than LDP's respectively. Personnel costs for LDP were $15,455,617 
more than JCPD ($45,566,317 compared to $30, II 0,700). 
Consolidating and building a new LMPD budget was complex. This was due to 
different accounting practices such as how purchasing was conducted, how accounts were 
paid, and to which line items goods purchased were assigned and encumbered. If ofllcers 
weren't aware of the different categories of each of the fomler budgets, those in 
management positions from the other agency(s) might not have perceived the 
complexities involved. 
Third, when the departments consolidated, many of the bureaus, units, squads and 
the like, in addition to the equipment belonging to them, came in sets of two (i.e., police 
departments, communication sections, neet services, specialty teams/squads, training 
units, press relations, etc.). Some of this equipment from these bureaus, units, and squads 
was compatible, some was not. For example, many of the recording devices used for the 
Hostage Negotiating Team(s) were compatible, while radio communication systems were 
not. Each department utilized different radio systems. LDP used a UHF system and 
JCPD used a VHF system. These systems could not easily be used for officers from each 
agency to communicate with one another. This caused complex issues of 
communications for everyday duties. This was especially true for large details such as 
the Kentucky Derby. Careful considerations were given to every personnel assignment 
during large events/details to ensure proper communication and safety for officers. If 
management personnel and line officers did not perceive the complexities involved in 
merging these systems. they probably didn't understand the implementation of persOlmei 
decisions using communications as a basis for these assignment detenninations. 
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Fourth, there were two different distinct sets of policies, procedures and rules. 
Many ofthe policies for each agency were different. One example ofthis relates to 
atTests out of the state of Kentucky. JCPO personnel, if in pursuit, could make an arrest 
of a felony in Indiana. LOP personnel were prohibited by policy from making any aITests 
out of the state of Kentucky. Another example of different policies is that JCPO officers 
could seek an aITest or traffic waITant without pennission of a commanding officer. LOP 
officers first needed approval of an officer of the rank of sergeant or higher to obtain an 
aITest waITant or traffic wan·ant. Merging policies that were common to all LMPO 
personnel was a complex undertaking. Many personnel might have lacked a perception 
of the difficulty of this process. 
To complicate the consolidation process even further, there were 11 union 
contracts (i.e., FOP Lodge 6 - three contracts; FOP Lodge 14 - two contracts; Teamsters -
three contracts: American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees - one 
contract; International Brotherhood of Ekctrical Workers - one contract; and the School 
Guard Association - one contract). To consolidate these contracts and to make them 
consistent with one another was a very complex matter. Many of the differences in 
contracts included contract duration, salary differences, benefit differences, management 
prerogatives, transfer rights and the like. Personnel fi'om the different fornler agencies 
might not have been aware of the vast differences in the different contracts. For example, 
the transfer rights of officers with JCPO incorporated a 10 day notice prior 10 any 
transfer, unless an emergency existed. LOP had no such contractual clause. The JCPO 
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) contract also did not include lieutenants, captains, 
majors, or lieutenant colonels in its provisions. While LDP's FOP contract did not 
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include captains, majors, or lieutenant colonels in its provisions, it did include 
lieutenants. Additionally, in another example of contractual differences, the JCPO 
contract provided for legal representation tor officers who were sued as a result of action 
within the line of duty. LOP's contract otfered no such provision. Sworn personnel, 
especially officers, might not have perceived the ditferent complexities of these contracts, 
nor the complexities in consolidating them to meet the needs of both the Louisville Metro 
government and the officers. 
Finally, consideration had to be given to uniforms and equipment. The type of 
uniform (i.e., patch, badge, hats, etc.) was a controversial issue for officers as were the 
particular weapons and tools (i.e., guns, batons, etc.) that would be used by them. 
Controversy even continued over the design of markings on the police vehicles (i.e., 
logos and placement of them, etc.). As an example, controversy erupted over whether or 
not to utilize a gun belt with a buckle. Fonner JCPO personnel used a gun belt without a 
buckle while LDP's personnel had gun belts with buckles. Ultimately, a gun belt with a 
buckle was chosen for the LMPD uniionn. This change in uniform, while seemingly 
simple, was complex in nature and also controversial. In Grant's (2010) study on 
organizational justice, one of the respondents notes: 
"you can talk to any county officers and it has kind of become a joke, what did we 
get from merger, thirteen buttons and a Santa Claus belt from merger, that's what 
the county got out of it" (p. 184). 
Also, determining what type of weapon would be used was controversial and 
complex due to the fact that JCPO personnel purchased their own weapons while LOP 
personnel had their weapons purchased by the police depm1ment (LOP). This caused 
great controversy in that at one point in time, L.OP personnel were asked to pay the 
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government back for their weapons. This resulted in threats oflaw suits and grievances 
by the FOP. Determining what weapon system to use, to include caliber of weapon, was 
a process of which personnel might not have perceived its complexity. 
In order to ease the process of making these complex decisions and changes, 20 
committees were created to address contracts, training, uniforms, policies and procedures, 
mission and values statements, criminal investigations and the like. The membership in 
each committee was varied and consisted of both sworn and non-sworn personnel. 
Approximately 225 committee members volunteered to serve on a committee of 
their choice. An effort was made to allow personnel to serve on the committee of their 
choosing which led to membership being relatively stable. Some committee members 
were selected or appointed based on their expertise in the particular area being 
researched. Usually one commanding officer \vas chosen by the Chief of Police to chair 
each committee. All of the committees were diverse in that they were comprised of 
individuals from different agencies who were of different ranks. Persons serving were 
also a diverse group based on gender and ethnicity. This was done in an effort to solicit a 
variety of views on subject areas and to get "buy-in" from the officers and personnel at 
all levels. 
The committees were charged with 1) identifying the tasks or components to be 
merged, 2) identifying best practices in the particular area of concern, 3) developing 
actions to merge the particular tasks or components, 4) prioritizing the actions identified 
to merge the particular tasks or components, and 5) quantifYing or assigning a cost to 
merge the tasks or components of the departments. Within the first year of merger, the 
committees made 171 recommendations to the Chief of Police for merging the tasks or 
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components of the departments of which 28 were omitted due to them not being feasible 
to implement. 
The representatives on these committees served dual purposes. In addition to 
facilitating the decision-making processes, they also were a communication conduit to 
personnel serving in their units and bureaus. 
Staff officers, working at the direction of the Chief of Police, developed a 
strategic plan to assist in identifying issues and concerns that would need to be resolved 
for a successful consolidation. As part of this process, the ChiefofPolice, the Chiefs 
staff: officers, and civilian personnel all provided suggestions and/or recommendations as 
to the most important issues/concerns that needed to be addressed in consolidating LDP 
and JCPD. Somc of this infonnation gathering was fonnal in nature as it related to 
management and supervisory personnel. The Chief of Police and Lieutenant Colonels 
talked with management and supervisory personnel, and unit commanders were asked to 
submit written assessments of their area(s) of command, along with sugges1ions and 
recommendations of how to merge them, in writing. However, some of the infonnation 
gathering was infonnal and collected at roll caBs and while in infonnal settings. 
Additionally, some of the changes such as policies and procedures, communications 
systems, budget considerations, facility consolidation and the like were mentioned in the 
recommendations contained in the 1998 merger report by the Louisville-Jefferson County 
Crime Commission. 
The par1icular committee(s) researching the issues/concerns was/were responsible 
for making recommendations regarding the resolution of specific issues, detern1ining 
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costs associated with the changes, and identifying priorities within ninety days. Some of 
the more prominent issues that were considered by the committees included: 
1. Development of a new mission statement and values statement for the 
Department 
2. Identifying departmental cultural differences and changes 
3. Legal and contractual collective bargaining considerations 
4. Budget and funding considerations 
5. Organizational structure 
6. Operations (including patrol and investigations) 
7. Facilities 
8. Specialty units 
9. Recruitment and training 
10. Workload analysis and personnel development 
II. Communications 
12. Intormation technology 
13. Policy/General Directive Manual changes 
14. Community outreach/involvementieducation 
Other issues taken into consideration included: 
1. The makeup of the original staff (initially half city and half county) 
2. A review of existing units to determine duplication in functional 
responsibility 
3. Impact of organizational change 
4. Degree of decentralization of the department 
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5. Development of a strategic planning process 
6. Development of a Standard Operating Procedure for the department 
7. Identifying cultural differences 
8. Integrating the payroll system 
9. Developing a Standard Operating Procedure for Metro Government 
Human Resources 
The Consolidation of Departmental Operations 
When the LDP and JCPD merged in January 2003, Robert White was appointed 
as the first ChiefofPolice for the newly formed LMPD. Some of the more prominent 
issues were changed directly as a result of consolidation. These included development of 
a new mission statement and values statement for the Department, legal and contractual 
collective bargaining considerations, budget and funding considerations, facility 
considerations and consolidation, specialty units, recruitment and training, 
communications, information technology. and policy/General Directive Manual changes. 
Other changes were based indirectly on consolidation and directly on the Chiefs 
beliefs and perceptions as to how a consolidated police agency should operate. These 
beliefs and perceptions were based on his experience with other police agencies and his 
educational experience and knowledge. Changes such as community 
outreach/involvement/education, organizational structure reconfiguration, workload 
analysis and personnel development, equalization of workload, and the decentralization 
of personnel from specialty units to the patrol divisions were all concerns and strategies 
of the Chief of Police, but also a necessary part of a consolidated professional police 
agency. 
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Culture was an organizational change component that was at the forefront of the 
minds of the Chief and top commanders of the new police department. As in any 
organization, culture is important. The LMPO consolidation attempted to merge the best 
practices from the LOP culture and the best practices from the JCPD culture to create an 
even better LMPO culture. The "best" practices were detemlined by the direct 
experiences of personnel, reviews of protessionalliterature, and evaluating the practices 
of the former departments, in addition to other police agencies. As a result, a roadmap 
for the culture ofLMPD was detIned. As such, "culture" was established as an 
independent variable along with "mission and values" and "decentralization of 
personnel." Merging the cultures of both of these agencies was a very complex 
undertaking. 
Each agency had its own mission and values statement. LOP's mission was to: 
"deliver quality services and provide puhlic safety 10 our 
community in an e./fective, responsive. and professional 
manner ,. (Feasibility 5;wely on Local Police Consolidation. 
p. 1-9), 
The values statement: 
"reflects those qualities in our community and in our lives 
thaT 11'e cherish and dedicate our service to uphold" 
(Feasihili()J StU(~V on Loca/ Po/ice Consolidation, p. /-9), 
The values statement included: 
Partnership - We believe that effective policing is 
accomplished by establishing a police/community 
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partnership to identify problems and to engage in problem-
solving activities that reduce crime and the fear of crime. 
Responsibility-- We have a responsibility to honor a 
commitment to involve the community in all policing 
activities that impact the quality oflife in our community. 
Integrity - We hold ourselves and others accountable to 
maintain the highest degree of integrity, to present a 
professional demeanor, to obey all laws and ordinances, 
and to serve as role models to our community. 
Dignity - We shall partially enforce all laws and 
ordinances, afford respect and dignity to all persons, and 
safeguard individual rights that are guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
Excellence - We must constantly strive to achieve 
excellence and remain flexible enough to admit and learn 
from our mistakes. 
The LDP values statement was designed for the first letter of all of the values to 
spell the word "pride". This word was the impetus for the development of the values 
statement. 
The mission statemtmt of JCPO's \Vas: 
"Committed to providing the highest quality (~l police 
service and public sajdy by empm~·ering our memhers and 
community to work in partnership ·wilh the goal of 
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improving the qualizv (?f' IUe in JefJ<!rson Counry, while 
maintaining rc.\pecl fur individual rights and human 
dignity" (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation. 
p. 1-11). 
JCPD's organizational values were: 
Integrity - We are committed to nurturing and further 
developing the public trust by bolding ourselves 
accountable to the highest ethical standards founded on 
honesty and strong moral character. 
Dedication - We are devoted to providing the highest 
quality of law enforcement service to the citizens of 
Jefferson County to further enhance the quality oflifc. 
Professionalism - We are committed to providing a highly 
skilled, well-educated, disciplined work force devoted to 
the highest standards of perfonnance. 
Fairness - We are committed to treating members of the 
community and the depm1ment in a consistent, equitable, 
unbiased manner which tosters mutual respect. 
Teamwork - We are committed to working in a 
coordinated, cooperative effi)rt with the community and 
each other to identify and resolve issues which impact tbe 
welfare of our community. 
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A merged or reddined mission statement had to be constmcted so that officers 
would know what they needed to do. The mission statement let officers and citizens 
know where the agency was going. It was a roadmap for the agency. In other words, 
what was the LMPD intending to accomplish; where was it going. 
The values of the organization also needed to be developed. Each fonner agency 
had values statements. However, they needed to be merged or redefined. Values are 
integral to an agency's operation. Values guide behavior of personnel. 
Related to the culture was the Chiefs decentralization policy which was also a 
vast cultural difference. While decentralization is an issue of organizational stmcture. it 
influences procedures, which in tum induces habit forming behavior. At this level, 
behavior becomes a characteristic of the organization's culture. Both LDP and JCPD 
were accustomed to centralized specialty units. For example, units such as the homicide 
squad. crimes against persons unit, and the crimes against property unit were all 
centralized at the respective city and county headquarters. All of these units were p311 of 
each department's criminal investigation section (CIS). If assistance was needed from a 
patrol division, requests were made to the particular centralized specialty unit for them to 
respond to a specific problem under their purview. To the contrary, Chief White wanted 
all Division Commanders to have the resources needed to address any problem they had 
in their particular Division. Consequently, many centralized units were abolished and 
personnel from these specialty units were transferred to the patrol divisions. This was a 
monumental undertaking in the organizational stmcture and ultimately the culture oflhe 
police depm1ment, tar different from what had ever been experienced. Decentralization 
affected many personnel causing low morale which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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As an example related to the general culture of LOP and JCPD, the JCPD officers 
had a culture of not ~oming into the police substations f'Or off-going roll call. Rather, 
they would go out of service from their vehicle when their shift ended. The LOP 
personnel came to the substation for off-going roll calls. This was done to make sure all 
of the officers were safe and allowed them time to turn in all of the paperwork or reports 
that were generated during their shift. In consolidating, a single, uniform method of off-
going roll calls had to be established that would satisfy organizational needs and a 
majority of personnel. Ultimately, officers were required to retum to their respective 
police substations for off-going roll calls. 
The policies and procedures of both the LOP and the JCPO had to be combined or 
reconfigured to meet the application(s) ofLMPO"s. Policies and procedures, 
administrative reporting practices, types of weapons used were also independent 
variables which provided general guidelines for all personnel. 
When the implementation of merger first began, policies from both LDP amI 
JCPO were used. During the infancy of LMPO, all JCPO and LOP policies were used. 
Committees were established to review all policies and to merge or redefine them. 
Policies that were considered to be "high risk'· policies, such as use of l'(Jfce and vehicle 
pursuits, were the first to be reviewed and either merged or redefined to meet the needs of 
the LMPO. Most of the departmental policies that affected the entire departments were 
complex in nature to merge or redetine. 
All administrative reporting practices were merged. All reporting fonns such as 
overtime, injuries, court compensation, damage to equipment and the like were reviewed 
and either refined, revised, or restructured for use at LMPD. In some instances, [onns 
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from either LDP or JCPD were used if they met the needs of LMPD. Some changes to 
these fonns were as subtle as adding new departmental logos to them. In some cases, 
fom1s or fom1ats from either LDP or JCPD were ust:d as long as they met the specific 
applications ofLMPD. Depending on which agencis fonns/formats were used, 
confusion existed with the members of the other agency whose fonn/fom1at was not 
utilized. However, in many cases, entire fonns were revised or redeveloped. Developing 
only one particular fonn for use by personnel of LMPD was complex in that systems and 
procedures such as personnel and finance had changed after the consolidation. 
When devising a policy on which service weapons would be carried by patrol 
officers, many issues came to light. To begin, the JCPD personnel carried Sig Sauer 
semi-automatic <) mm pistols while LDP personnel carried Glock 40 caliber semi-
automatic pistols. In addition to these diHerences, the LDP purchased weapons for their 
personnel while JCPD required each oftlcer to purchase his/her own weapon. The choice 
in weapon not only caused the obvious problems in tenns of complexity, it also caused 
even smaller problems in deciding what types of holsters would be canied which affected 
what types of belts would be used and what type of ammunition pouches. All of these 
issues were very complex to implement as not only the decisions were difficult, but cost 
was a factor, not to mention the unions were both formally and ini()rmally involved in the 
decisions. 
Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) and 
a VHF system (.TCPD). Communications, 10-codes and car numbers \Vere all 
indt:pendent variables that allowed for effective radio communication between officers 
during emergency situations. 
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When the LDP and JePD were merged, the systems of both agencies did not 
"talk" to one another unless a "link" was tripped to allow conversation. This only 
occurred in very emergent situations such as disasters. A way to merge or restructure the 
communication systems of both agencies needed to be developed so that eftective 
communications could take place by all officers. 
At the time of the consolidation, the JCPD utilized the entire 10-code system and 
the LDP personnel did not. The LDP personnel only utilized approximately 10-12 10-
codes. Rather than using words on the radio, 1 O-codes were established to shorten radio 
transmissions and for confidentiality purposes. For example, a 10-75 and a "bomb 
threat" mean the same thing. However. when transmitting on a radio that is not 
encrypted or open for all to hear, the 10-code is more appropriate in that it takes less time 
to transmit on the radio and it adds a degree of confidentiality that can reduce panic for 
those listening to a scanner monitoring police radio channels. The use of all of the 10-
codes, approximately 100 of them, was confusing to LDP personnel. It was a complex 
process to redefine and merge what was heing utilized by both of the fonner police 
agencies and adapt it to LMPD. 
Additionally, the car numbers utilized by each agency were entirely difterent. For 
example, patrol officers with the JCPD were each assigned car numbers. Car numbers at 
LDP were shared. If an offiGer with LDP needed to get on the radio when they were off 
duty, they used their assigned code number instead of a car numher. Off-duty JCPD 
personnel would use their assigned car number as it was exclusive to the officer to who it 
was assigned. 
115 
The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to officers and 
management. At the time of the consolidation, 11 contracts existed with different pay 
rates, benefit packages, and miscellaneous contractual provisions. Many of these 
contracts were merged or redefined to provide parity and also minimize the number of 
contracts that existed. Therefore, collective bargaining contracts, employee rights, and 
pay were included as independent variables. 
Salaries for officers were one of the biggest issues to address during the 
consolidation. In fact, parity was one of the reasons LOP personnel were supportive of 
the merger as JCPO personnel made more in salary before the merger (Grant, 2011 ). 
LOP personnel anticipated that their salaries would rise after consolidation to parity with 
fom1er JCPO officers. 
Employee benefits also needed to be reconciled to be equal and fair for all 
personnel of the newly f0l111ed LMPO. Vacation time accumulation, sick time 
accumulation and the like were different for each agency. All of these issues were 
redeiined and/or merged through contractual negotiations. 
Another critical and important consideration by LMPO involved the restructUling 
of police divisions. Before the consolidation of LDP and JCPD, LOP operated with six 
patrol divisions while JCPD operated with four. The restmcturing of patrol boundaries 
was an arduous task that was complex. Personnel might not have perceived the 
difficulties of redefining the patrol divisions. Many of the complex considerations 
included, but were not limited to, geographical boundaries, calls for service, crime 
statistics, population size, area size, equal distribution of workload, population density, 
and type of area, i.e., residential, commercial or manufacturing. 
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The restructuring of boundaries resulted in eight patrol divisions, each of which 
would be commanded by a Major. Some of the newly fonned divisions required larger 
numbers of personnel while others required fewer. For example, some divisions such as 
the Fom1h and Second Divisions were smaller in size, but required more personnel than 
the Third and Eighth ~ivisions. This was primmily due to the tact that personnel 
numbers \vere based on considerations such as calls for service, self-initiated calls, 
population size, population density, type of area (residential, commercial, manufactUling, 
etc.) and geographical size. Many of the smaller Divisions, in terms of geographical size, 
resulted from denser populations causing more calls for service in these areas. 
As a result, some of the officers in each of the fonner city and county districts 
were reassigned. Voluntary requests tc)r reassignment to the newly fonned divisions 
were honored tirst so that the personnel needs of the particular division could be 
accommodated. Less than 50 requests for transfer were submitted, primarily by officers 
wanting to leave inner city divisions and transfer to suburban divisions. After voluntary 
requests yvere fultIlIed, approximately 100 involuntary reassignments took place. These 
reassignments of personnel accounted for some of the fomler city officers being assigned 
to fonner cOllnty areas and some county otIicers being assigned to former t:ity areas. 
At the time of the LlVIPD consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, six districts, 
1 -- 6, in LDP's jurisdictional area and t<)Ur districts, Adam, Baker. Charlie, and David 
districts, in JCPO's jurisdictional area. All of these areas needed to be redefined after the 
consolidation. The number of patrol districts for a city the size of Louisville Metro was 
too great. Patrol boundaries, geographical size, and equalization of workload were 
independent variables. 
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For example, when the patrol boundaries were redetined, geographical size was a 
paramount consideration. In Jefferson County, all of the patrol areas were larger in 
geographical size in that the population was sparse in those areas and calls for service 
were much less than in the LDP jurisdiction, therehy decreasing the workload of officers 
assigned to those areas. In other words, because of less workload, the geographical area 
an officer patrolled was larger. Conversely, LDP patrol areas were somewhat smaller is 
size due to population density and many more cans for service. For example, LDP's 2nd 
patrol district, located in the downtown area or central business district of the former City 
of Louisville was much smaller in geographical size than JCPD's districts. This was due 
primarily to the large daytime popUlation and ultimately more calls f(x service originating 
from the downtown businesses and offices. The consideration of geographical size was 
also important so that officers would not have too far to drive to respond to the needs of 
or calls from citizens. 
When redefining the patrol boundaries, equalization of workload was an 
important factor for consideration and was very compkx to define. Consideration for 
calls for service was contemplated in redefining patrol boundaries. Calls for service were 
detIned as emergency or non-emergency calls made to the 911 communications center 
where an officer was dispatched to the problem location. Examples of calls for service 
,vere repOli runs, traffic accidents, disorderly persons, and the like. The self-initiated 
activities of officers were also considered. Self-initiated activities include actions such as 
traffic violations/violators, stopping suspicious persons. and checking businesses to 
determine whether or not they are secure after business hours. More specifically, self-
initiated activities arc initiated by the officers while calls for service are initiated by the 
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911 communications section. Additionally, boundaries had to be realigned to equalize 
workload in each district. This was sometimes di fficult due to geographical boundaries, 
neighborhood considerations and the like. 
As previously mentioned, one of the first considerations toward the innovation of 
consolidating the operations of LMPD was whether or not to decentralize a large number 
of functions and personnel to the patrol di visions. The impetus of this thought began 
with the Chief of Police, When LOP and JCPD consolidated, infol1nation was gathered 
from personnel that led to the conclusion that each patrol division did not have the 
personnel to address certain issues such as narcotic investigations. The Chief of Police 
wanted all patrol divisions to be "self-sufficient", 
Ultimately, the decision \vas made to decentralize the department. This was a 
complex process that involved a thorough review of all functions and units withill the 
department, especially those functions and units that were centralized. The inquiries 
were performed so that an infonned decision could be made in reference to what 
functions/units would remain centralized and \vhich would he decentralized. By 
decentralizing functions/personnel to the divisions, commanders in each Division would 
be held responsible for preventing, rcsponding to, and investigating criminal activity. 
However, as both former agencies were mostly centralized and neither had experienced 
decentralization in the past, the perceived complexity of this process was limited at best. 
Resulting from this decision was the decentralization of personnel from several 
units, in addition to the elimination of some units. The LOP units disbanded were the 
Stolen Property and Recovery Squad Unit (SPARS) and the Street Crimes Unit. 
Disbanded JCPD Units were the Major Case Squad and Domestic Violence Unit. Other 
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centralized units were downsized such as the Criminal Investigation Division which is 
comprised of specialty units such as Homicide, Sex Crimes, Robbery, and Crimes 
Against Children. 
The most notable among oHicers was the decentralization of the Narcotics Unit. 
Several officers were reassigned from this unit to the patrol divisions to address street-
based narcotics. This unit had a complex make-up in that it had many sub-units such as 
street comer enforcement, major case, diversion, asset forfeiture and the like. 
Additionally, the decentralization entailed a complex process involving all levels of 
supervision to detennining who would leave the unit to go to the patrol divisions and who 
would stay. Sergeants interviewed personnel. reviewed their personnel Jiles and 
activities, and selected the detectives who would leave the unit. Lieutenants would 
engage in the same process for sergeants and would choose which of them would be 
transfcITed. Finally, the commander of the unit would interview the lieutenants and 
assess their management abilities to detennine who would be sent to the patrol divisions. 
This \'/as a complex task that was very unpleasant fc)r all involved. If personnel 
had perceived the complexities involved, they might have had a better understanding of 
the issues and tribulations associated with the innovation of decentralization. 
These decentralizations resulted in about 100 police officers being reassigned into 
the patrol divisions (Courier-Joumal, 2003), This initiative was concerning for the 
officers and the police union due to the fact that I) many ofticers did not want change 
because they were familiar or liked their position/job, 2) there was a sense of entitlement 
to some specialty positions in both departments and 3) many officers had no experience 
with a Chief of Police from an outside agency and consequently, new ideas that were 
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different from LDP or JCPD. In fact, employee morale has been most notahle. The 
Courier-Journal newspaper (2004) noted that following the consolidation, morale was at 
an "all time low". 
Morale was low after the police department consolidation. There seemed to be 
many causes for the morale plummeting, including an outside Chiefheing selected, his 
belief of holding officers accountable, lack of leadership, change occurring in the 
organization and parity issues to name a few. 
In a qualitative study on organizational justice, Grant (201 0) interviewed 40 
police officers with LMPD after the merger. The 40 officers were comprised of both 
fonner LDP and JCPD personnel. 
In general reference to the merger, one officer who was interviewed noted: 
"Everything plummeted, morale plummeled, production plummeted. a lot 
of tinger pointing. COs were pointing at each other, lieutenants were 
pointing at sergeants, sergeants pointing at lieutenants, lieutenants 
pointing at majors and vice versa al1 the way up and down. It's a blame 
game" (p. 153). 
Another officer stated: 
"I don't know that morale has ever been the same since merger. I mean 
we all get along but I don't hear people say how much they love to come 
to work. We used to say it all the time, man I love coming to work this is 
so much fun, I love working with these people. I think a lot of people 
have bad attitudes about it still and it still lingers and you're like quit your 
bitching, you knmv it's been seven years, I mean you don't think about it 
as merger but I think it's a result of merger that people are still 
complaining about stuff' (p. 153). 
Some officers were dissatisfied that a Chief of Police was selected from outside of 
the LDP and .rCPD ranks. Many officers believed that the Chief should have been 
selected from either the JCPD or the LDP. Low morale even permeated the higher ranks 
of officers (lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels) in that many of these 
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individuals believed that they had an opportunity to be the first Chief of Police for 
LMPD. One of the officers that Grant (2010) interviewed stated: 
"1 think that (selecting an outside Chief) did a lot for morale Oow) when 
he brought in an outsider but then again it brought both sides together. 
Now we're both (LDP and JCPD personnel) going to hate this guy" (p. 
145). 
Many other officers' comments were like in nature. According to Grant (2010), 
many offIcers believed that the consolidation was managed well, but did not believe that 
the administration, in its decision-making processes, showed respect and support for its 
officers. According to these officers, this has contributed to the current low morale on 
the department (Grant, 2(10). 
Low morale was also caused by the Chiefs attempts to hold officers accountable 
for their actions. While this occurred, officers believed that the administration failed to 
hold its commanders accountable for their actions. These perceptions were a contributing 
factor in the distrust officers had for the administration and the officers' low morale. One 
of the officers interviewed by Grant (2010) notes: 
"They're (officers) just not happy with the administration because hom 
what 1 understand, it looks like the administration is more so trying to fire 
them rather than trying to help them. That's just like this court stuff we're 
going through I1m\l". Everybody's getting these days and 48 hour notices 
and writing letters and stuff because the news media wrote an article and 
got everything stirred up" (p. 165). 
Another officer in Grant's (20 I 0) study states: 
"Out of the biggest headaches on the depaI1mcn1, that would have to be 
it. .. how they disperse the disciplinary. What applies to officers don't 
apply to them (commanders)" (165). 
Another reason for the low morale of officers was the pen.:eived lack of 
leadership. According to Grant (20 I 0), officers indicated that they felt consolidation \vas 
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managed well, but that there had been little leadership by the command staff. Officers 
also believed that there had been little or no respect tor and support of officers in the 
department. They further believed that the administration has been out of touch with its 
officers throughout the process. In Grant's (2010) study, one oUicer notes: 
"'That's what I'm saying there' s just that lack of respect. You know what I 
think this \\'ould fix a lot of things, there are a lot of little things I've done 
to make the department merge better but I think this is number one. If we 
had a leader like the mayor's office or something like that somebody that 
supported us and said these are my guys, these are my girls, this is my 
police department then we would do whatever they asked" (p. 165). 
Another cause oflow morale, especially among JCPD officers, was parity. As 
LOP personnel earned 100ver salmies than their JCPD counterparts, JCPO officers did not 
receive a decent pay raise when the two agencies merged while LDP officers showed 
increases in their pay to give them parity with JCPD officers. Additionally, JCPD 
officers had cost increases in their insurance benefits while fornler LDP personnel did 
not. Changes were also made to the take-home car policies related to when vehicles 
could be driven. As a result of new policies, former JCPD personnel were restricted 
more in the use ofthe vehicle than they had been accustomed. To the contrary, former 
LDP personnel were allowed more use of the take home vehicles than they previously 
experienced. All of these changes meant that JCPD personnel actually lost money which 
ultimately added to their lowered morale. 
LO\v morale also resulted in decreases in work productivity. Some police officers 
continued to work. but only did a minimal amount of work. Grant (2010) notes that 
respondents in his study indicated that while there were unhappy officers on the 
department, they attempted tn stay fl)Cllsed. The following quotes arc a sample of the 
responses given by LDP and JCPD otliccrs in Grant's study. 
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"y just kept doing what I was supposed to do. Some stuff I was alright 
with other things Y didn't necessary agree with but I'm a professional you 
just adapt and overcome and continue doing your job. It's not going to 
change the way I police, you know. No changes changed the way I police 
or look at things" (p. 154). 
"So you're putting somebody who had been comfortable now in an 
uncomfortable position which is not necessarily a bad thing. I saw a lot of 
unhappy people. I was fairly new so I didn't have a lot of experience on 
how things ran, what depmtments did what and such. I was young, 
excited and eager to ride the streets. I mean I just think you can't force 
feed adults they're going to rebel against you: they might not do it out in 
the open but behind closed doors they're not going to eat what you're 
feeding them. They got lazy and didn't want to go out and do stuff, they 
would just spin and grin is what we called it, just out riding around in their 
cars spinning their tires and just grinning" (p. 154). 
"Some responded better. I mean you've still got a lot of officers that are 
very professional and will always be professional whether they like whaCs 
going on or not. They've got a joh to do and that's what they're going to 
do. But then you've got others that are crying malcontent that were 
probably never really happy before we merged and never going to be 
happy. Well of course the work slows down when all you want to do is 
get together and fuss. It \vasn't about locking up bad guys anymore they 
were just angry" (p. 154). 
"Yeah I think there vvere some people who laid down and quit working, I 
mean there were some people of l:ourse who retired, they were able to 
retire, without a doubt no matter what you do it's going to happen 
whenever you have change. I think for the most part people stayed 
f()cused and did their job and moved on with it but there were a lot of 
people yeah it definitely at1'ected their work product" (pp. 154-155). 
While morale \vas low during the process of merging LDP and JCPD, in 2010, it 
was still considered to be low as noted in Grant's study on organizational justice. 
In 2012, a new ChiefofPolice, Steve Conrad, was hired. Chief Conrad was a 
former LMPD assistant chief. Time will tell whether or not his tenure will make a 
difference in officer morale. 
Other changes of innovation in consolidation included the JCPD Community 
Relations Unit, the Training Division, and the Police Al:ademy (all one unit) being not 
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only consolidated, but also geographically relocated. This move created great 
controversy among officers and was a very complex part of the consolidation process. 
The JCPD Community Relations Unit was located at Southtields in eastem Jefferson 
County on a 62 acre tract of land. The JCPD unit was moved into the city limits to the 
LDP Training Academy and the property at Southfields was put up for sale by Mayor 
Abramson. By moving the JCPD Community Relations Unit, former JCPD officers 
would have to travel across town to the former Cily's training unit location. This caused 
morale issues because JCPD personnel were partial to the Southfield's facility and the 
move was a change for fOl11lCf JCPD personnel. Additionally, the sale of the Southtields 
propeJiy caused further morale issues in that fonner JCPD officers felt that all of the 
things belonging to the JCPD \verc being sold or given away. Personnel at the time the 
departments merged in 2003 might not have perceived how complex, controversial, and 
difficult this consolidation OfUlli1s would be. 
Two additional units with JCPD, Vehicle Impoundment and the Police Garage, 
were transfelTed to the fonner City of Louisville Public Works Depaliment. Again, the 
physical locations of the garages "V ere on opposite ends of town. Some JCPD officers 
had to drive their vehicles to the opposite end of tmvn for routine service and vehicle 
maintenance. This was also the case for some LOP officers in that they had to drive into 
the County areas to get their vehicles servic:t:d. 
Many officers with each of the former departments also had the same mechanics 
service their cars for several years. Many ot1icers had become good friends with their 
Inechanics. This consolidation was an innovation for officers and Public Works crews 
and was complex to implement. This caused morale issues for officers. This was 
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possibly due to the fact that they might not have perceived the complexities of the 
innovation. 
According to Chief White, division commanders in an agency the size of LMPD 
should have resources at the division level to work on any crime problem. He also 
believed that officers in the divisions needed to interact with the public in a positive way. 
Pursuant to a 2003 newspaper article in the Courier-Journal, Chief White stated that 
oftlcers needed to focus on preventing crime and establishing relationships with the 
community. His philosophy for the merged agency revolved around four main tenets: 1) 
crime prevention, 2) crime control, 3) community involvement, and 4) respect for all 
people. He stlived to place more officers closer to the community to address crime issues 
and to build community partnerships. As a result of this philosophy relating to larger 
agencies, more police oftlcers would be placed on the streets in the patrol divisions. 
Stabilization Stage 
As there has been only one study following the consolidation of LOP and JCPO, 
documentation of stabilization is limited at best. Therefore, determining exactly when or 
if, approximately or otherwise, this stage occurred is difficult to asceliain. However, a 
summary of the accomplishments of the consolidation include: 
1. The departmental reorganization led to the downsizing or elimination of 
many centralized criminal investigative units and their investigative 
functions were reallocated to the patrol divisions. Likewise, personnel 
from these centralized units were reassigned to the patrol divisions. 
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2. New policies, standard operating procedures, and rules were designed and 
implemented allowing for one set of operating rules for the officers of 
LMPO. 
3. The department was able to provide for some connectivity of the former 
LOP and JCPO communication systems. This enabled police officers, no 
matter their assignment, to communicate with one another. 
4. The former LOP and .Tepn fleets were merged. This merger accounted 
for the review and assessment of all vehicles and resulted in some older 
vehicles being taken out of service. It also allowed tor the assignment of 
more take-home vehicles to officers who previously did not have one. 
The ultimate result of this merger has been reduced vehicle costs. 
5. The number oflabor contracts has been reduced and officers of the same 
grade are receiving like wages and benefits. 
The aforementioned list summarizes just a few of the accom plishments of the 
LMPO merger. All of these changes were complex in nature. The changes were 
complex for the majOlity of issues related to consolidation as there were always 
unforeseen considerations in the process of innovation. Officers might not have 
perceived the complexities involved in this innovation. Had the complexity of innovation 
been perceived, ofticers may not have been as supportive of consolidation prior to it. 
Even though there have been success stories, concems, problems, and issues such as 





This chapter presents inicnmation regarding the methodology that was utilized for 
this research study. The chapter is divided into several sections: 1) background of the study, 
2) significance of study, 3) overview of organizational change components (OCC), 4) 
purpose of study, 5) description of variables, 6) survey instnnnent utilized, 7) survey 
population, 8) descliptive characteristics of population, 9) Demographic/descriptive 
characteristics of respondents, 10) analysis/predictions, 11) data analysis for the research 
hypotheses, and II) evaluation of the research methods. 
Background of Study 
The purpose ofthis study was to explore police officers' perceptions of the 
complexity in merging organizational change components (OCCs) and how this 
perception affects officer attitudes toward supporting or opposing a consolidated police 
agency. The main focus of this study was the Louisville Metro Police Department 
(LMPD). 
In 2003, the Louisville Metro Police Depal1ment came into being with the 
consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police 
Department. As a result of the consolidation, the Louisville Metro Police Department 
was in the top 0.4% of law enforcement agencies in the nation with 1,000 or more sworn 
personnel (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). 
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Prior to the merger of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson 
County Police Department (JCPD) in 2003, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission (LJCCC) (1998) conducted a survey on the perceptions and attitudes of 
police officers regarding police consolidation. This survey was distributed to members of 
the LDP, .TePD, and the Jefferson County Sherriff's Office. The statistics reported for 
purposes of this research relate only to the LDP and JCPD. 
The survey focused on whether or not the consolidation was supported by sworn 
officers. According to the findings, 82.1 % of LDP sworn personnel were in favor of the 
consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD s,vom personnel were opposed to consolidation. 
The survey also measured the attitudes and perceptions of employees related to 1) 
the anticipated effects of merger on the individual offIcer, the organization, and the 
citizens, 2) outcomes expected from consolidation, and 3) priorities of issues to he 
addressed by consolidation, as discussed in the previous chapter. DemobYfaphic 
infol111ation for the respondents was also captured. Since the consolidation of the LMPD 
in 2003, one follow-up study has been conducted to measure the perceptions and 
attitudes, whether changing or not, of the police department members (sworn officers) 
regarding the agency's consolidation. 
Many factors/issues/components were considered in fom1ing the LMPD such as 
culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and 
re-defining patrol division boundaries. All of these components or factors were very 
complex and were an integral part of the LMPD merger. 
Oftentimes, employees of agendes do not perceive the complexities involved in 
consolidating sub-units of government or, more specifically, implementing these OCCs. 
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Therefore, in an effort to understand the complexity of the organizational change 
components, officers' perceptions ofthat complexity, and how this perception affects the 
support for the consolidation, this research was undertaken. 
Significance of Study 
The results of this research will assist those who are considering undertaking 
police consolidation, or those \vho have already done so, to understand some of the more 
prominent issues that influence consolidation success: 1) employee perception of the 
complexity of merging the OCCs and 2) the attitudes and perceptions of employees. It 
will further provide organizational leaders with insight into the perception of officers 
regarding the complexity of organizational change components and its effects on change 
\vithin their organizations. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) assel1 that the ability to manage 
change is, or should be, a core organizational competence. Currently, minimal scholarly 
research exists that focuses on police officers' perception of the complexity of merging 
the OCCs and how this perception of complexity affects attitudes toward merger. Also 
lacking is research that focllses on case-specific comparable data. 
Given the role of police officers in society, attitudes and perceptions of police 
officers can have a significant impact on the organization, its supervisors, and the 
community (Grant, 2011). These attitudes and perceptions change over time and, 
depending on transitional and operational efficiency, can either positively or negatively 
affect the organization. 
Studies of consolidated governments usually describe thoroughly how the 
consolidations came about but are less successful in distinguishing between changes that 
follow consolidation and the changes that are caused by consolidation (Carver, 1973). 
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This especially holds hue for changes that occur in attitudes and perceptions. Identifying 
the changes in attitudes and perceptions of police officers that were caused by 
consolidation requires a comparison to what happened after consolidation. It would also 
be beneficial to determine what would have happened if consolidation had not occurred. 
However, methods are lacking to accurately determine a future that failed to occur. 
Thus, because of the difficulty in determining the impacts of government 
consolidations, some researchers have turned to survey research to gain insights into the 
effects of consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000). This research was designed to 
survey the people who are most likely to experience the effects of consolidation and/or 
who influenced the consolidation by their supportive or opposing views, attitudes, and 
perceptions. 
As previously mentioned, there is a data set that exists from a 1998 study 
conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission about support for the 
LMPD merger. From this data set, some comparative information was gathered that 
allowed the researcher to investigate and report some of the changes of attitudes and 
perceptions of LMPD officers that have occurred over time. Insights gained from this 
research are expected to make a valuable contribution to this field of knowledge and will 
serve as a basis for the development of a guide for meaningful discussion and analysis of 
police consolidation efforts. 
Overview of Organizational Change Components 
The consolidation case selected for this study, the Louisville Metro Police 
Department, provided a unique context in which to describe and understand how the 
perception of complexity related to certain factors or components may influence support 
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for the consolidation process. SuppOli for consolidation was assessed by using 
organizational change components developed for this study that were integral to the 
LMPO consolidation process and the operation of the organization. 
Any police department consolidation is a complex task. It can impact employees, 
management, political leaders, and citizens of the community. Consolidation necessarily 
involves structural change, integrating some or all pmis of each of the Oliginal 
organizations' functions and activities (IACP, 2003). Changes in both the structural 
complexity and structural control of an organization could occur during the consolidation 
process. 
Robbins (1987) notes that stmctural complexity is the extent of differentiation 
within the organization. This includes the degree of specialization, or division oflabor, 
the number oflevels in the organization's hierarchy, and the extent to which the 
organization's units are dispersed geographically. 
When the LOP and the JCPO consolidated, a multitude of transformations 
occurred that included structuraL administrative, and operational changes. In an effort to 
measure the most important or dynamic changes or considerations, a list of components 
or factors was developed in order to detennine an officer's perception of complexity 
related to consolidating organizational change components. Culture(s), policies and 
procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol 
division boundaries are all organizational change components that were important to a 
successful police department consolidation. These OCCs affected all police employees 
and they all had some knowledge of them by word of mouth, written departmental 
notification, or departmental meetings. However, officers may not have perceived the 
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complexity of them in their application or implementation in tenns of the actual 
consolidation. 
Many dynamic variables affect organizations and our work in them (Glenn and 
Malott, 2004). The aforementioned changes or OCCs were "dynamic" in nature in that 
consolidating, redefining, or changing them and ultimately implementing them was a 
complex process that had an everlasting affect on LMPD. 
One can assume that these organizational change components not only affected 
the organization, but also the employees and their attitudes and perceptions. The 
particular OCCs, culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective 
bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries, were selected because 1) 
all police officers within the LMPD had a vested interest in each ofthem, and 2) each 
officer on the department was aware of the accs and understood that changes would be 
implemented regarding them. 
As in any organization, culture is important. Cameron and Quinn (1999) assert 
that in companies, the most powerful factor they all highlight as a key ingredient in their 
success, is their organizational culture. As such, when the LMPD consolidation process 
began, the Chief of Police had discussions regarding the new LMPD culture with 
employees of both the fonner LDP and JCPD. During these discussions, he advised 
employees that he wanted to develop a new culture that incorporated the best from the 
LDP culture and the best from the JCPD culture to create an even better LMPD culture. 
This combined culture would he integral to LMPD and would affect all oflicers. 
The policies and procedures of both the LDP and the JCPD would have to be 
combined or reconfigured to meet the needs of the newly fonned LMPD. These new 
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policies and procedures provided general guidelines for all personnel and added 
consistency, in terms of operations, to the LMPD. 
Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) 
and a VHF system (.fCPD). Both of these systems had a "linking loop" that would allow 
for combined radio communication between officers during emergency situations. 
However, for day-to-day activities, there was no interconnectivity between officers in the 
same division or between officers in different divisions. Officers had acute awareness of 
this problem and wanted it con·ected. This was also a major issue that was continually 
brought to the forefront of conversations by Fraternal Order of Police. 
The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to oft1cers and 
management. At the time of the LMPD consolidation, officers and civilians alike were 
doing the same jobs or duties and were being paid different salaries. At the time of the 
consolidation, 11 officer, supervisor and civilian contracts existed with different pay 
rates, benefit packages, and contractual provisions that governed things such as days off, 
vacation days, sick time, promotion and the like. Officers and civilian employees were 
very cognizant of this ace and looked for expedient contract resolution after 
consolidation. 
At the time of the LMPD consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, 6 in the 
fonner City of Louisville limits and 4 in the jurisdiction of Jefferson County. In order to 
equalize workload and provide for some expediency in response 10 calls for service, it 
was necessary to redefine, restructure, and merge patrol boundaJies. As this OCC 
affected all officers, they were keenly aware of the change about to take place. 
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Even though there was awareness on the part of officers about the aforementioned 
oces, it is uncertain whether or not they actually perceived the complexity involved in 
their consolidation and implementation in the newly formed LMPD. It was also 
uncertain how the otlicers' perception of the organizational change components and the 
difficulty involved in merging them affected their attitudes in supporting the LMPO 
consolidation. 
Purpose of Study 
The specific purpose of this study was to examine the Louisville Metro Police 
DepaJiment consolidation and the police officers' perceptions ofthe complexity of 
merging the oces intc!,TfaJ to consolidating the LOP and JCPD into one department. 
This study further identified hnvv an officer's perception of the complexity of merging the 
oees affected their attitudes toward the police department merger and, in particular, 
their support for or against consolidation. Certain portions of this data, specifically parts 
addressing support of merger, were compared to the results from a survey conducted in 
1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC). The 1998 survey 
was distributed to police officers from the LDP and the JCPD and measured support for 
the police department consolidation. 
The literature review also demonstrated the need for a better understanding of the 
effects of an employee's perception of the complexity of merging oces on their attitudes 
and perceptions in relation to !heir SUpp011 of police consolidation. No studies have been 
conducted in police departments concerning a police officer's perception of complexity 
related to merging organizational change components during a consolidation and how the 
perceived level of complexity affects support for consolidation. 
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The study of complexity is a relatively new science and, like any new science, is 
not fully accepted within the scientific community (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). The 
origins of complexity theories lie in attempts of meteorologists to build mathematical 
models of weather systems (Lorenz, 1993). Only recently have these theories 
transcended from the natural sciences to the social sciences. In tenns of their application 
(complexity theories) to organizations, it is only in the last decade that a sufficient body 
of academ ic work has been amassed to allow those studying organizations to recognize 
the potential of complexity theories (Burnes, 2005). Even so, research regarding an 
officer's perception of complexity in merging organizational change components during 
the consolidation of a police agency is non-existent. 
In response, this study (1) examined the level of police officer support for 
consolidation and how it has changed since 1998, before the LMPD consolidation, (2) 
compared police officers' perception of the complexity of merging organizational change 
components in the consolidation process and how their perception of the complexity 
affected their attitudes and perceptions toward the consolidation, and 3) determined how 
the police officers' perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs affected support 
for or against police consolidation. 
The study was conducted by means of a written survey instrument that consisted 
of 32 questions and was distributed to police officers who were currently working tor the 
LMPO and were working for either the LOP or the JCPD when the LMPD consolidation 
occurred in 2003. The survey sought to elicit information regarding a police officer's 
perception of complexity pertaining to the organizational change components (culture(s), 
policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining 
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patrol division boundaries) which were an important part of the consolidation. Rather 
that selecting a sample from the population, the entire population was surveyed. The 
population consisted of 669 pol ice officers who, as previously mentioned, worked for 
either the LOP or the JCPO at the time of the police department consolidation in 2003. 
The study was conducted using the aforementioned survey, in addition to the results of a 
survey of police officers conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission (LJCCC) measuring attitudes toward merger. 
A quantitative examination was conducted utilizing regression analysis models 
and the results of this study were compared, in part, with the fIndings of the 1998 study. 
The results of the survey were also analyzed comparing police officer pen;eption of 
complexity in merging oces to the support of consolidation. 
The hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
1. Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is 
related to attitudes toward police consolidation. 
2. The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change 
components, the less support for police consolidation. 
Description of Variables 
The variables for this study were divided into five categories: I) support, 2) merger 
experience and participation, 3) satisfaction, 4) perceived complexity, and 5) demographic 
infol111ationlofficer characteristics. The dependent variable for this study was support for 
consolidation. 
The support category included two variables (Questions I and 2). One variable, 
support for consolidation prior to the actual consolidation of LOP and JCPD, was included 
for comparative purposes with the study conducted by the Louisville - Jefferson County 
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Crime Commission in 1998. The other variabk in this section, CUlTent level of supp0l1 fOJ' 
the consolidation of the two agencies, was the aforementioned dependent variable. 
For purposes of the merger experience and participation section (Questions 3, 4,5, 
and 6), variables were selected to determine an officer's experience with and participation in 
the consolidation process. Question 3 measured the independent variable (IV), experience, 
nominally. Question 4 also measured the IV, service on a merger committee, nominally. 
Question 5 provided a listing of the different merger committees on which the respondent 
might have served. Finally, Question 6 measured information the respondent might have 
received fi'om others who served on a committee. This IV was also measured nominally. 
The third section of the questionnaire specifically addressed satisfaction with the 
merged organizational change components (Questions 7 - 22). Responses were ordinal 
measures utilizing a 7-point Likert scale. These variables were selected for this section in the 
following manner. When the LDP and the JCPD consolidated, a multitude of changes 
occun'ed. In an effort to measure the most important dynamic changes or considerations. 
a list of components or factors was developed in order to determine the perceived 
complexity of consolidating what were termed organizational change components 
(OCCs). Culture(s), policies and procedures, comrnunications, collective bargaining 
contracts, and fe-defining patrol division boundaries were all considered to be OCCs that 
were important to a successful police department consolidation. 
These changes Of organizational change components were dynamic in nature. 
They were selected because of their importance to the organization, the employees, and 
the citizens ofthe community. The OCCs selected also had a lasting effect on all 
involved in the consolidation process. Due to the importance of the OCCs and their 
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effect on all employees, one can assume they also affected the attitudes and perceptions 
of employees. 
The paIiicular oees were selected because each police officer had knowledge or 
awareness of the components through different mediums (i.e., word of mouth, written 
departmental notification, or departmental meetings). Each officer on the department 
also understood that changes would be implemented regarding them. However. while 
officers were aware that these organizational change components would be merged or 
redefined during the implementation of the consolidation, they may not have perceived 
the complexity of them in their application or implementation in terms of the actual 
consolidation. Additionally, these oces were chosen due to tact that all police officers 
within the LMPD had a vested interest in each of them. 
In addition to the "primary" organizational change components, culture(s). 
policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining 
patrol division boundmies, two supplemental components were included in conjunction 
which each oee that were implemented during the consolidation. These two 
components listed under each oee were similar in nature to the oce itself. For 
example, under the oce of culture. mission statements and values and decentralization 
were included because of the cultural nature of these components. Additionally, each of 
the two additional components was dynamic, had a lasting effect on all personneL and 
\vere complex to merge and/or reddlne. It should be noted that it was possible that these 
variables worked individually or in concert to affect a police ot11cer' s support of police 
consolidation. 
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As in any organization, culture is impo11ant. The LMPO consolidation attempted 
to merge the best practices from the LOP culture and the best practices from the JCPO 
culture to create an even better LMPO culture. The "best'" practices were determined by 
the direct experiences of personnel, reviews of professional literature, and evaluating the 
practices of the former depm1ments, in addition to other police agencies. As a result, a 
roadmap for the culture of LMPO was defined. As such, culture was established as an 
independent variable along with mission and values and decentralization of personnel. 
Merging the cultures of both of these agencies was a very complex undertaking, 
Prior to merger, each agency had its own mission and values statement. LOP's 
mission was to: 
"deliver quality services and provide public safety to our 
community in an effective, responsive, and professional 
manner" (Feasibility .s'ludy on Local Police Consolidation, 
p. 1-9). 
The values statement: 
"reflects those qualities in our community and in our lives 
that we cherish and dedicate our service to uphold" 
(Feasibility Stuc~v on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-9). 
The values statement included: 
Partnership - We believe that effective policing is 
accomplished by establishing a police/community 
partnership to identify problems and to engage in problem-
solving activities that reduce crime and the fear of crime. 
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Responsibility -- We have a responsibility to honor a 
commitment to involve the community in all policing 
activities that impact the quality of life in our community. 
Integrit)' - We hold ourselves and others accountable to 
maintain the highest degree of integrity, to present a 
professional demeanor, to obey all laws and ordinances, 
and to serve as role models to our community. 
Dignity- We shall partially enforce all laws and 
ordinances, afford respect and dignity to all persons, and 
safeguard individual rights that are guaranteed hy the 
Consti tution. 
Excellence - We must constantly strive to achieve 
excellence and remain flexible enough to admit and learn 
from our mistakes. 
The LOP values statement was designed for the first letter of all of the values to 
spell the word ·'pride"'. This word was the impetus for the development of the values 
statement. 
The mission statement of JCPO's was: 
"Commifted 10 providing the highest quality (?l police 
service lind puNic sale~v by empowering our members and 
community to work in partnership with the goal of 
imprtJ\'ing the quality oll~fi? in Jefferson County. while 
maintaining rc;.,pecf for individual rights lind human 
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dignity" (Feasibility Study on Lo(.'o/ Police Consolidation, 
p. 1-11). 
JCPD"s organizational values were: 
Integrity- We are committed to nurturing and further 
developing the public trust hy holding ourselves 
accountable to the highest ethical standards founded on 
honesty and strong moral character. 
Dedication-- We are devoted to providing the highest 
quality of law enforcement service to the citizens of 
Jefferson County to further enhance the quality oflife. 
Professionalism - We are committed to providing a highly 
skilled, well-educated, disciplined work force devoted to 
the highest standards ofperfonnance. 
Fairness- We are committed to treating memhcrs of the 
community and the department in a consistent, equitable, 
unbiased manner which fosters mutual respect. 
Teamwork - We are committed to working In a 
coordinated, cooperative eff()rt with the community and 
each other to identify and resolve issues which impact the 
welfare of our community. 
A merged or redefined mission statement had to be constructed so that officers 
would know what they needed to do. The mission statement let officers and citizens 
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know where the agency was going. It was a roadmap fiJr the agency. In other words, 
what was the LMPD intending to accomplish; where was it going. 
The values of the organization also needed to be developed. Each fonner agency 
had values statements. However, they needed to be merged or redefined. Values are 
integral to an agency's operation. Values guide behavior of personnel. 
Decentralization was a vast cultural difference. While decentralization is an issue 
of organizational structure, it influences procedures, which in tum induces habit fonning 
behavior. At this level, behavior becomes a characteristic of the organization's culture. 
Both LOP and ]CPD were accustomed to centralized specialty units. For example. units 
such as the homicide squad, crimes against persons unit, and the crimes against property 
unit were all centralized at the respective city and county headquarters. All of these units 
were part of each department's criminal investigation section (CIS). If assistance was 
needed from a patrol division, requests were made to the pal1icular centralized specialty 
unit for them to respond to a specific problem under their purview. To the contrary, 
Chief White wanted all Division Commanders to have the resources needed to address 
any problem they had in their particular Division. Consequently, many centralized units 
were abolished and personnel from these specialty units were transferred to the patrol 
divisions. This was a monumental undertaking in the organizational structure and 
ultimately the culture of the police department, far different from what had ever been 
experiem:ed. 
As an example related to the general culture of LOP and JCPD, the JCPD otlicers 
had a culture of not coming into the police substations for off-going roll call. Rather, 
they would go out of service from their vehicle when their shift ended. The LOP 
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personnel came to the substation for off-going roll calls. This was done to make sure all 
of the officers were safe and allowed them time to tum in all of the paperwork or repOlis 
that were generated during their shift. In consolidating, a single, uniform method of off-
going roll calls had to be established that would satisfy organizational needs and a 
majority of personnel. Ultimately, officers were required to return to their respective 
police substations for off-going roll calls. 
The policies and procedures of both the LOP and the JCPO had to be combined or 
reconfigured to meet the application(s) of LMPO. Policies and procedures, 
administrative reporting practices, types of weapons used were also independent 
variables which provided general guidelines for all personnel. 
When the implementation of merger first began, policies from both LOP and 
JCPO were used. During the infancy of LMPO, all JCPD and LOP policies were used. 
Committees were established to review all policies and to merge or redefine them. 
Policies that were considered to be "high risk" policies. such as use of force and vehicle 
pursuits, were t,he first to be reviewed and either merged or redefined to meet the needs of 
the LMPO. Most of the departmental policies that affected the entire departments were 
complex in nature to merge or redefine. 
All administrative reporting practices were merged. All reporting fomls such as 
overtime, injuries, court compensation, damage to equipment and the like were reviewed 
and either refined, revised, or restructured for use at LMPO. In some instances, fCH"ll1s 
from either LOP or JCPO were used if they met the needs ofLMPD. Some changes to 
these forms were as subtle as adding new depmimentallogos to them. In some cases, 
fomls or fomlats from either LOP or JCPD were used as long as they met the specific 
144 
applications ofLMPD. Depending on which agency's forms/formats were used, 
confusion existed with the members of the other agency whose fonn/format was not 
utilized. However, in many cases, entire forms were revised or redeveloped. Developing 
only one particular form for use by personnel of LMPD was complex in that systems and 
procedures such as personnel and finance had changed after the consolidation. 
When devising a policy on which service weapons would be carried by patrol 
offil.:ers, many issues came to light. To begin, the JCPD personnel carried Sig Sauer 
semi-automatic 9 mm pistols while LDP personnel carried Glock 40 caliber semi-
automatic pistols. In addition to these differences, the LDP purchased weapons for their 
personnel while JCPD required each officer to purchase his/her own weapon. The choice 
in weapon not only caused the obvious problems in terms of I.:omplexity, it also caused 
even smaller problems in dCl.:iding \",hat types of holsters would be callied which affect 
what types of belts \vould he used and what type of ammunition pouches. All of these 
issues were very complex to implement as not only the decisions were difflcult, but cost 
was a factor, not to mention the Fraternal Order of Police unions were both fonnally and 
informally involved in the decisions. 
Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) and 
a VHF system (JCPD). Communications, lO-codes and car numbers were all OCCs that 
. , 
allowed for eflective radio communication between officers dming emergency situations. 
When the LDP and JCPD \vere merged, the systems ofhoth agencies did not 
"talk" to one another unless a "link" was activated by the communications section to 
allow conversation. This only occuned in very emergent situations such as disasters. A 
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way to merge or restructure the communication systems of both agencies needed to be 
developed so that effective communications could take place by all officers. 
At the time of the consolidation, the JCPO utilized the entire] a-code system and 
the LOP personnel did not. The LOP personnel only utilized approximately 10-12 10-
codes. Rather than using words on the radio, la-codes were established to shorten radio 
transmissions and for confidentiality purposes. For example, a 10-75 and a "bomb 
threaC mean the same thing. However, when transmitting on a radio that is not 
encrypted or open for all to hear, the lO-code is more appropriate in that it takes less time' 
to transmit on the radio and it adds a degree of confidentiality that can reduce panic for 
those persons listening to a scanner monitOling police radio channels. The use of all of 
the 10-codes, approximately 100 of them, was confusing to LOP personnel. It was a 
complex process to redefine and merge what was being utilized by hoth of the fonner 
police agencies and adapt it to LMPO. 
Additionally, the car numbers utilized hy each agency were entirely different. For 
example, patrol officers with the JCPD were each assigned car numbers. Car numbers at 
LOP were shared. If an officer with LOP needed to get on the radio when they were off 
duty, they used their assigned code number instead of a car number. 
The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to ofticers and 
management. At the time of the consolidation, 11 contracts existed with different pay 
ratt:s .. bent:fit packages, and miscellaneous contractual provisions. Many ofthese 
contracts were merged or redefined to provide parity and also minimize the number of 
contracts that existed. Therefore, collective bargaining contracts, employee rights, and 
pay were included as independent variables. 
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Salaries for officers were one of the biggest issues to address during the 
consolidation. In fact, parity was one of the reasons LOP personnel were supportive of 
the merger as JCPO personnel made more in salary before the merger (Grant, 2011). 
LOP personnel anticipated that their salaries would rise after consolidation to parity with 
fonner JCPD officers. 
Employee benefits also needed to be reconciled to be equal and fair for all 
personnel of the newly fonned LMPD. Vacation time accumulation, sick time 
accumulation and the like \vere different t()r each agency. All of these issues were 
redefined and/or merged through contractual negotiations. 
At the time ofthe LMPO consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, six districts, 
1 - 6. in LDP's jurisdictional area and four districts. Adam, Baker, Charlie, and David 
districts, in lCPD's jurisdictional area. All of these arcas needed to be redefined after the 
consolidation. The number of patrol districts for a city the size of Louisville Metro was 
too great. Patrol boundaries, geographical size, and equalization of workload were 
independent variables. 
For example, when the patrol boundaries were redefined, geographical size was a 
paramount consideration. In Jefferson County, all of the patrol areas were larger in 
geographical size in that the population was sparse in those areas and calls for service 
were much less than in the LDP jurisdiction, thereby decreasing the workload of officers 
assigned to those areas. In other words, because ofless workload. the geographical area 
an officer patrolled was larger. Conversely, LOP patrol areas were somewhat smaller is 
size due to population density and many more calls for service. For example, LDP's 2nd 
patrol district, located in the downtown area or central business district of the former City 
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of Louisville was much smaller in geographical size than JCPD's districts. This was due 
primarily to the large daytime population and ultimately more calls for service regarding 
the downtown businesses. The consideration of geographical size was important so that 
officers could respond in a timely fashion to the needs of or calls from citizens. 
When redefining the patrol boundaties, equalization of workload was an 
important factor for consideration and was very complex to define. Consideration for 
calls for service was contemplated in redefining patrol houndaries. Calls for service were 
defined as cmergency or non-emergency caBs made to the 911 communications center 
where an officer was dispatched to the problem location. Examples of callsfi)r service 
were repmi runs, traffic accidents, disorderly persons, and the like. The self-initiated 
activities of officers were also considered. Self-initiated activities include actions such as 
traffic violations/violators, stopping suspicious persons, and checking businesses to 
determine whether or not they are secure after business hours. More specifically, self-
initiated activitics are initiated by the officers while calls t())" service are initiated by the 
911 communications section. Additionally, boundaries had to be realigned to equalize 
workload in each district. This was sometimes difficult due to geographical boundaries. 
neighborhood considerations and the like. 
Even though there was awareness on the part of officers about the aforementioned 
accs, it is unceltain whether or not they actually perceived the actu<ll complexity 
involved in their merging in the newly formed LMPD. Therefore, all ofthe 
atorementioned variables were included in both the satisfaction and perceived complexity 
sections of the survey. 
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The fourth section, perceived complexity, was measured with Question 23. 
Question 23 utilized the same organizational change components as the satisfaction 
section. This section was intended to measure officer perceptions of complexity in 
merging the OCCs. Ordinal measures were utilized in a 7-point Likert scale. 
Finally, the demographic information/ot1lcer characteristic section t Questions 24 
- 32) included both independent and control variables, agency affiliation, y~ars 
experience in law enforcement, years experience with previous agency, current rank and 
rank when agencies merged. The variables of age, gender, race, and education were also 
included for compatison purposes. 
Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument (Appendix A) was utilized that was divided into five 
sections: 1) suppOli, 2) merger experience and partici pation, 3) satisfaction~ 4) perceived 
complexity, and 5) demographic infonnation/officer characteristics. The survey 
instrument consisted of 32 questions. 
Only one survey instrument was used for officers of all ranks. While a dehate can 
ensue that oftlcers of different ranks responding to the survey can have varying 
perceptions of merger, one must realize that the expelicnce of merger was common to 
both. Even so, a question vvas included in section five inquiring as to the respondent's 
current rank and his/her rank at the time of merger. 
Pre-test surveys were conducted, and the questions and fonnat were revised as 
necessary. [n order to detennine whether the survey questions and fonnat are generating 
the desired responses necessary to address the research questions, a pretest of the survey 
was conducted with retired LMPD police officers. Using a purposive sample, these 
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individuals were selected based upon their knowledge of consolidation and their 
affiliation as fonner LDP or JCPD police officers at the time of the LMPD consolidation. 
The researcher received 32 pre-test surveys from respondents. This survey pre-testing 
provided an opportunity to address any potential problems and oversights in the survey 
questions and/or fonnat. 
It should be noted that the sections of the survey were not obvious to the 
respondent. However, the survey was divided into the aforementioned sections for the 
use of the researcher only. 
The first section. support, contained 2 questions addressing an officer's current 
level of support for the police consolidation that took place in 2003, in addition to the 
level of support for consolidation prior to the merger in 2003. For the questions in 
Section T, as-point Likt:rt scale was utilized for measurement. Included in the 5-point 
Like11 scale was a neutral answer or response for respondents that were undecided. 
Sedion II, merger expelience and participation, consisted of four questions and 
measured an officer's plior experience with or participation in the merger process. Three 
questions in Section n of the survey utilized nominal measures and one question (#5) 
utilized a list of different merger committees on which the respondent could have served. 
Again. for this section, a neutral answer was provided for those who didn't recall or \\lho 
preferred not to answer the question. 
Section III consisted of 16 questions and measured an officer's satisfaction with 
the merged organizational change components and sub-components. This section 
incorporated a 7-point Likeli scale ("very satisfied" to "very unsatisfied") and ordinal 
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measures for analysis. For this section, a neutral answer of "don 't recall/prefer not to 
answer" was provided. 
Section IV consisted of one question com prised of 16 parts. This question 
measured an officer's perception of difficulty or complexity at merging the aces and 
sub-components. As with Section III, this section incorporates a 7-point Likert scale and 
ordinal measures for analysis ranging from "very easy" to "very difficult." In this 
section, a neutral answer of "don't recall/prefer not to answer" was provided. 
In Section V (demographic infonnation/ofticer characteristics), measures included 
all three measurement types for the remaining 8 questions: nominal, ordinal, and ratio. 
Section IV sought to gather demographic infol111ation and officer characteristics for 
con-e1ative purposes. In this section, infonnation was sought regarding the respondents' 
prior department affiliation, years of experience with LDP or JCPD, total years oflaw 
enforcement experience, current rank, rank when LDP and JCPD merged, age, gender, 
race, and education. 
The survey was purposive in nature and distributed via e-mail to the entire 
population of 669 officers. These officers were selected because they worked for either 
the LOP or the JCPD prior to the merger of the two departments, but were also pmi of the 
wnsolidation process in 2003 and cun"cntly work for LMPD. 
The survey was distributed in August 2012 and was available for four weeks for 
respondents to complete. A bIiefpre-notice e-mail (Appendix B) was sent to all 
members of the population via their departmental e-mail addrcss.This pre-notice e-mail 
invited them to participate in the study and \vas forwarded a few days prior to the survey 
being sent to the members of the population. More specifically, the pre-notice e-mail 
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explained the background and purpose of the study and requested the chosen participants' 
assistance in completing the survey. 
Approximately three days later, an e-mail was fOr\,varded to all members of the 
population via their departmental e-mail address along with an electronic link to the 
survey utilizing SurveyMonkcy, Inc., an online survey service. Because home addresses 
for officers could not be secured from the department (confidential information), the 
questionnaire was forwarded to each member's departmental e-mail address. The 
SurveyMonkey, Inc. link contained the instructions for completing the survey. the 
infornled consent fann, and the survey (see Appendices C). 
An introductory letter of invitation was included as part of the aforementioned e-
mail outlining inforrnation on the researcher and the research study. This invitation 
included the researcher's name, affiliation, purpose of the study, and the procedures that 
would take place in the study. As part ofthe invitation, potential participants were 
informed that the Chief of Police was notified and that his approval was secured for the 
study. Participants were also advised that their participation was voluntary. Although 
total privacy could not be guaranteed, participants were reassured that their privacy was 
protected to the extcnt permittcd by law. Additionally, the invitations provided 
infornlation to the participants informing them that although there were no foreseeable 
risks other than possible discomfort in answering personal questions, there might be 
unforeseen risks. Pm1icipants were informed that although they might not directly 
benefit from the study, the information learned in the study could be hclpflll to others. 
Pm1icipants were also advised that there would be no compensation fIX their time, 
inconvenience, or expenses tor their participation. Infonnation contained in the Jetter 
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also included the research suhject's rights and where they could present questions, 
concerns and complaints. Finally, the invitations infonned participants that the study had 
been approved by the University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board. 
Participants were allowed as long as necessary to review the informed consent 
and the survey, until such time that the individual was comfortable in making an 
informed, personal decision about whether to participate in the study. Potential 
participants were provided with the contact infonnation to ask the researcher questions 
related to the study and to ask the University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board 
questions about their rights. Additionally, the survey included one more attempt to assist 
the participants by informing them that if they had any questions, hefore they proceeded 
with the survey, they should contact the researcher ahout the infonned consent or any 
other aspects of the research. If they felt uncomf01iable about any document or aspect of 
the research, they could immediately opt out of the study. 
Prior to completing the survey, participants could "c1ick" the designated field 
("Next'" hutton) of the consent form signifying acknowledgment thal they voluntarily 
agreed to participate in the survey. The consent form assured participants that their 
responses would remain anonymous. 
As offIcers at LMPD have access to their departmental e-mail off site and away 
from work, the surveys could have been completed at a location of the pmiicipant's 
choosing. Giving them this oPP0l1tmity helped to protect the participant's confidentiality 
and/or privacy in that he/she could have selected a location where he/she felt comf()ftable 
completing the survey (i.e., coffce shop, home, office, etc.). Although the time required 
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to complete the survey varied according to the person taking it, the questionnaire took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
A follow-up e-mail (Appendix B) and another copy of the original survey link on 
Survey Monkey, Inc. was also forwarded to individuals in the population approximately 
one week and three weeks after the initial e-mail in order to encourage those who failed 
to complete the survey to do so. Aside from the aforementioned e-mails and responses to 
participants' subsequent questions, the researcher had no contact with the study's 
participants. 
Additionally, a closing date was established for completion of the survey. The 
survey was active for four weeks to allow members of the population to complete the 
survey at their convenience. Only participants who completed the survey prior to the 
closing date were included in this study. 
This research commenced upon the approval (Appendix D) of the University of 
Louisville's Institutional Review Board ORB). 
Survey Population 
As this was the first survey of personnel since 2003 and after the merger of the 
LDP and the JCPD, many officers have retired. Therefore, the population selected for 
this study was 669 sworn personnel who were police officers with the former LDP or the 
JCPD prior to the consolidation of these departments in 2003. 
The officers that were paI1 of this population held the rank(s) of officer through 
Lieutenant Colonel. Of the population, 435 s\vom personnel were employed with the 
fonncr L.ouisville Division of Police and 234 officers were fonnally with the Jefferson 
County Police Depat1mcnt. Officers who were employed by LMPD, but were not with 
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either JCPO or LOP, were not selected. Although this group may have had some 
knowledge and/or minimal experience with a small part of the consolidation process, they 
were not present throughout the entire consolidation process. Additionally, it is unlikely 
that these individuals would have had firsthand knowledge of either LPO or JCPO. 
These two factors would have made it difficult for this particular group to provide 
responses to the survey questions that "vould enhance the quality of insight and 
understanding attempted in this study. Additionally, persons retiring after the 
consolidation in 2003 were not invited to participate due to the fact that many oftheir 
current addresses were not known or availahle. 
In order to conduct this study, a written request was submitted to LMPD's Chief 
of Police. The purpose of this request was to gain access to the organization and some of 
the officer information in order to conduct this study. In this request, permission was 
sought to receive electronic mailing addresses of police officers who were currently 
working for LMPD and who were previously with the LOP or JCPO at the time of the 
police merger in 2003. The inflmnation thaI was requested was I) names of the officers, 
2) their prior department affiliation, 3) current assignment, and 4) curn.mt e-mail address, 
current rank, gender and race of the oflicer. The Chief of Police was advised that the 
individual intonnation obtained from the LMPO organizational records was to be kept 
confidential, but that the results of the study would be made available upon request with 
participants' identifying information removed. 
This method was used due to the fact that it provided the best means to capture 
infom1ation necessary to distribute the survey and gather essential demographic 
characteristics necessary for the collection of pCliinent data for this study. These 
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particular characteristics included: 1) an officer's name, 2) e-mail address, 3) assignment, 
and 4) the officer's former department aftiliation. 
As an example, an officer's aftiliation with his/her fonner department can 
inf1uence his/her attitude regarding merger to include their support for it, or lack thereof 
As previously cited, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission Report (1998) 
conducted a survey with findings that 82.1 {% of LDP officers supported consolidation 
while 89.9% of JCPD officers were opposed to it. 
Also, an officer's rank can influence his/her awareness and perception of certain 
complexities. Consohdating tv\"o large organizations resulting 11-0111 a large government 
consolidation, involves widespread structural changes. These changes require integrating 
some or all parts of the original organizations' tlmctions and activities ([ A CP, 2003). 
Depending on the degree of consolidation of the stnlcture or the perception of difficulty 
of redesigning the structure, perception of complexity could be intluenced differently by 
individuals based upon their responsihilities and/or their knowledge of the complexity 
within a given department at the time of the departmental consolidation. 
Based upon these characteristics, two categories of officers were constructed in 
order to analyze responses. These categories include: I) former LDP officers and 2) 
fonner JCPD officers. These groups were constructed using the info11nation availahle 
from and provided by LMPD. This infonnation represented both the current ranks of 
officers and their rank at the time of consolidation. Given the relatively small number of 
police officers that held the ranks above sergeant (i.e., lieutenants, captains, majors, 
lieutenant colonels, and colonels), and in order to protect the contidentiality of 
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participants, these individuals along with sergeants, were categorized as middle-
management and/or staff 
Descriptive Characteristics of Population 
Descriptive characteristics of the population were captured through information 
gained from The Louisville Metro Police Department's Human Resource Department. 
This included information related to department affiliation, gender, race/ethnicity, job 
title or rank, and education. All of these characteristics are described below with the 
exception of education. Accurate up to date descriptive characteristics related to 
education were not available. Theret{xc, they were not included as part of this 
description of the total population. 
As previously mentioned, the population consisted of 669 sworn personnel. Of 
this number, 435 or 65~'o of which were employed with the fonner Louisville Division of 
Police and 234 or 34.9% were fonnally yvith the Jefferson County Police Depmiment. 
Tahle 8 depicts a breakdown ofthe gender and racc!ethnicity of the population. 
Additionally, it displays a breakdown of the ranks/job titles of those in the population. 
Of the 669 s\"'orn officers in the population, the majority of respondents \Vere males 
(85%). This was true in totality and for both of the former agencies. 
When assessing the entire population, the majOlity of members were Caucasian 
(86.0%) followed in frequency hy Black/ African-Americans, Hispanics or Latinos, and 
Asians. As with the entire population, the same was true fIX each of the former agencies 
(LOP and JCPD). 
157 
Most members of the population held the rank/job title of patrol officer (67%), 
followed by Sergeants and then members of middle management. Once again, this trend 
was consistent for members of each of the fonner agencies. 
Table 8 - Demogra,Ehic/Officer Characteristics of PO,Eulation 
LDP JCPD 
GENDER Percent Frequency Percent Frequency 
Male 1'5.1% 370 87.2% 204 
Female 14.9(Yo 65 18.8% 30 
RACE/ETHNICITY 
Asian or Asian-American 0.2% 0.9% 2 
Black or African-American 13.8% 60 9.4% 22 
Hispanic or Latino 0.9'Y;' 4 1.7% 4 
White (Non-Hispanic) 85.1% 370 88% 20ti 
RANK/JOB TITLE 
Patrol Officer 63% 274 73.5% 172 
Sergeant 23.4% 102 20.5% 48 
Middle Management 10.1 44 4.7% 11 
Staff Officer 3.4% 15 1.3% 3 
Demographics/Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents 
Demographics and/or descriptive characteristics of the respondents were captured 
through information gained from the survey instrument which addressed 1) prior police 
agency affiliation, 2) total years of expelience in law enforcement, 3) years employed by 
LDP or JCPD prior to merger, 4) cunent rank, 5) rank at the time of merger in 2003, 6) 
cunent age, 7) gender, 8) race/ethnicity, and 9) educational level. All of these 
characteristics are described below. It should be noted that as with any survey, missing 
values exist. As such, valid percentages are reported. 
Of the population of669 sworn personnel, 390 or 58.2~/o of the population 
completed the survey. Table 9 depicts the former departmental affiliations, gender, 
158 
race/ethnicity, education, years of experience, years with fonner agency and current rank 
of the respondents. 
Of the 390 officers that responded to the survey, the majority were fomler LOP 
officers. Respondents ranged in age fi'om 31-64 (.1\:1=42.50) with the majority being 
males. 
In reference to the race/ethnicity, the majority of respondents were White (Non-
Hispanic), followed by Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, 
and Asian or Asian-American. Five respondents classified themselves as "Other". 
The mean educational1evel of the respondents was 3.85. Most of those 
responding to the survey had a Bachelor's Degree, followed by those having 1 or more 
years of college, but no degree and those with some college, but less than 1 year. Next 
were respondents with a Master's Degree or above and then an Associate's Degree. 
Twenty-six persons responding had a high school degree. 
The mean expelience level was 3.79. Overall, the majority of the respondents had 
more than 10 years oflaw enforcement experience at the time the survey was completed. 
Only 15 respondents had Jess than 10 years of service. Conversely, at the time of merger, 
mosi of the respondents had less than 10 years with their fomler respective depariment(s) 
with a mean of 1.89. 
The mean rank of the respondents was 2.26. The Il1qiority of respondents were 
patrol officers and detectives. It should be noted that a1 LMPD, the classification of 
"detective" is ajob title. Detectives are still considered the same rank as a person with 
the rank of"poJice officer." Sergeants were majority of the supervisors and management 
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,vho responded to the survey. At the time the departments were merged. most 
respondents were patrol officers with a mean rank of 1.552. 
Table 9 - Demographic/Officer Characteristics of Respondents 
Percent Freguencv 
FORMER DEPT. AFF'ILIA nON 
LDP 64.6% 243 
JCPD 35.4% 133 
GENDER 
Male 8~l.I ~,'O 319 
Female 14.9% 56 
RACE/ETHN ICITY 
American Indian or Alaska Native 1.6% 6 
Asian or Asian-American 1.1 (~'O 4 
Black or African-American 8.9%, 33 
Hispanic or Latino 1.3% 5 
White (Non-Hispanic) 85.7% 318 
Other l.3~o 5 
EDUCATION 
High School/GED 6.9~/;' 26 
Some College, but less than 1 year 10.3% 39 
One or more years of college/no degree 28.4% 107 
Associate's Degree ~ "10; I.~ 10 27 
Bachelor's Degree 39,3% 148 
Master's Degree or above 7.9% 30 
TOTAL YEARS EXPERIENCE 
>5 Years up to and including 10 Years 4.0% 15 
> 1 0 Years up to and including 15 Years 36.6% 137 
> 15 Years lip to and including 20 Years 35.3% 132 
>20 Years 24.1% 90 
YEARS w/FORMER AGENCY 
0-5 years 40.7% 153 
>5 - 10 years 35.4% 133 
> I 0 - 15 years 19,4% 73 
> 15 - 20 years 2.9% 11 
>20 years 1.5% h 
CllRRENT RANK 
Patrol Officer 32,4% 122 
Detective 26,5% 100 
Sergeant 25.7% 97 
Middle Management 13.3%, 50 
Staff Officer 2.1% 8 
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Analysis/Predictions 
Data collected from the surveys were analyzed using SPSS version 20.0. 
Stepwise rehJfession analyses were used to detennine prediction values between the 
independent variables (i.e., officers' perceptions of complexity of merging or redefining 
policies and procedures, culture, redefining boundaties, etc.) and the dependent variables 
csupport (current support) and overallsupport (overall support) for consolidation. More 
specifically, data analysis procedures included the following: 
1. Data Coding - Data collected had numeric coding assigned to each level 
of variables. 
2. Exploratory Data Analysis - Descriptive statistics were calculated to 
screen the data for potential errors and to describe the data and outline the 
characteristics of the population and the relationships between the 
variables. 
3. lntemal Consistency Reliability - Cronbach's alphas were calculated as an 
estimate of reliability for each scaled variable. An alpha of 0.70 or greater 
is a measure of consistent reliability and according to Nunnally (1970) a 
"good" coefficient alpha is one that is .80 or greater. 
4. Pearson's r correlations - Coefficients of detennination (r) were 
computed in order to determine whether variation in the perception of 
difficulty of merging the different accs (culture, policies and procedures, 
communications, etc. ),fiJr example, predicted variation in rates of suppoli 
for consolidation. 
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5. Pearson product-moment con'elations - Correlations were examined to 
determine the relationship between two or more of the variables so that it 
could be established if changes in one variable (i.e., perception of 
complexity in merging the aCes) were associated with changes in support 
for consolidation. These relationships were used to test this study's 
hypothesis in determining whether or not police officers' perceptions of 
complexity in merging the aces affected their support for the police 
department consolidation. Positive or negative relationships were 
expressed through r-values, ranging from 1 to -1, respectively. 
6. Anova Multiple Regression Analysis - Stepwise (forward) regression 
analyses were used to explain the relationships between a set of predictor 
(IV) variables and a dependent variable (support for merger) for 
explanatory purposes of the study. 
Data Analysis for Research Hypotheses 
Following are the notations for the constant, unstandardized coefficient, error, and 
variables related to this study used in the regression analysis for HI and H2. 
Demographics 
XI = Years Experience 
X2 = Department Years Experience 
X3 = Rank 
X4 = Rank at the time of Merger in 2003 
Xs = Age 
X6 = Race (wvnon = White/non whites) 
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X7 = Education 
Xs = Fonner Police Department 
Sati.~faction 
X9 = Satisfaction 
Complexity 




YI = Current Support 
Y 2 = Overall Support 
ho = Constant 
b = un standardized coefficient 
el = error 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 
HI Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change 
components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. 
H2 The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change 
components, the less support for police consolidation. 
Multiple regression analyses using the stepwise method were conducted to 
explore whether a significant explanatory relationship existed among the demographic 
variables, prior support, satisfaction with the OCCs, and perceived complexity in merging 
the OCCs with support for merger (i.e., current support and overall supp0l1). When using 
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overall support (prior support + current support) as the dependent variable, prior support 
will not be used as a predictor. The stepwise regression model for Hypotheses 1 & 2 
used the following equations: 
Current Support 
Yl = (bo + blXl + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5XS + b6X6 + b7X7 -+- bsXs + b9X9 + 
blOXlO+bl1Xll) + el 
Overall Support 
Y2 = (bo+ blXl + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5XS + b6X6 + b7X7 + bsXs + b9X9+ 
blOXIO+bllXll) + el 
Evaluation of the Research Methods 
In evaluating the research methods utilized fix this study, an examination of both 
internal and external validity was scrutinized. External validity is increased if the 
findings of the study are relevant to those subjects and settings beyond the study. Internal 
validity can be bolstered through the use ofreliable instrumentation. 
In ternal Validity 
In assessing issues related to internal validity of this analysis, one of the strengths 
of the study was that it was conducted in a natural setting of the respondents choosing. 
Respondents could feel comfOliahle with their environment and as a result, respond 
candidly. 
An appropriate size population was used for the study. Mundtrom, et al. (2005) 
asserts that the appropriate sample size or in this case, population size, is 60 to 400, with 
a minimum of 100. 
164 
The procedures used to test the hypotheses were consistent and clear. 
Additionally, the statistical procedures utilized were appropriate to these the hypotheses. 
The use of meticulous data analyses (reliability estimates, correlations, stepwise 
regression, and use of correlational research, etc.) represented a strength and contributed 
to the internal validity of the study. 
Issues rdated to memory were one of the limitations of this study. The study 
focused on the efforts of police officers to remember back to 2003, over 9 years ago. The 
danger of this technique is evident. Sometimes people have faulty memories; sometimes 
they are less than forthright. 
The population, while a strength, was also a limitation. Many of the people who 
were not surveyed for this research, those who had more experience at the specific time 
the departments merged and have since retired. would possibly have had different 
pcrspectives rcgarding their perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs. This is 
in part because of their experience level, or rank, at the time of the police consolidation in 
2003. The persons inten/iewed for this research had far less experience at the time of the 
merger in 2003, and therefore, may have had a different perspective and perception of the 
complexity of the OCCs. 
The Organizational change components selected for this study may vary from 
department to department during a consolidation. Efforts were taken to select five basic 
components (i.e., culture(s), policy and procedures, communications, collective 
hargaining contracts, and redefining patrol boundaries) that would be key or crucial to 
any consolidation. However, there is no guarantee that these particular organizational 
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change components would apply to all consolidations and, therefore, it may be difficult to 
duplicate this study in other jurisdictions. 
Another limitation of the study might have been situational contaminants which 
could not be controlled. It is possible that participants may have consulted with others 
when completing the survey instrument. 
Finally, this study did not seek to measure perception of complexity among those 
who were hired into LMPD after merger. Even though it has taken several years for the 
LMPD to stabilize, the foclls of this study addresses the attitudes of persons who were 
employed by either LOP or JCPO at the time that these two departments were 
consolidated in 2003 and had remained employed until the survey commenced. 
External Validity 
One of the strengths of the strengths of the study related to external validity was 
that the collection of data was in a location of the respondent's choosing. The study was 
conducted in an environment that was natural to the respondent thereby avoiding threats 
to external validity that are experienced in other types of research (i.e., laboratory, 
location of the researcher's choosing, etc.). 
The population chosen was also added to the external validity in that it was 
homogenous to the police department consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky and 
specifically involving the Louisville Metro Police Department. Also, the population that 
was surveyed consisted of the average police officer in the depmtment to increase the 
ability to generalize results. 
One of the limitations related to external validity was the Organizational Change 
Components selected tor this research. The OCCs were established by the researcher and 
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specific to the Louisville Metro Police Department. Generalizing beyond Louisville, 
Kentucky may be limited depending upon the specific OCCs conducted my other 
consolidating agencies. 
Finally, because of the final data producing respondents in the surveyed 




The purpose of this study was to examine the Louisville Metro Police Department 
consolidation and police officers' perceptions ofthe complexity of merging the OCCs 
integral to consolidating the LDP and JCPD into one department. More specifically, this 
study sought to determine how officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the 
OCCs affected their attitudes toward the police department merger and, in particular, 
their support for the consolidation. One p0l1ion ofthis data, specifically parts addressing 
support for merger, was compared to the results from a survey conducted in 1998 by the 
Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC). The 1998 survey was 
distributed to police officers from the LDP and the JCPD and measured support for the 
police department consolidation prior to it occurring. 
The Louisville Metro Police Department provided a unique context in which to 
describe and understand how the perception of complexity related to certain factors or 
components influenced support for consolidation. Support for consolidation was 
assessed by using organizational change components that were "dynamic" in nature in 
that consolidating, redefining, or changing them and ultimately implementing them was a 
complex process that had an everlasting effect on LMPD. 
Data Collection 
As previously mentioned, the entire population of 669 sworn officers with the 
LMPD who were formerly affiliated with either Louisville Division of Police or Jefferson 
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County Police Department was surveyed. Surveys were distributed via Survey Monkey, 
Inc. A total of 390 completed surveys were returned, representing 58.2% of the 
population. The survey data fi'om the completed surveys was downloaded into an SPSS 
20.0 data file via the Survey Monkey, Inc. software program and checked for accuracy. 
Blank responses and unanswered questions were entered as blank fields in the data tile 
and treated as missing data. 
Descriptive Statistics 
As mentioned in the Methodology Chapter. the survey was divided into five 
sections: 1) support, 2) merger experience and participation, 3) satisfaction, 4) perceived 
complexity, and 5) demographic infol1nation/officer characteristics. The descriptive 
characteristics pertaining to the section on demographic infornlation/officer 
characteristics was covered in Chapter IV. 
The following frequency distributions are reported in aggregate form for each 
variable. They are then repOlied by fOlmer police department affiliation. It should be 
noted that the frequencies for all respondents combined include answers from 
respondents who did not identity their former police department affiliation. 
Two variables were contained in the supp0l1 section. These included prior 
support (psupport) and current support (csupport). These variables were measured with a 
5-point Likert scale (1 =strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=undecided, 4=disagree, and 
5=strongly disagree). 
In regards to prior support for the merger ofLDP and JCPD, respondents were 
asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that they were supportive of the 
merger prior to it occurring and prior to the inception of LMPD. Table 10 shows their 
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responses. Of the combined 389 respondents answering the question, support for or 
against merger was near equal (44.1 % vs. 44.3%). Eleven percent of the respondents 
were undecided. 
When posed with the same statement addressing current support for merger of 
LDP and JCPD, 56.2% supported consolidation while 33.1 % did not. Fifty-eight of the 
respondents or 10% were undecided. 
Table 10 - Psupport and Csupport Combined and by Former Department 
Combined LDP JCPD 
PRIOR SUPPORT Percent N Percent N Percent N 
Strongly Agree 18.7% 73 26.7% 65 4.5% 6 
Agree 25.4% 99 34.6% 84 7.5% 10 
Undecided 11.3% 44 13.2% 32 5.3% 7 
Disagree 17.9% 70 18.1% 44 19.5% 26 
Strongly Disagree 26.4% 103 7.4% 18 63.2% 84 
CURRENT SUPPPORT 
Strongly Agree 20.3% 79 29.8'Vo 72 4.5% 6 
Agree 35.9% 140 4l.7% 101 25J)% 33 
Undecided 14.9% 58 8.7% 21 12.1% 16 
Disagree 14.9% 58 12.0% 29 19.7% 26 
Strongly Disagree 18.2% 71 7.9% 19 38.6%. 51 
When stratified by fOlmer department affiliation, Table) 0 shows that the majority 
of LDP officers were supportive of merger prior to it occurring while the majority of 
JCPD officers were not supportive. In regards to current support for merger, the findings 
are similar. The majority ofLDP officers were currently supportive of merger while the 
majority of JCPD officers were not. 
Four variables were contained in the section regarding merger experience and 
participation: 1) prior experience with merger (experience), 2) serving on a merger 
committee (serve), 3) the committee on which the respondent served (committee), and 4) 
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whether or not officers talked to anyone who served on a committee (talk). For the 
experience, serve, and talk variables, 1 =yes, 2=no, and 3=don't recall/prefer not to 
answer. For the variable committee, respondents had a choice of20 committees on 
which they could have served to select. 
When asked if the respondent had any experience with a police merger prior to 
the LMPO consolidation, 20 (5%) responded that they had prior experience while 366 
(94%) did not. Ofthe 20 who had previous experience with merger, 14 respondents were 
from the fonner LOP and 6 were from the former JCPO. The overwhelming majority of 
respondents from each of the fonner departments had no experience with merger or the 
process. Two, or 0.5%, didn't know or preferred not to answer. 
When the respondents were asked whether or not they served on any of the 
merger committees at the inception ofLMPD, 42 (11 %) acknowledged that they had 
while 342 (88%) did not. Five, or 1.3~/o, didn't know or preferred not to answer. 
Twenty-six, or almost 61.9% of the all of the respondents who served on a committee, 
were with the former LOP. Sixteen, or 38.1 %, of the former JCPD respondents served on 
a committee. 
Respondents listed 14 different committees on which they served. Nine (23%) 
served on the badge/patch/vehicle markings committee, 4 (l0%) on communications, 2 
(5%) on community outreach, 3 (8%) on the facilities committee, 2 (5%) on in-car 
cameras, and 1 (3%) on infonnation technology. The mission statement/values 
committee and the values committee each had 2 (5 cyo). One respondent (3%) served on 
the recruiting/hiring committee, while 4 (10%) served on the committee regarding 
training. Five respondents (13%) served on the specialty teams committee and 2 (5%) 
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served on the unifonn committee, 1 (3%) on weapons issues, and 1 (3%) on workload 
analysis. Of those serving on the committees, 17 (44%) respondents served on at least 2 
committees, 5 (13%) served on at least 3 committees, and 4 (10%) served on 3 
committees. 
If they did not serve on a committee, respondents were asked if they talked to 
anyone who did serve. Of those respondents, 104 (30%) indicated that they did talk to 
someone who served on a committee while 226 (65%) did not. Twenty (6%) didn't know 
or preferred not to answer. Of those responding, 52 (24%) from LDP talked to someone 
who served on a committee about the merger whik 158 (72%) did not. Eleven (5%) of 
those serving with LDP didn't know or preferred not to answer. Of the former JCPD 
respondents, 51 (44%) did talk to a committee member about the merger while 58 (50%) 
did not. Seven (6%) of the former JCPD officers didn't know or preferred not to answer. 
The 16 organizational change components (culture, mission, values, 
decentralization, policy and procedures, administrative reporting, weapons, contracts, 
pay, benefits, boundaries, equalization of workload, size of divisions, communications, 
10-codes, and car numbers) are variables that are contained in the satisfaction and 
complexity sections. In the satisfaction section, the variables are preceded by the letter 
"s" (satisfaction) and by the letter "c" (complexity) in the complexity section. 
The OCC satisfaction variables were measured using the following 7-point Likert 
scale: 1 =very satisfied, 2=satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 4=somewhat unsatisfied, 
5=unsatistied, 6=very unsatisfied, and 7=don't recalllprefer not 10 answer. In the 
satisfaction section, respondents are asked to indicate their satisfaction with the OCCs 
that were created as a result of merging LOP and JCPO. 
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Table 11 displays the results in aggregate fonn, in regards to the satisfaction 
OCCs. Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix C) depict the responses for the members from each 
fonner agency (LDP and JCPO respectively). 
In reference to the respondents' satisfaction with the culture (sculture), almost 
70% of the respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with 
the culture. Sixty-five percent of the LOP respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, 
unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied. JCPD personnel were even more so with 78% being 
somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied. 
However, in relation to the mission and values of the newly fonned LMPD, most 
were satisfied. The majority ofLDP (79%) personnel were satisfied with the mission 
statement that was merged while only 49.4% offom1er JCPD personnel were satisfied. 
For both the mission (smission) and values (svalues) of LMPD for both LOP and 
JCPO, over 60% of the respondents were very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied. 
However, the decentralization (sdecent) policy of LMPO left over 75% of the 
respondents somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied and very unsatisfied. Over 82~/o of LOP 
personnel were unsatisfied with the decentralization policy. The same held true for 
fonner JCPO officers of which 72.9% were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very 
unsatisfied with decentralization. 
Over 67% of the respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very 
unsatisfied with the merged policies and procedures (spp) ofLMPD. In reference to the 
policies and procedures, 59.6% of the LDP officers were somewhat unsatisfied, 
unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied. In comparison, even more of the fonner JCPD officers 
(83.2%) were to some degree unsatistied, 
173 
Additionally, the majority of respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied 
or very unsatisfied with the administrative rep0l1ing practices (sreport) of the newly 
formed LMPD. Most of the respondents with both LDP and JCPD were somewhat 
unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied (57.8 and 69.2% respectively). 
However, in regards to weapon selection (sweapon), the majority of respondents 
were very satisfied or satisfied with the choice of weapon for the merged department. 
Former LDP personnel (88%) and JCPD personnel (54%) were both either very satisfied 
or satisfied with the weapon choice made for LMPD. 
Although the majority of respondents (54~cl) were satisfied with the contract 
(scontract), it was not an overwhelming majority. However, former department 
affiliation showed vast differences. While 74% of the LDP respondents were somewhat 
satisfied, satisfied, or very satisfied, 81 ~'O of JCPD personnel were somewhat unsatisfied, 
unsatisfied or very unsatisfied. 
The same held true for the officers' satisfaction with pay (spay). Related to pay, 
75.2% ofLDP respondents were somewhat satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied. JCPD 
respondents saw this issue differently as 84.2% of them were somewhat unsatisfied, 
unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the pay issue. This may have been due to JCPD 
officer salaries being greater than LDP officers. LDP officers "vere seeking parity in the 
merger process and, as a result, received raises in salaries while the salaries of JCPD 
personnel were held at a constant level until LDP achieved equal pay with them. 
Of the contractual issues, officers seemed most satisfied with benefits (sbenefit) 
with over 60% of the officers being very satistied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied. As 
with the contract and pay OCCs, the majority of LDP personnel (81 %) were somewhat 
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Table 11- Combined OCC Satisfaction Resl!onses 
Variables VS S SS SU lJ VlJ DR 
Sculture .8~/o 11.4% 16.9'% 14.8% 25.5% 29.1% 1.6% 
(3) (44) (65) (57) (98) (112) (6) 
Smission 4.9~/o 32.0% 25.8% 1.).3% 12.4% 8.5% 7.0% 
(.19) ( 124) (100) (36) (48) n~) (27) 
Svallles 5.4%, ~3.4% 24.1%, 9.8% 8.8~o 111°,'0 7.3% 
(21) (129) (9~) (:18) (34) (43) (28) 
Sdecent ·01 .) /0 7.6% 11.2% 15.4% 24.2% 37.1<% 3.4% 
(2) (29) (43) (59) (93) ( 145) (13) 
Spp 1.3%, 1.;.1<% 15.1.)'10 17.0% 18.3% 31.9% 1.8%, 
(5) (53) (61 ) ((is) PO) (122) (7) 
Srept 1.3% 12.0% 21.2% 16.2% 18.6% 26.7% 3.9'~o 
(5) (46) (81) (62) (71 ) (102) (15) 
Sweapon 32.40/" 43.4';" 8.7'% 5.0% 3.7% 5.()% 1.8(~/O 
(In) ( 165) (33) ( 19) (14) (19) (7) 
Scontract 8.9% 26.8% 18.2% 8,2~{' 15.0% 21.8°1(, 1.1% 
(34) (102) (69) (31 ) (57) (81) (4) 
Spay 13.3'YO 24.0% 16.4% 6.8% 15.1% 23.4% 1.0% 
(51 ) (92) (63) (26) (58) (90) (4) 
Sbenetit 13.2'~o 26.9';;;' 20.6'10 8.4% 10.0% 20,1% .8% 
(50) (102) (78) (32) 08) (76) (3) 
Sbollndary 1.3% 2L9% 21.7% 12,5% 16.4% 25.1% 1.0% 
(5 ) (1l4) (83) (48) (63) (96) (4) 
Sequal .5°f) 19,5% 21.3'%1 13.2% 18.4% 22.6% 4.4% 
(2) (75 ) (82) (51) (71 ) (87) ( 17) 
Ssize .5~/(J 20.2% 19,6% 15,2% 20.9% 21.7% 1,8% 
(2) (77) (75) (58) (80) (83) (7) 
Scomm 2.1% 17.3°0 18.3% 12J'~';, 19.9% 28,8% 1.3 0/(, 
(8) (66) (70) (47) (76) ( 110) (5) 
SIO 8.4% 28.2% 17.0% 12,8% 12.8% 18.1<% 2.1% 
em (108) (65 ) (49) (49) (n) ( 8) 
Scar 7.3% 49.6% 17.6% 7.1% 7.6% 8,9'% 1.8% 
(28) ( 189) (67) (27) (29) (34) (7) 
*\'S=Ver~ Satisfied, S=Satislied, SS=Somewhat Satisfied, Sll=Somcwliat ullsatisfied, 
l,=t;nsatisfied, \'( '=\'~'1 un,ati~fied, DR=Don't recall/prefer lIot to answer 
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satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied with the benefits of the merged departments. 
However, JCPO personnel (75%) were mostly somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very 
unsatisfied. 
In regards to restructuring the patrol divisions, in aggregate, most of the 
respondents were unsatisfied with the results. However, while the majority of JCPO 
respondents were somewhat satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied, the majority of LOP 
personnel were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the change. 
As with the boundaries (sboundary), the same held true, in totality, with the size 
of the patrol divisions (ssize), and the equalization of workload (sequal) in the newly 
merged/formed patrol divisions. The same was true when size and equalization of 
workload was stratified by former department affiliation. Most (56%) of the fonner 
JCPO personnel were satisfied with the equalization of workload while the majority 
(63%) of LOP personnel were not. 
Regarding the size of the division boundaries, most (68%) ofthc former LOP 
officers were unsatisfied. To the contrary, the majority (57%) of JCPO personnel were 
satisfied with the sizes of the divisions, This may have been because former LOP 
personnel were accustomed to smaller areas due to the higher volume of calls for service. 
The sizes of former JCPO districts were much larger due to fewer calls for service. 
Collectively, the majority (61 %) of officers were discontented with the 
communications section merger (scomm) being somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very 
unsatisfied. Combined. approximately 54% of the respondents were very satistied, 
satisfied, or somewhat satisfied with the lO-code system (slO) that was implemented. 
The majority (51 %) of LO P personnel did not like the adoption of the I O-code system 
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while the majority (55%) offonner JCPD personnel did. This was probably due to the 
fact that LDP personnel, prior to merger, used very few of the 10-codes while JCPD 
personnel used them in their entirety. This was a drastic change for LDP personnel. 
Additionally, the majority (75%) of officers were satisfied with the car numbers 
(Scar) merged as a result of the consolidation. Tht: majority of officers with both LDP 
(75%) and JCPD (73%) were somewhat satisfIed, satisfied or very satisfied with this 
merger. 
The OCC complexity variables are measured using the following 7-point Likert 
scale: 1 =very easy, 2=easy, 3=somewhat easy, 4=somewhat difficult, 5=difficult, 6=very 
difficult and 7= no opinion. In the complexity section, respondents were asked to 
indicate their perception of difficulty in merging the OCCs that were a result of merging 
LDP and JCPD. Table 14 shows the summative OCC complexity responses. Tables 15 
(LDP) and 16 (JCPD) (Appendix C) contain the OCC complexity responses for each 
former agency. 
In regards to respondents' perceived compJexity in merging the culture (cculture), 
over 65% perceived that it was difficult or very difficult to merge. The majority of 
respondents from both JCPD and LDP (87% and 82% respectively) perceived merging 
the culture as somewhat difficult, difticult, or very difficult. In fact, 44.4% of JCPD 
personnel and 39.4% of LDP personnel perceived it as very difficult. Culture was 
perceived as difficult to merge in that each former department's culture was distinct, had 
endured the test oftime, and consisted of mutual interpretations that were exclusive to 
each palticular agency. 
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Collectively, the majority (67%) of the respondents didn't perceive the merging of 
the mission statements (cmission) as difficult. The same held true for the values 
(cvalues) of the newly merged LMPO. The majority of officers from both the fonner 
LOP and JCPO (70.3% and 61.4% respectively) perceived merging the mission 
statements as being somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. Officers f)'om both the fonner 
LOP and JCPO also perceived merging the values as somewhat easy, easy, or very easy 
(68.6% and 61.7% respectively). 
The decentralization (cdecent) policy of LMPO was not perceived as easy to 
merge. Cumulatively, almost 80% of the respondents perceived it as somewhat difficult, 
difficult, or very difficult to merge/implement. The greater part of officers from each of 
the former agencies believed this process to be somewhat difficult, difficult, or very 
difficult. 
Merging the policies and procedures (cpp) and administrative reporting practices 
(creport) ofLMPO were both perceived by the majority of respondents as very difficult 
difficult or somewhat difficult to merge. The preponderance of officers from both the 
former LOP and JCPO (60.6% and 79.7% respectively) were in agreement and viewed 
merging the policies and procedures as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. 
The respondents from the former LOP and JCPD (56.3% and 6~L2(~/o respectively) also 
considered consolidating the administrative reporting practices as somewhat ditlicult, 
difficult, or very difficult. 
However, in regards to weapon selection and the difficulty in merging the weapon 
systems (cweapon), the overwhelming majority (77%) of respondents perceived it as 
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being somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. In mass, the officers of each of the former 
agencies believe this merger process to be somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. 
Officers perceived the issues related to the contract as difficult or complex. The 
majority of respondents perceived the contract (ccontract) as being difficult to merge. 
However, for LOP personnel, almost as many perceived it to be somewhat easy, easy or 
very easy (49%). The majOlity of .TCPD personnel (80%) perceived merging the 
contracts as difficult. 
Amassed, officers believed merging pay (cpay) and benefits (cbenetit) as difficult 
to merge. Again, in relation to pay, the majority of officers of the former 1.0 P (51 %) 
believed merging pay to be a somewhat easy, easy. or very easy process. To the contrary, 
75.2% of the fonner .TCPD officer perceived the merger of pay to be somewhat difficult, 
difficult, or very difficult. In reference to merging benefits, the majority of LOP officer 
(52%) perceived the process to be somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. As with pay, the 
majority of JCPO officers (72%) perceived the process as somewhat difficult, difficult, or 
very difficult. 
Tn regards to restructuring the patrol divisions, most of the respondents perceived 
the process as complex. The majority of the respondents perceived merging the 
boundaries of the patrol di visions (cboundary) and detennining their size (csize) as 
difficult or complex. Equalization of workload (cequal) was also perceived by the 
majority of officers as difficult to merge. When assessing the responses for each former 
agency, the majority of both LOP and JCPO officers perceived all of these merger 
processes as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. 
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Table 14 - Combined oce Comelexit~ Reseonses 
Variables VE E SE SD D VD NO 
Cculture 1.3% 5.8% S.2% 17.5% 24.6% 40.7% 1.9% 
(5) (22) (31 ) «(,6) (93) (154) (7) 
Cmission 5.1% 27 7'~/o 34.1% 14.4% 6.1% 4.5% X.O'y" 
tJ9) (104) ( 128) (54) (23) (17) (30) 
Cvalues 5.S% 2h.9% 33.0% 135% 7.1% 5.5'~'" 8.2% 
(22) (102) ( 125) (51) (27) (21 ) (31 ) 
Cdecent 8°; , /0 5.8% 10.6% 26.5% 29.6'Yo 23.8% 2.9'Yo 
(3) (22) (40) (100) ( 112) (90) <II) 
Cpp So,' . /0 10.3% 18.3% 24,1% 23.6% 19.4% 3.4% 
(3) (39) (6'1) (91 ) (89) (73) (13) 
Crep1 1.1% 11,0% 21.2% 26,8% 19,0% 14.2% 6.7% 
(4) (41 ) (79) (100) (71 ) (53) (25) 
Cweapon 17,1% 36.3% 24.(J% 8.5% 5,'1% 4.5% 3,7%, 
(64) ( 136) (90) (32) (22) ( 17) (14) 
Ccontract 2,1%, 13,8% 22.0~/~1 22.8% 17.5% 18.3% 3.4% 
(8) (52) (83) ISh) (66) (69) (13) 
Cpay 2.9% 17.6% 19.8% 21.9% 15.2% IX.7% 3.7% 
(11) (66) (74) (X2) (57) (70) ( 14) 
Cbenefi1 2. 7(~'o 17,5% 22.3% 22.5% 13.5% 17.8% 3.7% 
(10) (66) (84) U~5) (51 ) (67) ( 14) 
Cboundary I.'J"";, 13.3% 17.8% 29,0% 18.4% 17.3% 2.4% 
(7) (50) (67) (109) (69) (65 ) (9) 
Cequal 2.1 (~,iJ 10.9% 15.7':/" 26.4% 22.y~/o 18.1% 3.70/0 
(8) (41 ) (59) (99) (86) (68) ( 14) 
Csize 2.4{~/O 12,0% 18.1% 23,9% 20.2% 20.2% 3.2% 
('J) (45) (68) «)O) (7h) (76) (12) 
Ccomm 1.6% 9,6% 14.7% 23.0% 20,9% 27,0% 3.2% 
(6) (36) (55) (86) (78) (101 ) ( 12) 
CI0 9,'10;(, 23,5% 26.7% 16,0%, 9. I (~~J 11,5% 3.5% 
(37) (S8) (100) (h(J) (34) (43) (13) 
Ccar ] 3.3~/o 36.3(~/o 23,2% 12,3% 5.3% 5.9% 3.7% 
(50) ( 13h) ( 87) (46) (20) (22) ( 14) 
*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somcwhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult, 
D=Difficult, VD=Very difficult, NO=No Opinion 
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The majority (27%) of respondents perceived the merger of communication 
procedures (ccomm) as very difficult while over 40% perceived it as either difficult of 
somewhat ditlicult. Respondents from both JCPO (75.R) and LOP (69%) had similar 
perceptions in that the majority of officers perceived this process as somewhat difficult, 
diftlcult, or very diflicult. To the contrary, collectively, the greater part of the 
respondents perceived the mergerlimplementation of the 10-code system (Cl 0) and the 
car numbers (ccar) as easy, as was the case for respondents of both LDP and JCPO. 
Data Transformation 
Cel1ain data transformations were necessary for complete and accurate statistical 
analysis of the relationships among individual and groups of variables, and specifically 
for confim1atory examinations of the intemal consistency of the relationships among the 
variable measures reported. 
One such transfonnation included how to address certain responses to the survey 
questions, i.e., no opinion and don't know/preter not to answer. The "don't kno\v/prefer 
not to answer" response was an option in the section related to merger experience and 
participation (Questions 3, 4, and 6) and the section referencing satisfaction with the 
accs (Questions 7 - 22). The "no opinion" response was available in the section 
regarding the perceived complexity of the aces (Question 23). Including these 
responses would distort the means; therefore, these responses were recoded as missing. 
In assessing the race of the respondents, over 85«)/0 were white (Non-Hispanic). 
As a result, a new variable, wvnon, was created with the following values: I =white and 
O=a11 others. 
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The variables serve, talk, committee, commetteel, committee2, and committee3 
were combined to form the variable "serviceoncommittee" (service on committee). This 
variable was created due to the fact that were few cases for Committee, committee} and 
committee2 in addition to there being no valiance (0.00) for the variable serve due to the 
small number of cases. 
In reference to satisfaction with the OCCs, a variable "satisfaction" was created 
and combines all of the satisfaction oces (i.e., scuIture+smission+svalues+sdecent+ 
spp+sreport+sweapon+scontract+spay+sbenefit+sboundary+sequal+ssize+scomm+ 
sI0+scar). This was created as a result of a principle components analysis where 4 
variables (sculture, smission, svalues, and sdecent) all had eigenvalues over 1.0 and 
accounted for 65.25% of the variance. 
In regards to perceived complexity of the OCCs, the variable "complexity" was 
created. Complexity included the following OCCs: cculture+cmission+cvalues+ 
cdecent-l-cpp+creport+cweapon+ccontract+cpay+chenefit+cboundary+cequal+ 
csize+ccomm+c 1 O+ccar. This was created as a result of a principle components analysis 
where 5 variables (cculture, emission, cvalues, cdecent, and cpp) all had eigenvalues over 
1.0 and accounted tor 75.70% of the variance. 
The final variable that ,vas created for analysis was "overallsupport" (overall 
suppOli). This included the variables of psupport (plior support) + csupport (cunent 
support). 
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Descriptive Statistics Post Data Transformations 
After the aforementioned data transformations, means and standard deviations 
were calculated for the variahles. These calculations are displayed in Table 17 
(Appendix C) in aggregate and also by fanner department affiliation. 
In reference to support, collectively, officers expressed less support for 
consolidation before merger than they currently do (3.089 vs. 2.718). When compming 
means for LDP and JCPO regarding prior supp0l1 for merger. LOP officers were more 
likely to support merger than did JCPD officers (2.364 vs. 4.365). This finding is 
consistent with the 1998 study on merger conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County 
Crime Commission where 82.1 % of LOP sworn personnel were in favor of the 
consolidation while 89,9% of JCPD s\vom personnel were opposed to it. Even though 
former JCPD personnel are more supportive currently than they were prior to merger 
(29.5% vs. 12.l)%), LOP personnel currently support merger more than their JCPO 
counterparts (71.5% vs. 29.5% respectively). 
Few respondents had any experience with the merger process, nor did many of 
them serve on any of the merger committees. When comparing experience levels by 
agency, the majority from LDP and JCPO had littlt; or no experience with a merger, nor 
did they serve on a committee. Additionally, the mean (1.684) indicates that not many of 
the respondents talked to officers who served on a (;ommittee. While few for both 
agencies, more JCPO officers talked to committee members than did personnel from LOP 
(44.0% vs. 23.5%). 
Of the OCCs variables addressing satisfaction, the respondents were most 
unsatisfied with the decentralization (sdecent) policy of LMPO with a mean score of 
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4.743. Following decentralization, officers were most unsatisfied (in ranking order) with 
culture, policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, and the 
communications section merger with mean scores of 4.422,4.351,4.237, and 4.185 
respectively. 
Respondents were most satisfied with the weapon choice having a mean score of 
2.176. Additionally, the means show that respondents were also satisfied, in ranking 
order, with car numbers, values, and mission statement (2.844, 3.178, and 3.191 
respectively). It is interesting to note that while respondents were satisfied with the 
mission and values of LMPD, they were the least satisfied with the culture which is, at 
least partially, molded by values and mission of the organization (3.178 and 3.191 vs. 
4.422). 
When comparing departments, the means indicate that fonner LDP personnel 
were most unsatisfied with the decentralization, followed by boundary size, culture, 
equalization of workload and division boundaries. The means also show that former LDP 
personnel were most satisfied with weapon choice (1.767), followed by benefits, pay, and 
the contract. FOffiler .rCPD personnel were most unsatisfied with pay and then the 
contract, policies and procedures, the culture, and henefits. They were most satistied 
with the car numbers (2.860), weapon choice, 10-codes, and values. 
In reference to difficulty or cnmplexity in merging the OCCs, culture had a mean 
score of 4.838 and was perceived as the most ditlicult ace tn merge. Decentralization 
was perceived as the next most difficult ace to merge and was seen as more difficult to 
consolidate than the communication's section or the policies and procedures. Officers 
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also perceived equalization of workload, size of the divisions, and merging administrative 
reporting practices as more difficult than ratifying the contract, pay, and benefits. 
The means show that former LDP personnel also perceived the culture as being 
the most diffIcult to merge (4.757). They also identified, in ranking order, 
decentralization, equalization of workload, merging sizes of the divisions, merging 
boundmies, and consolidating the policies and procedures as difficult to unify. Former 
JCPO personnel also saw the culture as being the most complex to merge (5.007), 
followed by decentralization. Merging the contract and policies and procedures were 
seen as next most difficult with both having a mean score of 4.584. They also 
distinguished, in ranking order, merging communications and benefits as the next most 
diftlcult oces to reconcile. 
Relating to the complexity in merging the OCCs, combined, respondents 
perceived it easiest to mergc the choice of weapon and the car numbers with means of 
2.620 and 2.767 respectively. The means also showed that respondents perceived 
merging the mission and values easier than merging the 1 O-codes (3.063 and 
3.063 vs. 3.262). 
Fonner LOP personnel perceived the easiest oces to merge to be the choice of 
weapon, follO\ved by car numbers, mission statement, and values. The means denote that 
fonner JCPO personnel perceive the car numbers. choice ofvveapon, mission statement 
and values to be the easiest OCCs to merge. 
In regards to the newly created variables, amassed, overall support had a mean 
score of 5.805 showing, collectively, there was little support for merger. In fact, the 
means show that overall support for merger was much less than with plior support or 
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current support. The means denote that fanner LOP personnel had more overall support 
than fanner .TCPD personnel (4.486 vs. 8.172). 
The variable addressing serving on a committee had a range of 35.00 to 52.00 and 
a mean of 46.000. However, due to the small number of cases, it was not used for 
analysis purposes. 
In regards to the variable satisfaction, the range was 21.00 to 96.00 with a mean 
score of 59.312 indicating that most of the respondents were unsatisfied with the results 
of merging of the OCCs. While the majority of respondents were unsatisfied with the 
results of merging the OCCs, the mcans indicate that former LDP officers were more 
satisfied than JCPD officers. 
The variable complexity had a range of 30.00 to 96.00 and a mean score of 
60.630, suggesting that most of the respondents perceived the merging of the OCCs as 
difficult. In assessing the means for each depaliment, members of each of the fonner 
agencies perceived merging the OCCs as complex. However, officers of the fomler 
JePD perceived merger as more complex than did the officers from LOP (63.744 vs. 
58.944 respecti vel y). 
In comparing both complexity and satisfacljOtl, respondents' perceived level of 
complexity/difficulty was greater than their level of satisfaction for the OCCs. 
After a review of the means, it scems that support for merger has increased over 
time. Additionally, the oces of culture and decentralization relating to complexity and 
satisfaction had the highest mean scores, suggesting that I) ot1icers perceived culture and 
decentralization as the most complex OCCs to merge and 2) of1icers were least satisfied 
\\'ith the merged culture and decentralization policy of LMPO. The lowest mean score 
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for both the satisfaction and complexity oees was the choice of weapon meaning 
choosing the weapon was the easiest aspect of merger and resulted in the greatest 
satisfaction. Finally, the means indicate prior experience with merger, service on a 
committee, or talking to someone who was on a committee was of little consequence in 
the support of consolidation. 
Data Analysis and Model Development 
In order to detennine 1) if officers' perceptions of the difficulty of merging 
organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation and 
2) if the degree of their support for consolidation diminishes as thcir perception of 
complexity increases, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first conducted to examine the 
relationships among the explanatory variables and the dependent vmiables of CUlTent 
support and overall suppOli. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 
18 (Appendix C). 
[n relation to suppOli, and specifically current support (csupport), a highly 
significant moderate correlation exists with prior support (r (306) =.581, p<.OO1). In 
relation to the satisfaction oces, all were highly significant at the [1<.001 level. The 
strongest correlations, although moderate, were positive and with the variables sculture, 
smission, svalues, spp, sreport, scontraet, spay, and sbenefits. Although highly 
signifIcant, weak positive correlations exist bet\veen current support and the satisfaction 
OCCs of sdecent, sweapon, sboundary. sequaL ssize, s 10, and scar. The weakest positive 
cOtTelal ion, which was significant with the satisfaction oces, \vas with the 10 codes (r 
(337) =.(06). 
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When comparing the complexity OCCs with current support, cmission, cvalues, 
cpp, creport, cweapon, ccontract, cpay, and cbenefit, all had weak positive correlations, 
but were highly significant at the p<.OO 1 level. Of these variables, ccontract had the 
strongest correlation (r (326) =.260, p<.OO 1), Still signitIcant at the p<O.OI level were the 
variables ccuiture, ccomm, and ccar. All of these variables also had weak positive 
correlations. The variables cdecent, cboundary, cequal, csize, and cl 0, were not 
statistically significant. 
Of the demographic/officer characteristics, the PD had a positive moderate 
correlation and was significant at the p<.OOI level. Rank had a weak inverse correlation 
that was also highly significant at p<.OO 1. This negative cOlTelation suggests that those 
with higher rank have more current support for consolidation than those oflower rank. 
The newly created variable of satisfaction had a positive moderate correlation 
with csupport and was highly significant. The variable complexity also was highly 
significant with a moderate positive correlation. Overall suppOli had a strong positive 
con'elation which was highly significant (r (306) =.883, p<.OO l). This is because overall 
support combines both current support and prior support. 
None of the service on committee variables was statistically significant. In 
relation to demographic/officer characteristics, years of experience, fom1er depaIiment 
years of experience, rank at the time of merger, age gender, ethnicity, nor education were 
statistically signifIcant. 
In assessing support, and in particular overall support, a highly significant strong 
positive correlation exists with prior support (I' (306) =.895, p<.OOI). Again, as with 
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cUlTcnt support, prior suppot1 was contained, along with current support, in the overall 
support variable. 
In relation to the satisfaction OCCs, sculture, smission, svalues, spp, sreport, 
sweapon, scontract, spay and sbenefits all were highly significant at the p<.OOI level. In 
ranking order, the strongest of these correlations, although moderate, were positive and 
with the variables sbenefit, scontract, spay, sculture, spp, sreport, smission, svalues, and 
sweapon. Weak positive correlations cxist between ovcrall support and scar, sdecent, and 
scomm, but all were highly significant. The variables ssizc and sequal had weak positive 
correlations, but wcre significant at the p<O.OI and 1'< 0.05 respectively. The satisfaction 
oces of 10-codes and patrol division boundaries ,\>'ere not statistically significant. 
Whcn comparing the complexity oces 'l-vith overall support, although moderate, 
cbenefit had the strongest positive con'elation (I' (274) = .381, p<.OOl). Other variables 
that were highly significant, with moderately positive correlations, were cpay, ccontract, 
and cpp. Cculture, cmission, cvalues, crcpot1, and cweapon, all had weak positive 
correlations, hut were highly signifIcant at the 1'<.001 level. Cdecent, ccomm, and ccar 
had weak positive correlations to overall support, but werc still significant at the p<O.OI 
levcl. The variables cboundary, cequal, csize, and c 1 0, were not statistically significant. 
Of the demographiC/officer charactcristics, the variable PD had a positive 
moderate con'clation and was highly significant \r (299) = .633, p<.OOl). Age and rank 
had weak inverse correlations that were also highly significant at p<.OO 1. This negative 
corrclation indicated that respondents of higher rank or those who were older had morc 
overall support for mcrger. Rank at the time of merger also had a wcak inverse 
correlation with overall support at the p<O.Ol level. This is consistent with the current 
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rank variable in that as rank increased, the more overall support they had for 
consolidation. 
The newly created variables of satisfaction and complexity had positive moderate 
correlations with overall support and were highly significant with r values of .563 and 
.361 respectively. 
As with current support, none of the service on committee variables was 
statistically significant. Also, in relation to demo!:,1faphic/officer characteristics, neither 
years of experience, former department years of experience, gender, ethnicity, nor 
education were statistically significant. 
It was hypothesized that 1) police officers' perceived complexity of 
organizational change components is rdated to attitudes toward police consolidation and 
2) the greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the 
less support for police consolidation. To test these hypotheses, a stepwise multiple linear 
regression analysis was carried out using the aforementioned significant correlations. 
Because many variables were initially used, stepwise regression analysis was utilized to 
detenl1ine which variable(s) had the most impact or was the best predictor of the 
dependent variable. 
This technique allowed the researcher to add one variable at each step of the 
analysis to determine if that new vmiable had a significant impact on the dependent 
variahle(s). The criterion for including variables in the regression equation was a 
significance level of p<O.05. 
All models realized by the stepwise regression analyses were assessed for 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are 
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highly correlated. This association makes it difficult, if not impossible, to detennine their 
effects on the dependent variable, in this case, current support. For each of the developed 
models, the tolerance or the proportion of variability in one independent variable not 
explained by the other independent variables was above 0.30 (Belsley et a1. 1980). The 
specific tolerance statistic for the variables in each of the models is depicted in the 
regression tables. 
The stepwise regression tested several models for each dependent variable (i.e., 
current support and overall support). For the DV elilTent support, the hypotheses for this 
study were supported in whole, or at least partially, depending upon the model. With 
overall support as the DV, the results were mixed depending upon which independent 
variables were used in the regression equation. 
Six models were constructed using current support as the dependent variable, and 
five models were constructed utilizing overall support as the dependent variable. The 
newly formed variable of complexity was selected rather than using each complexity 
oee due to a little over 75% of the variance being accounted for by five of the 
complexity OCC variables (i.e., Cculture, Cmission, Cvalues, Cdecent, and CPP). The 
variable satisfaction was also used for both dependent variables for the same reason: 
three of the variables explained a little over 60% of the variance (i.c., Sculture, Smission, 
and Svalues). Both the complexity and the satisfaction variables had statistical power 
while taking into consideration all of the accs. 
For assessing the effects on current support for merger, in addition to the 
complexity and satisfaction variables, the variables of prior support, former department 
atliliation, and rank were selected because of their correlational statistical significance. 
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Additionally, prior support and PD were chosen because of the passionate perceptions 
and attitudes from members of LDP and JCPD before the merger occurred in 2003 as 
identified in the 1998 police consolidation study conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson 
County Crime Commission. 
Table 19 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step 
by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable current support. All 
models were assessed for multicollinearity and the tolerance was above 0.30, illustrating 
no problems. Additionally, Table 20 (Appendix C) contains summary information (i.e., 
n, R, 1'2, F and P statistics). 
Using the dependent variable current support, a forward stepwise regression was 
conducted using complexity as the independent variable for Model 1. Complexity 
significantly predicted cun'ent support in this modeL Complexity also explained 7.3% of 
the variance in current support scores. 
The results of Model I, as hypothesized, indicate support for HI in that police 
officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the organizational change components 
are related to attitudes toward police consolidation. This model also supports H2, \vhich 
hypothesized that the more complex officers perceived merging the OCCs, the less likely 
they were to agree that they SUppOlt merger. 
Model 2 included both the complexity and satisfaction variables. In this model, 
satisfaction was a statistically significant predictor of current support. However, 
complexity was not. This model accounted for a little over 36% of the variance in 
CUlTent support. For this model, both HI and H2 were rejected indicating that officers' 
perceptions of t:omplexity did not affect their support for merger. This model also 
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implies that when respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction with the aces 
that ""ere created as a result of merging LDP and JCPD, the more unsatisfied, the less 
likely they were to agree that they support merger. 
Model 3 consisted of the variables of complexity and prior support. Satisfaction 
was removed fi'om this model. Prior support was deteJmined to be a significant predictor 
of current support in this model. However, as with Model 2, complexity was not. Just 
over 40% of the variance of CUlTent suppOli was accounted for in this model. Therefore, 
both H I and H~ were rejected. 
-------_ .. 
Table 19 - CUlTent Support* 
U nstandardized Standardized Collinearit.Y 
Coefficients Coefficients Statistics 
Model 
.!! Std. Beta ! Sig. Tolerance 
Error 
Complexity .030 .007 .277 4.547 .000 
2 Complexity -.014 .om~ -.126 -1.740 .083 .584 
Satisfaction .IJ71 .008 .681 9.388 .000 .584 
3 Complexity .008 .006 J)73 1.311 .191 .871 
Psupport .572 .052 .004 10.895 .000 .871 
4 Cumplexity -.025 .007 ·.225 -3.840 .000 .575 
Satisfaction .059 .006 .548 9.140 .000 .548 
Psupport .514 .047 .537 10.945 .000 .817 
5 Complexity -,()25 .007 -.223 -3.775 .000 .568 
Satisfaction .058 .007 .545 8.986 .000 .537 
Psupport 505 .059 .5211 8.598 .000 .525 
PD .050 .188 .016 .266 .791 .573 
6 Complexity -.024 .007 ··.212 -3.542 .00] .557 
Satisfaction .056 .007 .522 8.357 .000 .510 
Psupport .498 .059 .522 8.464 .000 .523 
PD .025 .189 .008 .134 .894 .571 
Rank -.098 .062 -.074 -1.569 .118 .890 
*Dependent Variable =Csupport 
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Model 4 included the variables complexity, satisfaction, and psupport. In Model 
4, complexity, satisfaction, and prior support were all significant predictors of current 
support. These variables accounted for 64% of the variance in current suppOli scores. 
support, the variable complexity had an inverse relationship. Model 4 supports H I in 
that police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related 
to attitudes toward police consolidation. However, H2 was rejected. In this model, the 
greater otlicers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the more 
support they have for police consolidation. 
Model S also consisted of the variables complexity, satisfaction, prior suppOli, but 
in this model, PD was added. As with Model 4, complexity, satisfaction, and psupport 
were all significant predictors of current support. As with Model 4, satisfaction and prior 
support had a positive relationship with current support while complexity had an inverse 
relationship. However, PD or former police department affiliation was not a predictor of 
current support. Sixty-four percent of the variance in current support was accounted for 
in this Model S. As with Mode14, ModelS supports HI. As the complexity in merging 
the accs was perceived as easier, there was less support for merger. Therefore, H2 was 
rejected for this model. 
The last model, Model 6, as with Model S, consisted of the variables complexity, 
satisfaction, psupport, and PD, but also added rank as a predictor. As with Models 3,4, 
and 5, complexity was a significant predidor of csupport while satisfaction and prior 
support were also signiticant predictors with positive relationships to the current support 
score. However, neither prior department affiliation nor rank had an effect on current 
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support. This model accounted for 64% of the variance in the current support score. As 
with Models 4 and 5, this model supported HI. However, H2 was rejected for this model. 
It is impOl1ant to note that the positive relationship in Model 1 becomes negative, 
but weak, in Models 4-6. The fact that complexity loses significance in Model 2 suggests 
complexity is an unstable predictor when other variables, especially satisfaction, are 
added. 
For the dependent variable current support, Models 1, 4, 5, and 6 suppOl1ed the 
hypothesis which states that police officers' perceived complexity of organizational 
change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. However, only 
Modell supported the second hypothesis affirming the greater officers' perceived 
complexity of organizational change components, the less support they have for police 
consolidation. 
In assessing all of these models, it was determined that Model 1 supported both 
hypotheses when the only variable in the model was complexity. In Model 4, prior 
suppOl1, followed by satisfaction, were stronger predictors of current suppOli than 
complexity. Nonetheless, complexity is statistically significant in predicting CUlTent 
support. As such, the most parsimonious model, indicated by the significance of all 
variables in the model and the variance within the model, is Model 4 
Tahle 21 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step 
by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable overall support. Table 21 
also depicts the collinearity diagnostics that were evaluated. All independent variables 
had a tolerance level of above 0.3, indicating no issues with multicollinearity. 
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Additionally, Table 22 (Appendix C) contains summary infonnation (i.e., n, R, r2, F and 
P statistics). 
Using the dependent variable overall support, a forward stepwise regression was 
conducted to test five models. Modell used complexity as the IV. Model 2 included the 
variables complexity and satisfaction. In Model 3, the IV PO was added to the 
complexity and satisfaction variables. Model 4 included the variables complexity, 
satisfaction, and rank. Model 5 contained the IV s complexity, satisfaction, PO, and rank. 
Plior suppOli was not used for determining its effect on overall support due to the fact 
that it was part of the overall support variable (i.e., overall support=psupport+csupport). 
Using the dependent variable overall support, a forward stepwise regression was 
conduded using complexity as the independent variable for Modell. Complexity 
significantly predicted current support in this model. However, complexity also 
explained a significant portion of the variance in current support scores. 
The results of Model I are in support of H], in that police officers' perceptions of 
the complexity of merging the organizational change components are related to attitudes 
toward police consolidation. Model 1 also supports fh The more officers perceive the 
complexity of merging the OCCs as difficult, the less overall suppol1 they have for 
merger. 
Model 2 included both the complexity and satisfaction variables. In this model, 
satisfaction was a statistically significant predictor of current support with a positive 
relationship. However, complexity was not. This model accounted filr a little over 31 % 
of the variance in current support. For this model, both HI and H2 were rejected. 
196 
Model 3 comprised the variables of complexity, satisfaction, and former police 
department affiliation. While satisfaction and PD had a positive relationship with overall 
support and were determined to be significant predictors of it, complexity was not. 
Almost 50% of the variance of overall support was accounted for in this model. Because 
complexity was not statically significant in this model, both HI and H2 were r~jected. 
For Model 4, PD was removed from the regression equation. Model 4 contained 
the IVs complexity, satisfaction, and rank. Satisfaction and rank were signitIcant 
predictors of overall support, but complexity was not. Satist~lction had a positive 
relationship with overall support while rank had an inverse relationship. This model 
Table 21 - Overall Support* 
U nstandardized Standardized Collinearitv 
Coefficients Coefficients Statistics 
Model !! Std. Beta ! Sig. Tolerance 
Error 
1 Complexity .(ns .013 .361 5.789 .000 
2 Complexity .003 .017 .015 .IR6 .R52 .5R6 
Satisfaction .111 .016 S-") .. )~ 6.956 .000 .586 
3 Complexity .005 .014 .022 .332 .740 .585 
Satisfaction .078 .014 .386 5.636 .000 .544 
PD 2.934 .322 .48R 9.106 .000 .891 
4 Complexity .008 .017 .039 .489 .626 .576 
Satisfaction .099 .0 \0 .490 5.992 .000 .539 
Rank -0400 .155 -.162 -2.587 .010 .918 
5 Complexity .007 .014 .034 .516 .607 .576 
Satisfaction .072 .014 .358 5.075 .000 .514 
PD 2.R49 .326 .474 8.747 .000 .871 
Rank -.21 R .132 -.089 -1.665 .100 .895 
* Dependent Variable=Overallsupport 
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accounts for over 32% of the variance in overall support scores. Again, as with the other 
models in Table 21, this model did not support either HI or H2. 
Model 5 included the variables complexity, satisfaction. PD, and rank. Both 
satisfaction and former police department affiliation, having positive relationships, were 
significant predictors of overall support at p<.OO 1 level. It should be noted that while 
rank was not significant at the p<.05 level, it was at p=.l 00, having a negative 
relationship with overall suppOli. As rank increased, overal1 support of merger also 
increased. Again, as with Model 3, complexity was not significant. Variables in Model 5 
accounted for over 53% of the variance in overall support scores. However, both HI and 
H2 were rejected. 
When assessing complexity on its own merit as a predictor of overal1 support 
(Model 1), it supported HI. However, when combined with other variables such as 
satisfaction, former police depmiment affiliation, and/or rank, complexity was not a 
significant predictor of overall support. In fact, tht: variables PD followed by rank were 
better predictors of overall support. In relation to complexity, Model 1 was selected as 
the best model as i.t supported H I. Overall, Model 5 is the best explanatory model fl..1r 
predicting overall support even though it omits complexity. 
When considering both measures of support for merger (i.e., cunent support and 
overall support), cunent support was selected as the best variable for gauging suppOli for 
merger. Cunent support was selected since this variable was the most sterile measure of 
support as it was unadulterated with prior support. Additionally, prior support was a 
significant predictor of cunent support. Model 4 in Table 19 utilizing the variables 
complexity, satisfaction, and prior support, was the best overall explanatory model for 
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predicting current support. All variables were significant and the greatest variance was 
explained by Model 4. As such, this model supported both hypotheses. 
In this analysis, complexity predided both current suppOli and overall support 
when there were no other variables in the models, and in both cases the relationship is 
positive. However, with current support as the dependent variable, the relationship, while 
remaining statistically significant in Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 19, turns negative. 
When current support is regressed with complexity alone, complexity has a 
positive relationship. However, when satisfaction is included in the regression model, the 
relationship between complexity and current support is negative, but weak. Specifically, 
in Model 4, prior support and satisfaction were determined to be stronger predictors of 
current support than complexity. Therefore, it appears that prior support of the merger 
and satisfaction with merging the oees is far more important and overrides complexity 
in the model(s). As long as officers had previously supported consolidation and were 
satisfied with the results of merging the oces, it seems to make little difference how 
difficult it was to merge the organizational change components. 
Additional Analysis 
While not the primary focus of this particular research, three additional analyses 
were conducted. Two analyses were conducted utilizing satisfaction as the dependent 
variable and one using prior support as the dependent variable. These analyses were 
conducted in an effort to gain more insight to the findings reported above. 
The first analysis utilized satisfaction for the dependent variable and complexity, 
prior support, PO, and rank for the independent variables. These variables were selected 
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based upon their cOlTelational statistical significance with the variable satisfaction, in 
addition to their utilization in other models used for analysis in this study. 
As with the aforementioned analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first 
conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in 
Table 18 (Appendix C). 
Complexity had a positive moderate correlation with satisfaction and was highly 
significant at the p<.OOO level. Prior support had weak correlation with satisfaction 
which was positive, but highly significant at the p<.OOO level. 
Of the demo!:,'Taphic/officer charactelistics, the variable PD had a positive weak 
correlation with satisfaction and was significant at the p<.OOl level. Rank had a weak 
inverse correlation that was also highly significant at p<.OOl. This negative correlation 
suggests that those with higher rank have less satisfaction with consolidation. 
Table 23 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step by step, 
to the regression equation with the dependent variable satisfaction. All models were 
assessed for multicollinearity and for each model, the tolerance was above 0.3, 
illustrating no problems. Additionally, Table 24 (Appendix C) contains summary 
infonnation for the analysis (i.e., n, R, 1'2, F and P statistics). 
Using the dependent vaIiable satisfaction, a forward stepwise regression was 
conducted which tested three models. Model 1 used complexity as the independent 
variable. Complexity significantly predicted satisfaction in this model. Complexity also 
explained 40.3% of the variance in satisfaction scores. This model suggests that the more 
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complex officers perceive the merging of the oces, the less satisfied they are with the 
results of merging them. 
Table 23 - Satisfaction* 
U nstandardized Standardized Collinearity 
Coefficients Coefficients Statistics 
Model !! Std. Beta ! ~ Tolerance 
Error 
1 Complexity .660 .056 .635 11.774 .000 
2 Complexity .63)1 .054 .614 11.808 .000 .991 
Rank .-2.670 .620 -.224 -4.306 .000 .991 
3 Complexity .613 .054 .590 11.390 .000 .965 
Rank -2.328 .620 -.195 -3.755 .000 .956 
PD 4.431 1.523 .153 2.909 .004 .934 
* Dependent Variable=Satisfaction 
Model 2 included both the complexity and rank variables. In this model, both 
complexity and rank were statistically significant predictors of satisfaction. This model 
accounted for a little over 45% of the variance in satisfaction. Model 2 implies that rank 
is a stronger predictor of satisfaction than was complexity. As with Model 1, this model 
indicates that as the perception of complexity increases in merging the OCCs, officers are 
less satisfied with the results of merging them. It further indicates that as an officer's 
rank increases, the more satisfied they are with the merged OCCs. 
Model 3 included the complexity, rank, and PD variables. In this model, 
complexity and rank were statistically significant predictors of satisfaction at the p<.OOO 
level. PD was significant at the p<.004 level. This model accounted for 47.5% of the 
variance in satisfaction. This model implies PD was the strongest predictor of 
satisfaction, followed by rank and complexity. As with Models 1 and 2, this model 
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indicated that as the perception of complexity of merging the accs diminishes, officers 
are more satisfied with the results of merging the accs. It further indicated that as 
officers' rank increases, the more satisfied they were with the merged accs. 
Additionally, former JCPD officers were less satisfied with the results of merging the 
accs. 
The second analysis utilized satisfaction for the dependent variable and 
demographic information as the independent variables, i.e., rank and age. These 
variables were selected based upon their cOiTelational statistical significance with the 
variable satisfaction. It should be noted that the demographic variables gender and 
wvnon were omitted from the analysis due to 1) their significance level and 2) there was 
little variance in the distribution of values for these variables. 
As with the aiorementioned analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was tlrst 
conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in 
Table 18 (Appendix C). 
Rank had a negative weak con'elation with satisfaction and was highly significant 
at the 17<.000 level. As rank increases, so does satisfaction with the merged accs. 
Age had weak correlation with satisfaction which was negative and significant at 
the p<.05 level. As age increased, so did satisfaction with the merged aces. 
Table 25 summarizes the results when the aforementioned independent variables 
were added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent vaJiable 
satisfaction. All models were assessed for multicollinearity and for each modeL the 
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tolerance was above 0.3, illustrating no problems. Additionally, Table 26 (Appendix C) 
contains summary information for the analysis (i.e., fl, R, r2, F and P statistics). 
Table 25 - Satisfaction'" with Demographics 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearit.l' 
Coefficients Coefficients Statistics 
Model !! Std. Beta ! Sig. Tolerance 
Error 
1 Rank -2.371 .753 -.188 =3.147 .002 
2 Rank -2.377 .745 -.189 -3.191 .000 1.000 
Age -.381 .144 -.157 -2.651 .008 1.000 
* Dependent Variable=Satisfaction 
Using the dependent variable satisfadion, a forward stepwise regression was 
conducted which tested two models. Model 1 used rank as the independent variable. 
Rank, while having an inverse relationship, significantly predicted satisfaction in this 
model. Rank only explained 3.6% of the variance in satisfaction scores. This model 
suggests that as rank increases, satisfaction with merging of the aces increases. 
Model 2 included both the rank and age vartables. In this model, both rank and 
age statistically significant predictors of satisfaction. This model accounted for 6.0~/o of 
the variance in satisfaction. Model 2 implies that rank is a stronger predictor of 
satisfaction than was age. As with Model 1, this model indicates that as ranks increased, 
so did satisfaction with the merged aces. It further indicates that as ,ttl officer's age 
increases, the more satisfied they were with the merged oees. 
The third additional analysis utilized prior support as the dependent variable and 
PD and rankmerge (rank at the time of merger) for the independent vaJiables. These 
variables were selected based upon their correlational statistical signiticance with the 
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variahle prior support. Additionally, the variable PD was utilized due to its inclusion in 
other models analyzed for this study. Complexity and satisfaction were not used for this 
analysis due to the fact that future or unknown events occurring after the consolidation 
could not influence prior support for merger, nor be used to predict it. Following the 
same logic, the variahle rank (current rank) was omitted as current rank could not be used 
to predict the past (i.e., prior support). 
As with the previous analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first 
conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the cOlTelation analysis are displayed in 
Table 18 (Appendix C). 
Of the demographic/oftIcer characteristics, the variable rankmerge had a negative, 
weak correlation with prior suppot1, but was highly significant at the p<O.O 1 level. This 
negative correlation suggests that those with higher rank had more prior support for 
consolidation. PD had a positive. moderate correlation with prior support that was highly 
significant at the p<.OOO level. 
Table 27 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step 
by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable prior support. Table 28 















(Appendix C) contains summary infonnation for the analysis (i.e., n, R, 1'2, F and P 
statistics). 
Using the dependent vmiable prior support, a forward stepwise regression was 
conducted which resulted in one model. For this model, the variable rankmerge was 
removed from the stepwise regression analysis. Modell used PO as the independent 
variable. PO significantly predicted prior support in this model. PO also explained 
37.1 % of the variance in prior suppOli scores. This model suggests that the former JCPO 
officers supported merger less that former LOP personnel prior to the consolidation 
occurring. This finding is consistent with the results of the 1998 study conducted by the 
Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission in which fonner LOP officers supported 




Throughout the country, government consolidation has been the topic of many 
discussions among advocates of both monocentric and polycentric views of government. 
Typically, proponents of government consolidation promoted effectiveness and 
efficiency as the cornerstone to their argument. Those opposing argue to the contrary 
citing the negative aspects of effectiveness and efficiency associated with larger 
governmental structures. The Louisville merger was no different. 
While many governmental entities conduct research on effectiveness and 
efficiency, little comparative research exists after a consolidation takes place (Durning, 
1992). Since city-county mergers occur infrequently, there is much work to be done in 
the study of governmental consolidation, in addition to the sub-units of government that 
also join together as a result of the overall merger. The Louisville police consolidation 
provided such an opportunity to learn more about such mergers. 
Change exists in all organizations, especially during a consolidation. Many 
changes I:an lead to complex issues. As a result, government consolidations are 
complicated because of the many ways an organization can change (i.c .. structurally, 
operationally, administratively, and procedurally). 
With or w-ithout a merger, satisfactory law entorcement service and protection are 
in large part contingent upon the attitudes of employees. During a consolidation, it is 
inevitable that rules will change, agencies will be restructured, and there will be different 
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interpretations of culture. These changes are complex and affect the attitudes and 
perceptions of employees including employees' satisfaction and perceptions of 
complexity with the processes and resulting structures. These changes in employee 
attitudes and perceptions can have both positive and negative consequences. 
Additionally, the attitudes and perceptions of personnel, specifically police 
officers, can change over time resulting from experience, education, social interaction or 
influence, communication, environment, and persuasion. A police officer's perception of 
the complexity of merging organizational change components (OCCs) relating to police 
depmil11cnt consolidation affects attitudes and perceptions regarding support for 
consolidation. 
Many factors or organizational change components were considered in fonning 
the LMPD. All ofthese components or factors were an integral part of the LMPD 
merger. For this study, a list of the most important or dynamic changes, organizational 
change components, was developed in order to determine officers' perceptions of 
complexity related to consolidating these accs. All of these organizational change 
components were important to the successful police department consolidation of LMPD 
and not only afJected the organization, but also the employees and their attitudes and 
perceptions. 
Because consolidation was an innovation or new to members of the LMPD, many 
did not pen.:eive the complexities involved in consolidating sub-units of government or of 
implementing these oces. Therefore, this research was conducted in an effort to 
understand the complexity ofthe organizational change components, officers' 
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perceptions of that complexity, and how the perception of complexity in merging the 
OCCs affects the supp0l1 for the consolidation. 
In terms of complexity and complexity theory and its application to organizations, 
only recently has a sufficient body of academic work been collected to study 
organizations. However, research regarding officers' perceptions of complexity in 
merging organizational change components dUling the consolidation of a police agency is 
non -existent. 
In response, this study 1) examined the level of police officer support for 
consolidation and how it has changed since 1998, before the LMPD consolidation, 2) 
compared police oflicers' perceptions of the complexity of merging organizational 
change components in the consolidation process and how their perceptions of the 
complexity affected their attitudes tow-ard the consolidation, and 3) determined how the 
police officers' perceptions ofthe complexity of merging the OCCs affected support for 
or against police consolidation. 
The hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
1) Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is 
related to attitudes toward police consolidation. 
2) The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change 
components, the less support for police consolidation. 
To test these hy}",otheses, a survey instrument (Appendix B) was utilized to gather 
information regarding support for merger, merger expelience and participation, 
satisfaction with merged OCCs, perceived complexity of merging OCCs, and 
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demographic information/officer characteristics. Of the population of 669 oflicers, a 
total of 390 respondents (56%) completed the survey. 
While the analysis of the data shows somewhat mixed results for the specific 
etIect of identified organizational change components on support for merger, there are 
trends toward some significant relationships. These relationships exist between 
complexity of merging the OCCs, satisfaction with the merged OCCs, and prior support 
for merger with current support and overall support for merger. 
The data encompass a somewhat contradictory picture of the nature and strength 
of the relationships among some of the independent and dependent variables. The first 6 
models utilized CUlTent support as the dependent variable (DV). 
When using the DV current support, Models 1, 4, 5, and 6 sUPPOlted the 
hypothesis (H I) which states that police ot1kers' perceived complexity of organizational 
change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. Additionally, 
Modell supported the second hypothesis affirming the greater officers' perceived 
complexity of organizational change components, the less support they have for police 
consolidation. 
In assessing all of these models, it was determined that prior SUppOlt, followed by 
satisfaction were positively related and stronger predictors of current support than 
complexity. Nonetheless, complexity was statistically significant in predicting current 
support with a weak inversc relationship. As such, the hest model, indicated by 
significance and variance explained, was Model 4. 
When utilizing overall support as the DV and assessing complexity on its own 
merit, Modell supporkd Bland Ih However, when combined with satisfaction, former 
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police department affiliation, PO, and/or rank, complexity was not a significant predictor 
of overall support. For purposes of this study, Model I was selected as the best model 
supporting H]and H2 . However, overall, Model 5 was selected as the best explanatory 
model for predicting overall support even though it omits complexity. 
After considering all models and both dependent variables, current support was 
selected as the best dependent variable for measuring support for merger as it was 
autonomous and not linked with any other variables such as the case with overall support. 
The variable overall support contained both current support and prior support which 
might have altered findings, especially since prior support was a strong predictor of 
current support. Therefore, support was used in its purest form, current support, to 
measure support for consolidation. 
Some ofthe OCCs were quickly merged, while the consolidation of others has 
been an evolving process. In aggregate, officer support for merger has nominally 
increased since 2003. However, today as in 1998, there are still differences between 
fonner LOP and JCPO personnel. In 1998,82% of LOP officers supported merger while 
90% of JCPO officers opposed merger. Currently, 71.4 % offonner LOP officers 
support merger while 58.3% of former JCPO ofticers oppose it. 
Some officers seem to be "set in their ways" in reference to their attitudes 
regarding consolidation. Some officers were satisfied with the merged accs and 
have shifted their opinion of consolidation. However, many officers, even after going 
though the consolidation process, have not changed their attitudes. 
From the beginning, offIcers from both departments had strong opinions about the 
consolidation. These opinions prevailed even though officers from both departments 
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knew little, if anything, about merger. Many of these opinions were polarized by 
members of each of the individual departments and grounded in perception and attitudes. 
The data from the additional regression analysis supports this in that PD (IV) was a 
strong predictor of prior support (DV). Additionally, these perceptions and attitudes 
were, in part, nurtured and supported by the individual departments' Fratemal Order of 
Police lodges. Rogers (2003) notes that most people do not assess an innovation on the 
outcomes of scientific studies, but rather on subjective information about the innovation 
conveyed to them by others. During the LMPD merger, information was distributed from 
several different sources. However, over 65% of the respondents in this study never 
talked to any committee members directly involved in the consolidation process. 
Officers with the fonner LDP, in majority, supported the merger because of what 
it could provide to them. Just prior to merger, officers from LDP had lower salaries than 
their counterparts at JCPD. In comparison, there were also more restrictions on benefits 
at LDP than at JCPD such as the take-home car policy. court pay, and the like. LDP 
officers hoped to gain equal benefits and pay as a result of merger. 
Conversely, JCPD officers were against merger because ufthe personal losses 
they thought tht:y would encounter. They believed that if merger occurred, their pay 
\vould remain stagnant until all otlicers, fonner LDP and JCPD alike, had pmity. In other 
words, their pay would stay the same while their LDP counterparts would have salary 
increases until all officers were considered equal in terms of pay and benetits. They also 
believed that they would have a reduction in benefits such as the take-home car policy. 
JCPD personnel believed that their take-home car privileges would become more 
restrictive, similar to LDPs. In Grant's (2011) study on organizational justice, one officer 
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notes, "They (LDP) were going to get a great big pay raise, we were probably not going 
to see for a long time and we're going to get the short end of that stick" (p. 115). 
Probably most concerning to JCPD personnel was the perception that they would 
be forcefully overtaken by the former LDP, not merged with them. As with many 
opponents of police department consolidation, fonner JCPD personnel feared loss of 
autonomy. They feared loss oflocal control and also a loss of local identity from not 
having their own police department. 
Of major concern to officers from each fonner agency was the unknown of the 
innovation of merger. Only 5% of the 390 officers who participated in this study had any 
experience with a merger or the process of consolidation. V cry few of the officers knew 
of the complexities involved in merging 2 large police departments. As such, this merger 
was an innovation to the officers of both LDP and JCPD. In support, the literature 
(Rogers, 2003) points out that an innovation refers to a concept or procedure that is 
viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. It need not be new as dictated by time, but 
rather, it just needs to be perceived as new by the individual accepting it. In the case of 
the Louisville merger, the perceptions of officers, in relation to the character of the 
merger or innovation, not only affected attitudes of officers and their perceptions of the 
complexity of merging the oces, but it also affected support and how quickly the 
consolidation was accepted. 
Because of these strong beliefs from officers from both tonner agencies, prior 
support was a significant predictor of current support. Many of the officers surveyed, as 
shown in the findings, still have strong opinions for or against merger. As these opinions 
have been engrained in officers and their belief systems prior to innovation of merger 
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and, in many cases, since consolidation has occurred, they have an effect on current 
support of the innovation of merger. 
Officers arc still very passionate in their view supporting or opposing merger and 
many continue to have the same views they had before the merger occurred. One officer 
interviewed by Grant (20 II) noted: 
I didn't think it would benefit the people of Jefferson County and I 
still don't think it has. I don't see the people of Jefferson County 
are any better off now. They sold us a bill of goods about how 
there was going to be no morc duplication of services and all of 
this silliness and it didn'1 come to pass (Grant, 2010, p. 124). 
In regards to the innovation of consolidation, some ofticers did not view the 
merger as fair nor any better than the system used before consolidation where there were 
two major police agencies in Jefferson County (set~ Grant, 2011). This view was 
reflected in their prior support and current support for merger and with their satisfaction 
in merging the OCCs. While the majority of LDP oftlcers (72(%) suppOlied merger, the 
greater part of JCPD officers did not. Of the formc;~r JCPD officcrs responding to the 
survey, the majority (63%) strongly disagree, while 19.5% disagree with the statement 
that they suppOlied merger plior to the consolidations. Additionally, the majority (39%) 
offonner JCPD officers strongly disagreed and 19.7~'o disagreed with the statement that 
they cUlTently suppOlted merger. Additionally, the majority off()rmer JCPD offIcers 
were very unsatisfied with at least 50% of the merged oces to include culture, 
decentralization, policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, contract, 
pay, benefits, and communications. 
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Compatibility was non-existent for many officers. In other words, the merger was 
not perceived as consistent relating to the existing values, past experiences, and the 
needs, wants, and satisfactions of the individuals from each of the departments. 
Trialability or the degree to which officers had the opportunity to tryout or experiment 
with the innovation/consolidation before the adoption decision also did not exist 
(Agarwal and Prasad, 1997). Rather than merger occurring on a controlled basis utilizing 
an incremental approach. it occurred quickly, which caused uncertainty. Also, the 
attribute of observability was sometimes absent; changes in the structure and systems 
were not immediately visible to all. If those results had been seen by ofticers of both 
former departments, the merger would have been more likely to he accepted. 
For these reasons, the passion of officers from both LDP and JCPO, either in 
support of or opposition to merger, has continued through the years, even prior to the 
consolidation occurring. \Vhile in mass there has been an increase in officer support over 
the past 9 years, it has been minimal. This passion has affected attitudes in prior support 
and, as shown in Model 4, its relation to current support tor merger. In Model 4, prior 
support was the most significant predictor of current support. When prior support for 
merger increased, current support increased. Additionally, as displayed in Modell of the 
additional analysis when prior support was regressed on PD, PO was a significant 
predictor of prior support. 
In Model 4, satistaction was also a strong predictor of current support. As 
satisfaction with the merged OCCs increased, so did current support. As with any 
innovation, how oflicers perceive and view the change will affect their willingness to 
adopt the new ideas or innovation. Satisfaction with merging the oces is an integral part 
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ofthis perception as evidenced by Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 related to CUlTent support. The 
more satisfied oftlcers were with the merged OCCs, the more support they had for 
merger. Additionally, as detennined by the follow-up analysis where satisfaction was 
the OV, as the perception of complexity increased in merging certain OCCs, the less 
satisiied officers were with the results of merging the OCC(s). 
In regards to satisiaction, collectively, respondents were most satisfied with 
weapon choice, car numbers, values and mission. These OCCs were also perceived by 
respondents as the easiest to merge, which is supported by the literature. Pursuant to the 
literature, OCCs simpler to understand and merge are adopted more rapidly and easier to 
implement. These OCCs were also a very visual aspect of the merger. They were easily 
observed and personnel couid see merger taking place. 
Benefits, pay, and contract were most satisfying for former LOP personnel. This 
is because they gained from all of the contractual issues, especially pay. Increases in 
former LOP officer salaries raised satisfaction levels among LOP personnel. 
JePD personnel were most satistied with the car numbers, weapon choice, 10-
codes, and values. During the initial stages of merger, the consolidation committee, with 
approval of the Chief of Police, agreed to let officers calTY the weapons they cUlTently 
had and go to one weapon system through attrition of personnel. This was because of the 
extreme costs associated with purchasing new weapons. This decision led to not only 
more satisfaction with the weapon choice, but less complexity due to no changes in 
weapon choice. Consequently, ofticers from both ofthe former depm1ments were 
satisfied with the weapon choice. Additionally, the lO-code system chosen by the merger 
committee was unchanged from the version that was utilized by the tomler JCPD. Again, 
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there was little complexity involved from the perspective of JCPD officers. Additionally, 
their satisfaction levels were high when considering these OCCs. 
The respondents from the fonner LOP were most unsatisfied with the 
decentralization, boundary size, culture, equalization of workload and division 
boundaries. These changes were the most complex to merge and were supported by the 
findings in the follow-up analysis. As officers perceived merging the OCCs as complex, 
the less satisfaction they had for the merged OCCs. Again, consequently, in Model 4, the 
less satisfaction for merging the OCCs, the less suppOli. 
Fonner JCPD personnel were most unsatisfied with pay and then the contract, 
policies and procedures, the culture, and benefits. This, in part, resulted from the parity 
issue. Since former JCPD officers were paid more' than LDP officers, they did not 
receive pay increases until parity was achieved by fonner LDP officers. Many of the 
policies implemented were former LDP policies, and JePD oftIcers were not satisfied 
with changing from what they had previously known. 
Tn the 199R study thai \vas conduded by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime 
Commission, officers were asked to assess the personal effect on them from possible 
changes in pay, unifonns and equipment, promotion 0ppOliunity, benefits, take-home 
vehicles, pension, safety, and access to specialized assignments. Departmental 
differences emerged in that LDP personnel believed that most items would remain about 
the same and no items would bc worse. However, JCPD personnel believed that most 
items would worsen and no items would be better. This was shown to affect support for 
merger prior to it occurring. 
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As such, satisfaction with the accs is integral to support for merger. When 
assessing satisfaction on current support for merger in Models 2-6, satisfaction was a 
significant predictor of current support in each of these models. As satisfaction 
increased. so did current support for merger. Satisfaction is also a significant predictor of 
overall support, as shown in Models 2-5, when overall support is the dependent variable. 
However, complexity is a significant predictor of satisfaction as determined by the 
follow-up analysis. 
The consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County 
Police lends itself to what Krantz (1985) termed as a transitional event where internal or 
external events call for a rethinking of organizational structure, functions, or role. This 
consolidation resulted in many changes in the way each of the depm1ments conducted 
business prior to merger to include everything from geographical boundary restructuring 
to their mission and values. As sw.:h, many of the changes were complex and involved 
different accs \-vhere rethinking of structurcs, functions and roles took place. 
Complexity related to organizations is a relatively ne"" science. Complexity 
science is based on the premise that all organizations are "complex" and that this results 
from an accumulation of behavior on the part many members taking action on 
infol111ation. In addition, these behaviors were polarizt:d in two distinct groups, officers 
with JCPD and officers with LOP. The newly fomled LMPD organization was unique 
and, like other organizations, had different levels of complexity that \-vere contingent 
upon the varied organizational components, factors, structures, individuals. and the like. 
Many complexities resulted during the LMPD merger with over 1300 personnel, 
civilian and sworn off-lcers alike, attempting to merge difterent aces. in addition to other 
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factors or components. As the findings show, some officers perceived merging certain 
OCCs as easy, while other OCCs were perceived as very difficult to merge. Even though 
varied opinions existed regarding the complexity of merging the OCCs, they were 
eventually merged. 
In Model I where current support was used as the DV and complexity was the 
only independent variable in the model, it was a highly significant predictor of current 
support. As officers' perceptions of the difficulty in merging the OCCs increased, their 
support for current support of merger diminished. The literature is in support of this 
model. Rogers (2003) notes that complex innovations are difficult to implement and are 
adopted more slowly than ones that are viewed as simple. In support, Pankratz et al. 
(2002) assert that they are also less likely to be adopted. 
In Model 4, prior support was the strongest predictor of CUtTent support followed 
by satisfaction and complexity. Complexity also had a weak inverse relationship with 
current support. In other words, the more prior suppOli they had for merger, the more 
CUlTent support they had for consolidation. Also, the more satisfied officers were \vith 
the merged OCCs, the more current support they had for merger. Finally, the weak 
inverse relationship between complexity and current support indicated that the more 
L:omplex officers perceived merging the accs, the more support they had for merger. 
The 1 iteralure offers some explanation tor this inverse relationship. Organizations 
are dynamic, non-linear systems governed by a set of simple "order-generating" rules 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewis, 1994; MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001). Staceyet 
aL (2002) notes that the key to survival is for all organizations to develop a set of rules 
which keep the organization operating "on the edge of chaos. ,. If too much stability 
218 
exists, it will result in the absence of change. Too much chaos creates an overwhelming 
atmosphere where change cannot occur. 
During the consolidation of LMPD, the organization was operating in a chaotic 
mode. Many changes were being made quickly and the organization was constantly in a 
state of flux. To merge LDP and JCPD, GCCs were identified to merge. To merge them, 
a strategic plan or "order-generating" rules were devised to maintain order and to 
effectively and efficiently merge the GCCs. The chaotic nature of the organization, in 
addition to merging many of the GCCs, added to the complexity of the consolidation. 
This complexity caused more chaos and instability within the organization. Even though 
some of the aces were perceived as difficult to merge, the instability caused by merging 
them converted an existing pattern of behavior into a new more suitable one, i.e., a 
merged ace and ultimately a merged police agency. Since satisfaction was a strong 
predictor of current support, as long as officers were satisfied with the results of merging 
the aces, they had current support for merger. Even if merging the accs was 
perceived as complex, the complexity led to a suitable result with which officers were 
satisfied, and ultimately, they expressed current support for merger. 
In response to the aforementioned findings, further analysis was conducted using 
satisfaction as the dependent variable. In Model 3 of the analysis using satisfaction as the 
DY, complexity, rank and PD were all significant predictors of satisfaction. In this 
model, as the perceived complexity of merging the GeCs increased, officers were more 
unsatisfied with the results of the merged ace. The model also indicates that LDP 
officers were more likely to be satisfied with the results of merging the accs. Finally, as 
an officer's rank increased, they were more satisfied with the merger. 
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As previously mentioned in the literature, the more complex the innovation, the 
less likely it is to be adopted or supported. If officers are not satisfied with the results of 
merging the OCCs, they won't have current support the merger. Consequently, if officers 
believe the OCC to be complex to merge, they will be less likely to be satisfied and in 
tum, less likely to have current support for merger. As an example, decentralization and 
culture were perceived as the two most complex accs to merge. Officers were also 
most unsatisfied with the results of merging these OCCs. 
In this model using satisfaction as the dependent variable, the more rank 
increased, the more satisfaction an officer had for merger. During the merger, persons of 
higher rank were charged with consolidating the LOP and JCPD. They were responsible 
and accountable for the results of the merged LMPD and the OCCs perceived by officers 
to be the most difficult to merge, i.e., culture, decentralization, redefining patrol division 
boundaries, etc. Officers of higher rank were the ones orchestrating the consolidation of 
these aces and making the ultimate decisions regarding their merger. Because of this 
decision-making ability, higher ranking officers were more likely to be satisfied with the 
merged oces because ultimately, they planned them. 
Also, officers of higher rank in the organization were expected to follow the 
company line. In other words, they were expected to supp0l1 the merger without taking 
into account their personal feelings. This may have also affected their satisfaction in 
relation to the merged accs. 
The final additional analysis in the study was conducted using prior support as the 
dependent variable. In Model 1 of this analysis, PD was a significant predictor of prior 
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support. The results indicated that former LDP officers were more likely to be supportive 
of the consolidation than fonner JCPD officers. 
Based upon the analysis of current support complexity, prior support and 
satisfaction were all significant predictors of current support. However, the strongest 
predictor of current support for the selected model., Model 4, was prior support, followed 
by satisfaction and then complexity. Even though prior support was the strong predictor 
of current support, when officers were satisfied with the outcome of merging particular 
oces, or the OCCs in their totality, the complex nature of this consolidation was of less 
concern to them than satisfaction with the results. Officers showed supp0l1 for merger 
when they were satisfied with the results of the merged OCCs. 
They also showed current support for merger if they had prior support for it. 
Support for merger, prior to the consolidation OCCUlTing, was partially based on how 
officers would personally benefit from the merger itself. If they thought they would 
benefit, they might have had more prior support for merger. Regarding current support, 
however, ifthey benefited, they were satisfied with the results. As shown in Models 3, 4, 
5, and 6, prior support for merger was a stronger predictor of current support than 
complexity. 
Of greater interest is the more officers perceived merging the OCCs as complex, 
the greater support they had for consolidation. Subsequent analysis using satisfaction as 
the dependent variable indicated that the more complex officers perceived merging the 
OCCs, in totality, the less satisfied they were with the merged OCC(s). 
Consequently, utilizing all of the analyses, the more prior support an officer had 
fix consolidation, the more current support they had for merging the police departments. 
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Additionally, the less difficult merging the oces was perceived by officers, the more 
satisfied they were with the results. In tum, the more satisfied officers were with the 
results of merging the aces, the more they had current support for merger. 
Policy Implications 
From this research, several implications for policy concerning the innovation of 
consolidation are evident. Among the most challenging implications are: I) the 
importance of effectively communicating an innovation and the process for achieving it, 
2) the importance of understanding and communicating the complexity of an innovation, 
and 3) the important role satisfaction plays in merging complex aces during an 
innovation. 
In this study, officers' perceptions of complexity were assessed to deternline their 
effects on support for merger. The responses provided by the police officers who were 
part of the study allowed for a determination that complexity, satisfaction, and prior 
support all had an effect on support for consolidation, with prior support having the 
strongest effect. All organizational mergers involve complex, dynamic, and/or chaotic 
attributes. According to one of the models developed for this analysis, the more complex 
merging oces is perceived, the less support officer have for it. For three ofthe models, 
the more complex a merger is perceived, the more support officers have for it. Also, as 
prior support for merger increased. so did current support for consolidation. 
Additionally, as officer satisfaction with the merged oces increases, the more support 
for merger increases, and satisfaction, along with prior supp0l1, overrides complexity. 
Additionally, complexity has an impact on satisfaction. Three of the models were 
the variable satisfaction was used as the DV indicated that complexity is a statistically 
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significant predictor of satisfaction. As such, when the perception of complexity in 
merging the accs increases, satisfaction for the merged OCCs decreases. 
Finally, a police department consolidation polarizes officers. Their attitudes are 
dependent upon the culture of the departments from which they come. Usually, during a 
merger, these attitudes cause strong opinions and perceptions to be formed either 
supporting merger or opposing it prior to its occufl'ence. Additionally, some of these 
attitudes and opinions seem to withstand the test of time. 
As such, police administrators should remain cognizant that ofi1cers engage in an 
innovation such as consolidation w·ith certain individual assumptions, grounded in 
personal and professional beliefs which include perceptions, needs, satisfactions, and 
wants. These attributes can also be altered and/or enhanced due to the officers' 
vulnerability resulting ii'om the dynamic, chaotic, and complex nature of the innovation 
of consolidation. 
Police executives contemplating an innovation such as merger should 
comprehensively consider the needs, satisfactions, and wants of officers. Additionally, 
executives should consider the process by which the innovation or merger is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of the department. 
This diffusion should be directed to officers involved in the innovation or merger, which 
is virtually everyone in the organization. By conveying information aboul the merger, 
not only prior to merger and at the initial stages, but throughout the evolving process, 
officers are more likely to understand the complexities involved in the merger and the 
reasons for consolidating many of the accs that are selected for the merger. 
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Additionally, this diffusion will diminish apprehension on the part of officers about the 
chaotic process and add to support of the process. 
Officers should also be involved in the process at every possible opportunity. 
This involvement can lead to better understanding of the process, the innovation itself, 
and the complexities involved related to the innovation. As a result, employees will 
understand each exact stage in the process of merging departments. Additionally, if 
officers have a say in the process, they may be more satisfied with the outcome of 
merging the OCCs and the merger itself. 
Finally, rank was seen as an imp0l1ant factor for Models 4 and 5 in assessing 
overall support. While the important function of managers and supervisors in the 
innovation of consolidation was not the focus of this study, a cursory overview must bc 
provided. In order for the merger process to be effective, policing executives and 
administrators must gain support from managers and supervisors. These individuals are 
fundamental to the process of obtaining and disseminating information. In particular, 
first-line supervisors are crucial to this process. They are a detennining factor in how 
information is disseminated throughout the department, to include its timeliness and 
accuracy. In order to protect and preserve the integlity of this process, they must be 
supportive of the process, the vision of consolidation, and the organization. 
The context in which an innovation takes place is distinctive to each particular 
agency undertaking it. Not only is it unique, hut it is also new to most officers involved. 
Administrators must devdop a process of diffusion by which they collect relevant 
infonnation, analyze it, and disseminate it timely and accurately to all potential 
stakeholders, especially employees (McLean, 2006). Such efforts help to increase 
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ownership of initiatives and ensure validity of infimnation interpretation (Cummings & 
Worley, 2005; McLean, 2006). This will help to gain support and to dispel some 
negative perceptions of complexity, such as believing some changes are more complex 
than they really are or avoiding changes that are believed to be too difficult. 
Additionally, it may foster satisfaction among officers regarding the process of merging 
the OCCs and also allow them to understand the issues and circumstances surrounding 
the innovation. 
Consequently, some fundamental principles should be considered by 
administrators and police executives in order to maximize the innovation of merger and 
the process of merger and to gain support for it. These include communication channels, 
identitication and selection of OCCs having the potential to L:ause dissatisfaction, 
identifying equipment and funding sources, trial ability, observability, and minimal 
complexity. 
Communication channels should be developed so that information can be 
disseminated to all personnel involved in the merger process. These channels include 
committee meetings, informational meetings, departmental publications, training, and 
published minutes for merger meetings. As shownrrom this study, very few officers had 
experience with merger and consequently, had little information about merger or the 
process. Additionally, not many officers talked to others about the merger process. 
Communication channels should be selected carefully so that accurate information can be 
distributed to personnel in a timely fashion and distributed to personnel prior to 
consolidation occurring and at regular intervals during the various stages of the merger. 
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This will help to dispel misinformation conveyed between merger participants prior to the 
consolidation and will ultimately gamer support. 
Identification and selection of OCCs that present issues related to officer 
satisfaction should be discussed prior to change. As shown from this study, culture, 
polices, administrative reporting practices, restmcturing the patrol boundaries, and 
decentralization left officers unsatisfied with the results of merging them. Thorough 
di scussions of all of these issues must take place between administrators and officers so 
that there is a mutual understanding and the innovation of merger is perceived as better 
that the one currently in existence. Again, these positives/benefits should be reinforced at 
every opportunity to personnel. 
Attempts to identify equipment, in addition to funding sources, needed for 
merging departments should be conducted wdl in advance of the actual consolidation. In 
the case of the LMPD merger, the city was unable to purchase needed communications 
equipment. This equipment was integral to linking personnel in the urban and suburban 
patrol divisions. Had funding sources been identified prior to merger, ihis equipment 
could have been purchased and helped with communication issues. 
If the consolidation of the entities can be aecomplishcd on a trial or incremental 
basis, the innovation of merger could be more acceptable to personnel. During the 
LMPD consolidation, merging the oces was chaotic. Because ofthe holistic approach 
to merger, many oces were complex to merge. By conducting a consolidation on an 
incremental basis, the process would be less chaotic and consequently, less complex. 
Additionally, an incremental approach would allow for more time for officers to 
understand the process and the complexities involved. 
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During a consolidation, successes or results of merger must be seen. 
Administrators would be well advised to initiate the merger with several small, but 
observable, successes. Officials should attempt to expeditiously merge some of the 
accs perceived as easier to consolidate such as weapons, car numbers, and lO-codes. 
This would show urgency toward the process, in addition to probJress. Executives should 
communicate these successes when talking to personnel. 
Finally, complexity of the process should be minimized. New ideas that don't 
require development of new skills or knowledge are more readily accepted. In other 
words, if these ideas are accepted, officers may be more satisfied with the results 
resulting in more support for the consolidation. If personnel need to develop new skills 
or knowledge, open and frequent communications about the process will assist them and 
help in their support of the innovation of merger. 
Limitations of Study 
Due to the nature ofthis study, certain limitations exist. First, although etforts 
were made to represent UvIPD's sworn officers, the findings cannot necessarily be stated 
as representing a broader population of police officers. Nor can it be assumed that all 
LPD or JCPD police officers would have the exact same responses. 
Regarding demographic characteristics of respondents, due to structural 
pyramiding, very few Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels participated in this 
study. To the contrary, patrol officers/detectives may have been overrepresented. 
Other limitations include the officers' race and sex. Few minorities and women 
were represented in this research with the majority of respondents being Caucasian 
males. 
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Additionally, the type of unit to which officers were assigned (i.e., patrol, 
administrative, investigations. etc.) was not collected or assessed in this study. 
Depending upon the unit to which an officer might be assigned, they type of unit might 
influence their perception of consolidation. This is because some units were 
consolidated, while some were decentralized or disbanded. Again, these issues did not 
emerge in this study. 
Respondents' memories were another limitation of this study. The study focused 
on the efforts of police officers to remember back to 2003, over 9 years ago. Also, 
merging some of the oces, such as communications, was an evolving process that 
transcended several years. The merging of these specific GCCs required officers to recall 
information over many previous years from 2003 1[0 present. Thc ability of officers to 
recall information, specific to the consolidation, may be prejudiced or tainted due to the 
incorporation of other information or stimuli by more recent events through the years 
since 2003. Measures were taken to minimize these problems when constructing the 
survey so that intormation could be recalled by focusing on the key events of merger. 
However, it is unrealistic to believe that the perceptions reported by respondents have not 
been altered, over time, in some form or fashion. For example, satisfaction could grow 
over time as chaos subsides and doubt regarding merger diminishes. 
The population, while a strength, was also a limitation. Many of the people who 
were not surveyed for this research were those initially involved with the merger, but 
retired before the study. Due to their age, rank and early experiences with the 
consolidation, they might have had different views regarding the complexity of merging 
the OCCs. The perceptions of those interviewed for this research, due to their rank and 
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status in the organization when merger occurred in 2003, had less initial experience with 
merger and therefore, may have had different perspectives of the complexity of 
consolidating the OCCs. This study did not seek to measure perception of complexity 
among those who were hired into LMPD after merger. 
Also, the Organizational change components selected based on the Louisville 
experience. Efforts were taken to select five basic components (i.e., culture(s), policy 
and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and redefining patrol 
boundaries) that would be key or crucial to any consolidation. However, these OCCs 
may change depending upon the department being studied. As a result, it may be 
difficult to duplicate this study in other jmisdictions. 
Finally, consideration should he given to the confounding effect of Chief White, 
the newly appointed Chief of Police of LMPO. Some of the results of the merger may be 
attributable to him rather than the actual consolidation itself. For example, OCCs such as 
decentralization may have been a management preference of Chief White's rather than a 
result of the actual merger. However, it is hard to separate the two due to Chief White's 
integral role in the consolidation of LOP and JCPD. 
Future Studies 
All studies have limitations. Therefore, for future studies attempting to duplicate 
this research, suggestions are provided. These suggestions are based upon limitations of 
this study, in addition to the findings regarding the pen:eption of complexity, the OCCs. 
and satisfaction. 
First, future studies regarding the merger of LDP and JCPO should include 
officers who were hired after the merger in 2003 in order to get their perspectives. While 
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some of these individuals may not have been involved with merger during the infancy 
stages, they may have been involved for some stages of the merger regarding some of the 
OCCs that were constantly evolving. Additionally, these persons can be compared to 
former LDP and JCPD officers in regards to their perceptions of complexity and 
satisfaction with merging the OCCs. 
Second, as previously mentioned, many of the people who were not surveyed for 
this research were officers who had more experience at the specific time the departments 
merged, but who retired prior to the inception of this study. These officers could possibly 
have had different perspectives regarding their perceptions of the complexity of merging 
the OCCs. This is in part because of their experience level or rank at the time of the 
police consolidation in 2003. 
Third, the satisfaction and complcxity OCCs could be placed in homogeneous 
groups for analysis. For example, both satisfaction and complexity could bc stratified 
further by creating organizational, personal, work, and communications variables for both 
satisfaction and complexity. By dassifying satisfaction and complexity in this manner, 
researchers could determine specifically what types of satisfaction andlor complexity 
effect support for merger. 
Preliminary analysis shows that creating the aforementioned variables for 
satisfaction (i.e., orgsat persut, worksat, and commsat) might be fruitful. For this 
preliminary analysis, orgsat was created using sculture -+- smission + svalues + sdecent + 
spp + sreport. Persat utilized sweapon + scontract + spay + sbenefit. Worksat used the 
variables shoundary + sequal + ssize and commsat incorporated the vmiables scomm + 
slO + scar. 
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Fourth, when quantitatively analyzing the results of future research, additional 
tests could be utilized such as structural equation modeling for more comprehensive 
analyses. This type of analysis could provide the ability to construct variables which are 
not measured directly, but are estimated in the model from several measured variables 
(i.e., latent or hidden variables). These variables could provide additional information for 
analysis when looking at both satisfaction and complexity in relationship to current 
support for merger. 
Finally, while some researchers have turned to survey research to gain insights 
into the effects of consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000), future research might 
combine both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to explore further the 
perception of complexity. Although it is not outside the capability of quantitative 
methods to address this type of research, Berg (2004) asserts a qualitative method or case 
study provides an additional opportunity to explore "life-worlds" or naturally emerging 
languages and meanings individuals assign to this particular experience (Berg, 2004). 
Conclusion 
During a merger, change is inevitable. Instituting change during an innovation 
such as a police department consolidation is an inte:gration of systems, geographical 
locations, physical facilities and also people. In fact, people may be the most difficult to 
merge. 
During a police consolidation, the innovation of merger is dynamic and chaotic. 
Managing individuals' perceptions and attending to their satisfactions, needs and wants 
during such an innovation may be the hardest issue to address. 
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This study tested two hypotheses: 
I. Police offi.cers· perceived complexity of organizational change components is 
related to attitudes toward police consolidation. 
2. The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change 
components, the less support for police consolidation. 
Overall, the tindings in this study, based on several models that were developed, 
indicated that police officers' perceptions of complexity in merging organizational 
change components are related to attitudes toward police consolidation. Additionally, 
one of the models n:veals that the greater oflicers' perceived complexity of merging the 
oces, the less support officcrs have for police consolidation. 
Even though both hypotheses were supported, in some of the models, the effects 
of complexity on support for merger were superseded by prior suppot1 and satistaction. 
The more prior support an officer has for consolidation, the more current suppOl1 they 
will have. However, even though prior support was the strongest predictor of current 
support tor consolidation, throughout this study, satisfaction with the organizational 
change components has been a constant. Satisfaction is a detcrmining factor in support 
for merger. Additionally, complexity is a significant predictor of satisfaction. As such, if 
officers perceive the merger as complex, they will be less satisfied with the consolidation 
of the organizational change components. As long as they are satistied with the results of 
merging the oees, they will likely support the consolidation 
It should be noted that regardless of how hard administrators try, not everyone 
will be pleased with the decisions made during the consolidation of an organization, 
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specifically a police department merger. Leaders will quickly learn that their efforts 
attempting to please everyone will inevitably fail. 
Leadership consists of collectively motivating and influencing individuals to 
accomplish a common goal. This goal may be merger or go beyond the initial stages of 
an innovation such as merger. From this perspective, leaders of consolidation should 
attempt to develop a comprehensive plan focusing on immediate changes and the 
perceptions of those changes, in addition to the organization's future. 
Additionally, law enforcement executives involved in an innovation such as 
merger should also concentrate more on diffl.lsion of the innovation and inclusiveness as 
part of the innovation. This will help to dispel pre-merger miscom:eptions, alleviate the 
chaotic nature of the merger, and help to mold positive perceptions and ultimately 
satisfaction. Ultimately, this will lead to support of the innovation of merger. 
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"jcreedO l@cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com" 
From: 
<member@surveymonkey.com> 
Subject: Attirudes about Police Merger-John Reed Study on Survey Monkey 
Body: Dear LMPD Police Officer: 
My name is John Reed, a retired officer fi'om LMPD. I am currently pursuing 
my doctoral degree and I am Ph.D. candidate in the Urban and Public Affairs 
program at the University of Louisville. My dissertation topic involves 
perceptions and attitudes about the Louisville/Jefferson County Police 
consolidation that occurred in 2003. More specifically, I am studying how a 
police officer's perception of the difficulty in merging these departments affects 
their support for the consolidation. Cynthia Negrey, Ph.D. of the Department of 
Sociology serves as chair of my committee and is overseeing my work. 
I am surveying police ot11ct:rs who are currently working for the Louisville 
Metro Police Department and were working for either the Louisville Division of 
Police or the Jefferson County Police De:partment prior to the merger in 2003. 
As such, you have been selected to receive an online survey to complete. 
Please consider this note a request for you to participate by answering questions 
that will be sent to you via email this Thursday on August 23,2012. The survey 
should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
As you know, there is very little "scientific" research surrounding the 
Louisville/Jefferson County Police consolidation in 2003. While some attention 
has been focused on other police department consolidations, this survey is 
interested in your attitudes and perceptions as a police officer who has 
experienced merger here in Louisville. The survey is confidential. Individuals 
taking the survey will not be identified; identities and IP addresses will not be 
collected in the survey design. After data is collected and analyzed, results will 
be reported in aggregate form and made available upon request. 
You can expect to receive a link to the online survey, hosted by Survey Monkey, 
as an email on August 23, 2012. If you are willing to participate but prefer a 
different email address, please respond to this communication before 
Wednesday, August 22, 2012 at noon and provide the more preferable email 
address. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact me or my 
advisor, Dr. Cynthia Negrey. She can be reached via email at 
clnegrO l@louisville.edu or by phone at 502-852-6836. 
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Again. I will send you the link to the survey this Thursday. Thank you in 
advance for your time and consideration .. 
Sincerely, 
John C. Reed, Jr. 
Ph.D Candidate, Urban and Public Affairs 
University of Louisville 
jcreedO 1 @louisville.edu 
(502) 387-6802 
This electronic mail message and any tiles transmitted with it are the property of 
John Reed and are intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is 
addressed. The message, together with any attachments, may contain 
confidential and/or privileged inf<mnation. Any unauthorized review, use, print, 
save, copy, disclosure or distribution is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this message in error, please immediately advise the sender by reply email and 
delete all copies. 
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RECRUITMENT INVITATION E-MAIL TO POPULATION 
To: [Email] 
_ "jcreedO I @cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com" 
From: 
<member@surveymonkey.com> 
" Survey Link to John Reed Study on Survey Monkey - Attitudes about Police 
Subject: C I'd' on so 1 atlOn 
Body: Dear LMPD Officer: 
On Tuesday, I forwarded an email to you regarding a study about the 
Louisville/Jefferson County Police merger. You are being invited to participate 
in a research study about police officers' attitudes and perceptions related to the 
Louisville-Jefferson County police consolidation. 
Attached is a survey consisting of 32 questions. If you choose to participate in 
the study, it should take you approximately 10 minutes to complete the survey. 
On the first page of the survey are the instructions. Page two and three contain 
the informed consent. The actual survey questions begin on page four. 
If you are willing to participate in the study, this is the link to the survey: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx. The survey will remain active from 
08/20112 until 12:00pm CST 09/20112. 
The survey is confidential. There are no known risks for your participation in 
this research study. The information collected may not benefit you directly. 
However, the information you provide on the attached survey may be helpful to 
decision makers in understanding the impact police officers' perceptions and 
attitudes had on the consolidation. Also, this information could be beneficial to 
other police agencies considering a police consolidation. Your participation will 
also benefit me in my efforts to complete my doctoral degree at the University 
of Louisville in Urban and Public Affairs. 
Individuals from the Department of Urban and Public Affairs, the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), 
and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, 
however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law. 
Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed. 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. To take part in this study, please click this 
link: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx.Whenyoucompletethesurvey.it 
will automatically be returned to John C. Reed, Jr. (retired Louisville Metro 
Police Department). If you agree to complete the survey, you agree to take part 
in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions on the 
questionnaire that make you uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at 
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all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If 
you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part after beginning the 
survey, there will be no negative consequences for your decision. 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, 
please contact me or the principal researcher, Dr. Cynthia L. Negrey, who is 
supervising my project. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call 
the Human Subjects Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can 
discuss any questions about your rights as a research subject, in private, with a 
member of the Institutional Review Board (lRB). You may also call this number 
if you have other questions about the research, and you cannot reach the 
research staff, or want to talk to someone else. The IRB is an independent 
committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the 
institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these 
institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study. 
If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you 
do not wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24 hour 
hot line answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville. 
Thanks in advance for your participation with this study. I really appreciate your 
help. 




John C. Reed, Jr., M.S. 
Department of Justice Administration 
Brigman Hall 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, KY 40292 
(502) 852-6567 
J CReedO 1 @louisville.edu 
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Cynthia L. Negrey, Ph.D 
Department of Sociology 
Lutz Hall 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, KY 40292 
(502) 852-8023 
ClnegrO l@louisville.edu 
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click the 
link below, and you will be automatically removed from our mailing list. 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx 
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FOLLOW-UP E-MAIL TO POPULATION 
To: [Email] 
"jcreedO 1 @cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com" 
From: 
<member@surveymonkey.com> 
Sub.iect: Reminder - John Reed's Survey on Attitudes Regarding Police Merger 
Body: Dear LMPD Police Officer: 
As I know all of you are busy, I wanted to send this reminder to request your 
assistance in completing the survey regarding attitudes about the police merger. 
There is only a couple of weeks left to complete the survey and your input is 
very important. 
Please click on the following link to acct~ss the survey 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx . 
As you will recall, I am conducting this research to complete the requirements 
for my doctoral degree at the University of Louisville. My dissertation topic 
involves police officer perceptions and attitudes about the Louisville/Jefferson 
County Police merger. I am surveying police officers who are currently 
working for the Louisville Metro Police Department and were working for either 
the Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department 
prior to 2003. 
The survey is anonymous and confidential and will take approximately] 0 
minutes to complete. Individuals taking the survey will not be identitied; 
identities and IP addresses will not he collected in the survey design. After data 
is collected and analyzed, results will be reported in aggregate form and made 
available upon request. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact me. 
Thank you in advance tor your time and consideration. Again, click this link to 
access the survey http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx . 
Sincerely, 
John Reed, Ret., LMPD 
Researcher: 
John C. Reed, Jr., M.S. 
Department of Justice Administration 
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Bribrman Hall 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, KY 40292 (502) 852-6567 
J CReedO 1 @louisville.edu 
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from me, please click 






Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger 
Thank you for taking time to complete this very important survey. Your feedback is 
important in assessing attitudes toward the merger of the Louisville Division of Police and 
the Jefferson County Police Department. 
This survey should take approximately 10 minutes of your time to complete. Your answers will 
be completely anonymous and confidential. 
In order to progress through this survey, please use the following navigation links. 
- Click the Next» button to continue to the next page. 
- Click the Previous» button to return to the previous page. 
- Click the Submit» button to submit your survey. 
The next two pages contain the informed consent or information regarding your rights as a 
respondent to the survey. Following the informed consent pages, the survey will begin. 
Please check the block next to the answer you select that best signifies 
your response or position. Thank you again for participating in this 
important study. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE CONSOLIDATION 
Investigator(s) name & address: Principal Researcher: 
Cynthia L. Negrey, Ph.D Department of Sociology Lutz Hall 
University of Louisville 




John C. Reed, Jr., M. S. Urban and Public Affairs 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, KY 40292 
(502) 387-6802 
jcreed01@louisville.edu 
Site(s) where study is to be conducted: 
University of Louisville 
Researcher's Home 
Louisville, KY 
Phone number for subjects to call for questions: 
Cynthia L. Negrey (502) 852-6836 
John C. Reed, Jr. (502) 387-6802 
Introduction and Background Information 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted by Cynthia L. 
Negrey, Ph.D., and John C. Reed, Jr., M.S., both of the University of Louisville. 
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Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to understand police officers' perceptions of the Louisville Metro 
Police Department's consolidation process and how these perceptions affect support for 
merger. More specifically, how does a police officer's perception of difficulty in merging 
departments affect their support for merger. 
Participants 
You are being asked to participate in this study because of your experiences with the 
Louisville/Jefferson County Police consolidation. The criterion for participation is police officers 
currently employed by the Louisville Metro Police Department who have also served on either 
the Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department prior to the 
consolidation of the two departments in 2003. 
Procedures 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a survey consisting 
of 32 questions. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete the survey. If you 
agree to participate, you may decline to answer any questions that may make you 
uncomfortable. Results from the survey will be compiled and analyzed in their aggregate 
form. 
Costs/Compensation 
You will not be compensated for your time, inconvenience, or expenses for your 
participation in this study. 
Potential Risks 
There are no foreseeable risks other than possible discomfort in answering personal 
questions. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions; participation is entirely 
voluntary, and may be terminated at any time by striking the "cancel" button on the survey 
so that answers are not recorded. 
Benefits 
The information collected through your interview may not benefit you directly. However, the 
information you provide in your interview may be helpful to the Louisville Metro Police 
Department decision makers in understanding the impact police officers' perceptions and 
attitudes had toward the consolidation and the department. Also, this information could be 
beneficial to other police agencies considering a police consolidation. 
Confidentiality 
Total privacy cannot be guaranteed. Your privacy will be protected to the extent permitted by 
law. If the results from this study are published, your name will not be made public. While 
unlikely, the following may look at the study records: 
• The University of Louisville Institutional Review Board, and Human Subjects Protection 
Program Office . 
• Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), 
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If you agree to complete the survey, the results of the survey will be stored in a secure location 
at the researcher's home. 
Voluntary Participation 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to 
be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or 
if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify. 
How Finding will be Used 
The data collected will be analyzed and reported in generalities as doctoral dissertation public 
research conducted at the University of Louisville. Data will be reported in general terms or in 
aggregate form. Individual responses will not be reported. If for some reason you do not 
understand how the findings will be used, please contact one of the researchers to ask questions 
and have been given answers to them prior to proceeding. 
Research Subject's Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the study or the study staff, you have three 
options. You may contact the principal investigator at (502) 852-6836. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions, concerns or 
complaints, you may call the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO) (502) 
852-5188. You may discuss any questions about your rights as a subject, in secret, with a 
member of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) or the HSPPO staff. The IRB is an independent 
committee composed of members of the University community, staff of the institutions, as well 
as lay members of the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed 
this study. 
If you want to speak to a person outside the University, you may call 1-877-852-1167. You 
will be given the chance to talk about any questions, concerns or complaints in secret. This is 
a 24 hour hot line answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville. 
This paper tells you what will happen during the study if you choose to take part. As this is an 
on-line computer generated survey on Survey Monkey, Inc., your action of taking the survey is 
in and of itself a demonstration of your consent that you have taken this survey voluntarily 
under the conditions as presented. This informed consent document is not a contract. You are 
not giving up any legal rights by continuing and participating in this study. 
If you have any questions regarding this study or survey, before proceeding, please contact the 
primary researcher, John C. Reed, Jr. at 502.387.6802. Thank you in advance for your time. 
LIST OF INVESTIGATORS PHONE NUMBERS 
Cynthia L. Negrey (502) 852-6836 
John C. Reed, Jr. (502) 387-6802 
Click the "Next" button to participate in the surveyor close out of the window to exit. 
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1. Prior to the police department merger and inception of LMPD in 
2003, I was supportive of the consolidation of the Louisville Division 
of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson County Police Department 
(~CPD). 




5) Strongly disagree 
2. Currently, I am supportive of the merger of the Louisville Division of 
Police and the Jefferson County Police Department. 




5) Strongly disagree 
3. Prior to the police department merger and inception of LMPD in 2003, 
did you have any experience with a police consolidation? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
4. Did you serve on any of the merger committees at the inception of 
LMPD in 2003? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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5. If you did serve on any of the merger committees, please indicate on 
which committee or committees you served (check all that apply). 
1) Badge/PatchlVehicle Markings 
2) CIS/CID Consolidation 
3) Communications 
4) Community Outreach 
5) Facilities 
6) Fleet Management 
7) Impoundment 
8) In-car Cameras 
9) Information Technology 
10) Intelligence/SIU 
11) Mission StatementlValues 
12) Policy 
13) Property Room Consolidation 
14) Records 
15) Recruiting/Hiring 




20) VVorkload Analysis 
6. If you did not serve on one of the merger committees, did you talk 
about merger to someone who did serve on a committee? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
7. How satisfied are you with the culture that was created at the time of 
merger? 
1) Very Satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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8. How satisfied were you with the mission statement that was created 
and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very Satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
9. How satisfied were you with the new values statement that was created 
and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very Satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
10. How satisfied were you with the LMPD decentralization policy 
(reassigning personnel from specialty units) that was implemented as a 
result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
11. How satisfied were you with the new policy and procedure manual 
that was initially created and implemented as a result of merging the 
LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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12. How satisfied were you with the new administrative reporting 
practices that were initially created and implemented as a result of 
merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
13. How satisfied were you with the choice of weapon(s) that were 
initially selected for carry as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
14. How satisfied were you with the ratified collective bargaining 
contracts that resulted from the process of merging the LDP and 
JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
15. How satisfied were you with the pay rates of the ratified contracts 
(mentioned in question # 14) that resulted from the process of merging 
the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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16. How satisfied were you with the employee benefits of the ratified 
contracts (mentioned in question # 14) that resulted from the process of 
merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1 ) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
17. How satisfied were you with the new patrol division boundaries that 
were initially created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP 
and JCPD? 
1 ) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
18. How satisfied were you with the equalization of workload in the patrol 
divisions that was initially calculated and implemented as a result of 
merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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19. How satisfied were you with the geographical size of the patrol 
divisions that were created and implemented as a result of merging 
the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
20. How satisfied were you with the communications section that was 
created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
21. How satisfied were you with the policy of using the 10-codes that was 
implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very Unsatisfied 
7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
22. How satisfied were you with the car numbers that were created and 
implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD? 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Satisfied 
3) Somewhat satisfied 
4) Somewhat unsatisfied 
5) Unsatisfied 
6) Very unsatisfied 
7) Don't recalliprefer not to answer 
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23. In your opinion, how difficult was it to merge the following 
organizational change components of LDP and JCPD? 
Very easy Easy Somewhat easy Somewhat difficult Difficult Very difficult No opinion 
Cultures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mission Statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Values Statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decentralization of 
Personnel from 
Specialty Units 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Policy and Procedure 
Manuals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administrative 
Reporting Practices 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Type of weapon 
Patrol Officers 
would carry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Collective Bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Contracts 0 0 0 0 
Reconcile Pay Scales 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reconcile Employee 
Benefits (As defined 
by contract) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Patrol Division Boundaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equalize workload in 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 merged patrol divisions 
Geographical size of the 
patrol divisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Communication Sections 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10-Codes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Car Numbers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24. For which police department did you work prior to the merger in 
2003? 
1) Louisville Division of Police (LDP) 
2) Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD) 
25. How many total years of experience do you have in law 
enforcement? 
1) 0 years up to and including 5 years 
2) More than 5 years up to and including 10 years 
3) More than 10 years up to and including 15 years 
4) More than 15 years up to and including 20 years 
5) More than 20 years 
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26. How many years had you worked for either LOP or JCPO prior to the 
merger in 2003? 
1) 0 years up to and including 5 years 
2) More than 5 years up to and including 10 years 
3) More than 10 years up to and including 15 years 
4) More than 15 years up to and including 20 years 
5) More than 20 years 
27. What is your current rank? 
1) Patrol Officer 
2) Detective 
3) Sergeant 
4) Middle Management (Lieutenant or Captain) 
5) Staff Officer (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel) 
28. What was your rank when LOP and JCPO merged in 2003? 
1) Patrol Officer 
2) Detective 
3) First Line Supervision (Sergeant) 
4) Middle Management (Lieutenant or Captain) 
5) Staff Officer (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel) 
29. What is your current age? 
30. What is your gender? 
1) Male 
2) Female 
31. What is your race? 
1) American Indian or Alaska Native 
2) Asian or Asian American 
3) Black or African-American 
4) Hispanic or Latino 
5) White (Non-Hispanic) 
6) Other (Please specify) 
265 
Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger 
32. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If 
currently enrolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree 
received. 
1) High school graduate - high school diploma or the equivalent (GED) 
2) Some college credit, but less than 1 year 
3) 1 or more years of college, no degree 
4) Associate degree (AA, AS) 
5) Bachelor's degree (BA, AB, BS) 
6) Master's degree (e,g, MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 
7) Professional degree (e,g, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 
8) Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD) 
Survey Completed 
Thank you for helping researchers better understand this important police issue, 
Your time and attention is of great value, and your participation in this survey is sincerely 
appreciated, 
If you would like to receive survey results when they are compiled and the final report is 
available, please contact John Reed at jc.reed@ymail.com. 





Table 12 - LDP OCC Satisfaction Reseonses 
Variables VS S SS Sli U VU DR 
Sculture 1.2% 14.2% 18.8% 17.1% 27.1% 20.8% 0.8% 
(3) (34) (45) (41 ) (65) (50) (2) 
Smission 5.0% 36.0% 29.8% 9.1% 9.5% 5.8% 5.0% 
( 12) (87) (72) (22) (23) (14) (12) 
Svalues 5.4% 36.8% 25.2% 10.3% 8.3% 8.3% 5.8% 
( 13) (89) (61 ) (25) (20) (20) ( 14) 
Sdecent 0.8% 7.9% 7.9% 15.4% 27.9% 37.9% 2.1% 
(2) ( 19) ( 19) (37) (67) (91 ) (5) 
Spp 1.7% 16.9 20.7% 17.4% 17.8% 24.4% 1.2% 
(4) (41 ) (50) (42) (43) (59) (3) 
Srept 2.1% 12.5% 22.9% 20.4% 16.2% 21.2% 4.6% 
(5) (30) (55) (49) (39) (51) (I I) 
Sweapoll 44.1% 44.1% 5.9%, 2.9% 0.8% 1.7% 0.4% 
(105) (105) (14) (7) (2) (4) (I) 
Scontract 14.2% 38.9% 20.9% 7.5% 12.6% 5.4% 0.4% 
(34) (93) (50) (18 ) (30) ( 13) (1) 
Spay 20.7% 35.1% 19.4% 5.8% 11.6% 7.0% 0.4% 
(50) (85) (47) (14) (28) ( 17) (I) 
Sbenefit 19.6% 38.3% 22.9% 6.2% 8.8% 3.8% 0.4% 
(47) (92) (55) ( 15) (21 ) (9) (I) 
Sboundary 1.2% 21.1% 15.7% 12.S% 19.0% 29.8% 0.4% 
(3) (51 ) (38) (31) (46) (72) (I) 
Sequal 0.4% 18.1 ~/;, 15.6% 18.1%, 20.6% 24.7% 2.5% 
(I) (44) (38) (44) (50) (60) (6) 
Ssize 0.4% 16.9% 14.4% 18.9% 24.3% 24.3% 0.8% 
(I ) (41 ) (35) (46) (59) (59) (2) 
Scomm 2.5% 16.9% 19.8% 13.6% J9.0% 27.7% 0.4% 
(6) (41 ) (48) (33) (46) (67) (I) 
S10 5.0% 24.2% 17.9(~o 14.6% 17.5% 19.2% 1.7% 
(12) (58) (43) (35) (42) (46) (4) 
Scar 7.0% 50.4% 17.8% 5.4% 8.7% 8.7% 2.1% 
(17) ( 122) (43) ( 13) (2\) (21 ) (5) 
*VS-Very Satisfied, S-Satisfied, SS-Somewhat Satisfied, SV-Somewhat unsatisfied, 
LJ=Unsatisfied. VlI=Very unsatisfied, DR=Don't recall/prefer not to answer 
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Table 13 - JCPD OCC Satisfaction Res~onses 
Variables VS S SS SU U VlJ DR 
Sculture 0.0% 6.8% 13.5% 11.3% 22.6% 45.1% 0.8% 
(0) (9) ( 18) (5) (30) (60) (I) 
Smission 5.3% 24.8% 19.5% 9.0% 18.8% 14.3% 8.3% 
(7) (33) (26) ( 12) (25) (19) (11 ) 
Svalues 6.0% 27.1% 21.8% 9.0% 10.5% 17.3% 8.3% 
(8) (36) (29) ( 12) ( 14) (23) (I I) 
Sdecent 0.0% 6.0% 16.5% 14.3% 19.5% 39.1% 4.5% 
(0) (8) (22) (19) (26) (52) (6) 
Spp 0.8% 7.6% 6.9% 16.0% 20.6% 46.6% 1.5'% 
(\) (10) (9) (21) (27) (61 ) (2) 
Srept 0.0% 11.3% 18.8% 9.8% 21.8% 37.6% 0.8~\' 
(0) ( 15) (25) ( 13) (29) (50) (I) 
Swcapon 12.1% 41.7% 13.6% 9.1% 8.3% 11.4% 3.8% 
( 16) (55) ( 18) ( 12) (11 ) (15) (5) 
Scontract 0.0% 4.5% 13.6% 9.8% U~.9% S2.3% 0.8% 
(0) (6) ( 18) ( 13) (25) (69) (I) 
Spay 0.0% 3.0'Yo 11.3% 9.0%. 21.8% 53.4% I.S% 
(0) (4) (IS) ( 12) (29) (71 ) (2) 
Sbeneflt 0.8% 7.6% 16.0% 12.2% 12.2% SO.4% 0.8% 
(1 ) ( 10) (21) (16) ( 16) (66) (I) 
Sboundary I.S% 22.9% 32.8% 13.0% 12.2% 16.8% 0.8% 
(2) (30) (43) (17) (16) (22) (I) 
Sequal 0.8% 22.8% 32.3% 5.3% 14.3% 18.8% 6.8% 
(I) (29) (43) (7) (19) (2S) (9) 
Ssizc 0.8% 26.9% 29.2% 8.5% IS.4% 17.7% l.5~o 
(1) (3S) (38) (II) (20) (23) (2) 
Scomm 1.5% 17.4% 15.9% 9.8% 21.2% 32.6% 1.5% 
(2) (23) (21 ) (13) (28) (42) (2) 
S10 IS.O% 2S.3% IS.O% 9.8% 4.S'% 18.8% I.S% 
(20) (47) (20) (13) (6) (2S) (2) 
Scar 7.6% 48.9% 16.8% 9.9% 5.3% 9.9% I.St~/;' 
(10) (64) (22) (13) (7) ( 13) (2) 
*VS=Very Satisfied, S-Satisfied, SS-Somewhat Satisfied, SU=Somewhat unsatisfied, 
U=Unsalisficd, VU=Very unsatisfied. DR=J)on't recall/pre/'.!r not to answer 
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Table 15 - LDP OCC Comelexitl' Reseonses 
Variables VE E SE SD D VD NO 
Cculture 1.7% 6.6% 9.1% 18.7% 23.7% 39.9% 0.8% 
(4) (16) (22) (45) (57) (95) (2) 
Cmission 4.6% 28.5% 37.2% 13.X% 5.0% 3.8% 7.1% 
(11 ) (68) (89) (33) ( 12) (9) (17) 
Cvalues 5.4% 28.1% 35.1% 14.5% 5.0% 4.5% 7.4% 
(13 ) (6il) (il5) (35) (12) (II) ( 18) 
Cdecent 1.2% 5.8% 10.0% 27.4% 29.lJ% 23.2% 2.5% 
(3) ( 14) (24) (66) (72) (56) (6) 
Cpp 0.8% 12.9% 22.4% 24.9% 19.9% 15.8% 3.3% 
(2) (31 ) (54) (60) (48) (38) (8) 
Crept 0.8~o 12.6'};, 23.1% 26.9% 17.6% 11.8% 7.1% 
(2) (30) (55) (64) (42) (2X) ( 17) 
Cweapon 21.2% 40.0% 23.8% 6.2% 3.8% 2.9% 2.1% 
(51 ) (96) (57) (15) (9) (7) (5) 
Ccontract 2.1% 19.5% 27.4% 19.5% 17.4% IO.X% 3.3% 
(5) (47) (66) (47) (42) (26) (X) 
Cpay 3.3% 24.3% 23.0% 21.8% 14.2% 9.6% 3.8% 
(8) (58) (55) (52) (34) (23) (9) 
Cbenefit 3.3% 23.1% 25.6% 23.6% 11.6% 9.5% 3.3% 
(X) (56) (62) (57) (28) (23) (8) 
Cboundary 1.7% 13.8% 15.0% 2<.J.6% 20.0% 18.8% 1.2% 
(4) (33) (36) (71 ) (48) (45) (3) 
Cequal 2.1% 10.4% 11.2% 29J)% 26. I '}" 18.3% 2.9% 
(5 ) (25) (27) (70) (63) (44) (7) 
Csize 1.7% 12.9% 14.6% 24.6% 22.9~~ 21.2% 2.1% 
(4) (31) (35) (59) (55) (51 ) (5) 
Ccomm 1.2% 11.2% 16.7% 22.1% 23.3% 23.3% 2.1% 
(3) (27) (40) (53) (56) (56) (5) 
CIO 8.X% 23.4% 28.0% 15.5% 10.9% 10.9% 2.5% 
(21 ) (56) (6) (37) (26) (26) (6) 
Ccar 12.4% 36.5% 24.9% 12.')% 5.X% 5.4% 2.1% 
(30) (88) (60) (31 ) ( 14) ( 13) (5) 
*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somewhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult, 
D=Difficult, VD=Very dift1cult, NO=No Opinion 
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Table 16 - JCPD OCC Com~lexitl: Res~onses 
Variables VE E SE SD D VD NO 
Cculture 0.8% 3.8% 6.8% 15.8% 26.3% 44.4% 2.3% 
(I) (5) (9) (21 ) (35) (59) (3) 
Cmission 6.1% 25.8% 29.5% 15.9% 8.3% 6.1% 8.3% 
(8) (34) (39) (21 ) (II) (8) (11 ) 
Cvalues 6.8% 24.8% 30.1% 12.0% 10.5% 7.5% 8.3% 
(9) (33) (40) ( 16) ( 14) (10) (I I) 
Cdecent 0.0% 4.5% 12.0% 25.6% 30.1% 25.6% 2.3% 
(0) (6) (16) (34) (40) (34) (3) 
Cpp 0.8% 6.0% 11.3% 23.3% 30.1% 26.3% 2.3~o 
(1) (8) ( 15) (31) (40) (35) (3) 
Crept 1.5'),;' 7.6% 18.2% 27.3% 22.0% 18.9% 4.5% 
(2) (10) (24) (36) (29) (25) (6) 
Cweapon 9.8% 29.5% 25.0% 12.9% 9.8% 7.6% 5.3% 
(13 ) (39) (33) ( 17) (13) (10) (7) 
Ccontract 2.3% 3.0% 12.8% 2').3% 18.0% 32.3% 2.3% 
(3) (4) (17) (39) (24) (43) (3) 
Cpay 2.3% 5.3% 14.3% 22.6% 17.3% 35.3% 3.0% 
(3) (7) ( 19) (30) (23) (47) (4) 
Cbenefit 1.5% 6.8% 16.7% 21.2% 17.4% 33.3% 3.0% 
(2) (9) (22) (28) (23) (44) (4) 
Cboundary 2.3% 12.8% 23.3% 2X.M'o 15.0% 15.0% 3.0% 
(3) ( 17) (31 ) (38) (20) (20) (4) 
Ccqual 2.3% 12.2% 24.4% 22.1% 16.8% 18.3% 3.8% 
(3) (16) (32) (29) (22) (24) (5) 
Csize 3.8% 10.5% 24.8% 23.3°,'(, 15.0% 18.8'% 3.8% 
(5) ( 14) (33) (31 ) (20) (25) (5) 
Ccomm 2.3% 6.8% 11.4% 25.0% 16.7% 34.1% 3.8% 
(3) (9) (15) (33) (22) (45) (5) 
CIO 12.0% 24.1% 24.1% 17.3';;, 6.0% 12.8% 3.8% 
( 16) (32) (32) (23) (8) (17) (5) 
Ccar 15.3% 35.9% 20.6°1., 11.5% 4.6%, 6.9~o 5.3% 
(20) (47) (27) (15) (6) (9) (7) 
*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somewhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult, 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18 - Correlation Matrix 
2 3 4 5 
.581*'* .103 .050 .039 




6 7 8 9 10 
-.082 .208 .608 -.105 .347**' 
146 -.272 .137 -.130' .536**' 
.230 -.766 .c .028 -.048 
.c .c .c -.044 -.005 
.085 .664 .753 .C .058 
.898* .607 .c -.181 





































































Table 18 - Correlation Matrix 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
.119' .296'" .280'" .238**' .443**' .475'" .490**' .021 
.297'" A48**' .472' " .303'" .534**' .497'" .501'" .200**' 
.034 .008 -.030 -.064 -.022 .022 -.027 -.029 
.049 .024 .053 -.004 -.017 -.018 -.031 .015 
-.010 -.013 -.140 ·.026 -.228 -.123 -.069 .268 
-.074 .382 .031 -.213 -.411 -.471 -A38 .163 
-.813 -.189 -.279 .614 -.338 -.338 -.338 -.244 
.081 .594 .127 .700 .528 .528 .528 -.728 
-.151" ··.117' ··.129' ·.189**' -.161** -.188'** -.149** -.098 
A63'" .576'*' .572*" .234'" A26**' .337'" .363*** .351'" 
.307*" A90'" 540'" .232'" .355'" .326'" .334'" .251'" 
.304'" .466**' 507'" .205'" .321'" .300'" .289'" .230'" 
.391'" .392**' .098 .233*** .191**' .181'" .299'** 
.665'** .178" A33**' .385**' .370**' .257'" 
.153" .392'" .334'" .359'" .342**' 
A15'" .394**' .360'" .055 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.690'" .070 .380'" .628" * 




















































































































































Table 18 - Correlation Matrix 
51 52 53 54 
1. Psupport .181 .382'" 
.341 '" .895'" 
2. Csupport -0422 .605"* .277'" .883"* 
3. Exper"lence .c -.064 -.006 .047 
4. Serve .c .025 .022 .023 
5. Committee .858 -.028 .070 .003 
6. Committee1 .766 -.145 -.164 -.024 
7. Committee2 .557 .091 .115 -.038 
8. Committee3 .804 -.004 .632 0463 
9. Talk .c -.244'" -.218'" -.136' 
10.sculture -.862 -.714'" 0401'" .508'** 
11. smission .123 .683*" .415**' .407*" 
12.svalues 0476 .666'" .359*" .384"-
13. Sdecent .083 .517'" .316'" .232*** 
14.spp 0.000 .680"* .378*'* 0421'" 
lS.sreport -0476 .743*** 0438'" 0417* ** 
16.Sweapon .359 0451*'- .317'** .307**' 
17. scontract .051 .632'*' .360*" .563'" 
18. Spay . 051 .594 " • .311'" .560'" 
19.sbenefit .051 .617'" .324'8* .587*" 
20. Sboundary -.912 .525'*' .372'" .112 
21. Sequal -.791 
.601 '" 0470'" .147' 
22.ssize -.359 .573" , .426*" .171" 
23. Scomm -.359 .561'" .337'" .231'" 
24.SlO -.359 .335'" .248'" -.034 
25. Scar -.862 0497*'* .332'" .234" • 
26. (cullture .c .297'" .404'" .207'" 
27. (mission -.801 .545'" .654'" .267'" 
28. (values -.801 .541'" .645'" .250*" 
29. (decent .912 .375*" .608*** .161" 
30.Cpp -0476 .534'** .636'" .328'" 
31. (rept -.863 .539*" .678'" .274'" 
32. Cweapon -.043 .322'" .577'" .234'" 
33. (contract .051 .378*" .687*" .354'" 
34. (pay .051 .352'*' .679'" .359"* 
35. Cbenefit .051 .385*8* .699'" .381*" 
36. Cboundary .504 .365'*' .701'** .082 
37. Cequal .497 .379'" .722'" .059 
38. (size .287 .334*8* .707*** 085 
39. (comm .931 .324*8' .620'" .152** 
40.C10 .694 .295**' .528*** .071 
41. (car .359 .312*** .571 *** .153*' 
42. PD .359 .304**' .170** .633*" 
43. Yearsexp -.476 .035 -.057 -.043 
44. Deptyrs -.476 -.047 -.107 -.063 
45. Rank .359 -.205'" -.044 -.280'" 
46. Rankmerge -.912 -.190"* ·.095 ··.152" 
47. Age -.726 -.151' -.222'" -.207'" 
48. Gender .c -.082 .098 -.007 
49. Education -.043 -.017 .083 -.026 
50. Wvnon -.862 .095 .016 .005 
51. Serviceoncommittee -.569 .065 -.150 
~2. Satisfaction .641 *** .563'" 
53. (omplexity .361*** 
54. Overallsupport 
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Table 20 - Model Summary Statistics for 
Current Su~~ort* 
Model IV R 1 F P r 
1 251 .277 .073 20.678 .000 
2 208 .608 .369 59.990 .000 
3 226 .634 .402 75.053 .000 
4 189 .797 .636 107.675 .000 
5 189 .797 .636 80.368 .000 




Table 22 - Model Summary Statistics for 
Overall Su~~ort* 
Model N R ,; F P 
1 228 .361 .130 33.518 .000 
2 189 .561 .315 42.773 .000 
3 189 .726 .527 68.715 .000 
4 188 .580 .325 31.039 .000 




Table 24 - Model Summary Statistics for 
Satisfaction* 
Model N R 
, 
F P r-
1 207 .635 .403 138.620 .000 
2 206 .673 .453 16.555 .000 




Table 26 - Model Summary Statistics for 
Satisfaction* 
w/Demograehic lndeeendent Variables 
Model N R ? r-
1 271 .188 .036 










Table 28 - Model Summary Statistics for 
Prior Support* 
Model N R , . .2 
1 337 .609 .371 
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